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Abstract
Opportunistic Networks (OppNets) are exposed to a variety of security attacks, in-
cluding packet dropping and modification/integrity attacks. Due to the natural char-
acteristics of OppNets such as frequent partitions, long delays and intermittent con-
nectivity, malicious nodes can perform selective packet dropping and/or selective or
complete packet modification attacks easily without been identified. Routing and se-
curity management in OppNets is challenging, where effective and secure forwarding
of data delivery without any loss or damage is not easy to guarantee. Both attacks
result in a denial of service (DoS) attack, which degrades network performance and
can potentially disrupt the whole network. Securing OppNets from both attacks is vi-
tal because preserving the completeness and integrity of data as it flows in a network
is as important as making sure that the data arrives to its destination.
In this thesis, an effective system with techniques and algorithms that preserve
the completeness and integrity of packets in a network and protects OppNets from
packet dropping and modification attacks has been proposed. The techniques and
attributes used to create the system involve using Merkle trees, trust, and reputa-
tion. The system starts by having nodes authenticating the packets they receive using
Merkle trees. The Merkle tree is used to check and authenticate the completeness
and originality of all the packets, direct trust is formed as a result of this. As nodes
come in contact with each other during the packet transmission period, they provide
feedback on how much they trust other nodes. This feedback, in addition to the direct
experience with a node and few other factors are used to derive a reputation value.
The reputation value allows nodes to make the correct packet transmission decision
when meeting with nodes.
The system is designed to detect selective packet dropping and selective or com-
plete modification attacks, the node that performed the attack, and the path at which
the malicious node has performed the attack. The system evolves from detection
done by destination nodes in each path using trust, to detection done by each in-
termediate node in the network using reputation. The system aims to improve the
xi
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performance of the network by eliminating malicious acts and interactions with ma-
licious nodes.
In addition to undertaking detailed mathematical analysis, network simulations
were carried out using the OppNet simulator and validated using synthetic datasets
and the Epidemic and PRoPHET routing protocols to show the impact of the devel-
oped trust/reputation based system on OppNet protocols, and how it improves the
network performance.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In an opportunistic network (OppNet), when a source node needs to send a mes-
sage to a destination node, it forwards the message to the destination node through
nodes it comes in contact with opportunistically. Having evolved from Delay Toler-
ant Networks (DTNs), the connection between nodes is intermittent and the path to
the destination node is not known a priori. A node is chosen to deliver the message
to the destination based on its ability and history to deliver the message competently.
However, delays are normal, and message delivery is not guaranteed [1].
The main characteristic that differentiates OppNets from DTNs is that there is
never a fixed path to the destination node to forward the message. Therefore, message
forwarding is always opportunistic, and is based on the availability and ability of the
node to forward the message to the destination. In DTNs however, a search for an
existing path to the destination is made first. If the search gives no results, then an
opportunistic approach is used to forward the message to the destination.
Sometimes, the use of OppNets becomes mandatory when traditional network-
ing is exposed to failures resulting from natural catastrophes or unexpected emergen-
cies. In such unusual conditions, exchanging essential messages can only be done
through an OppNet [2]. Some of the growing uses of OppNets include their use in
Zebranets [3], a sensor network with tracking sensors attached to the animals (ze-
bras). OppNets are also used in the military [4], in inter-planetary networks [5], and
for natural disaster recoveries where opportunistic communication between people
becomes the only option.
The applications of OppNets could also span across newly emerging range of
applications such as pocket switched networks [6] which involve the transmission
of data through mobile phones, vehicular ad-hoc networks [7] recently known as
intelligent transportation systems - a wireless network composed of sensors, vehicles,
and road infrastructures, and Internet of things [8] - networks composed of cyber
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physical objects.
Over the years, researchers have introduced many routing protocols that deal with
the way OppNets are structured. OppNet routing protocols can be classified as ei-
ther replication based, forwarding based, or a combination of both approaches [9].
To increase message delivery rates [10], replication based protocols are more com-
monly adopted in an OppNets than forwarding based protocols. In replication based
protocols, the message is replicated and forwarded by multiple nodes to increase its
chances of reaching the destination, where as in forwarding based protocols, only
one copy of the message is created and forwarded.
Current routing protocols are only designed to manage routing in OppNets, how-
ever, they don’t protect the OppNet from security threats. OppNets are open networks
making them vulnerable to malicious acts and attacks. To utilize existing routing pro-
tocols, security may be added to a routing protocol by developing methods that may
be integrated into an OppNet protocol.
1.1 Motivation
Packet dropping and modification attacks cause a threat to OppNets because they
breach the completeness and integrity of the message communication. To elaborate,
a message is composed of a number of packets and the attack aims for dropping
some or modifying all of these packets as they are transferred from node to node
towards the destination. Arriving at the destination with missing or modified packets
results in an altered message. These types of attacks affect the completeness and
integrity of the message once it reaches the destination and results in the degradation
of network performance and can sometimes completely disrupt communication in
the network [11]. Preserving the completeness and integrity of the message from the
source to the destination nodes is very important in OppNets, yet a challenging task
at the same time.
Packet dropping and modification attacks are not easily detected. In a path with
multiple nodes, if the destination node is in charge of detecting any malicious be-
haviour, it would be hard for it to know which node has performed the attack. Also,
in the case where all the packets are modified, detecting this specific malicious be-
haviour is difficult in the absence of the original message. Malicious nodes also
could perform ‘on/off’ attacks. Where they choose to be legitimate in certain paths
yet malicious in some other paths.
Existing techniques used to deal with packet dropping attacks [12–23] have lim-
itations, some of them focus on redirecting or replicating messages, or detecting the
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malicious path but do not detect malicious nodes. Some methods aim for malicious
behaviour or node detection but with a very high network cost and decreased delivery
rates.
Less work has been done to protect networks from packet modification attacks.
Some of the techniques used to detect packet modification attacks include a key man-
agement system proposed in [24] where the malicious node is detected and elimi-
nated from the network, the key authentication process is not easily adopted in an
OppNet. The method in [25] uses a heuristic ranking algorithm to detect malicious
nodes in WSNs, the technique consumes lots of the networks sensors’ computational
resources which might delay the malicious node detection process as well. A ran-
dom multi-path routing approach is proposed in [26] which focuses on improving
the delivery rates, but does not identify the malicious node. The overhearing tech-
nique in [27] consumes a large amount of energy with delayed detection where the
modified packets are detected, but not the malicious node. The cryptosystem based
model in [28] protects the message using cryptography and cloud servers, however,
the model does not consider the trustworthiness of the cloud servers which are not
trusted in OppNets.
To deal with attack detection, and deal with different types of malicious behaviour
more efficiently, researchers have invested in developing security methods that are
based on the trust and reputation attributes. The two attributes are essential to validate
a node’s identity and avoid malicious nodes. Trust and reputation are used in P2P
networks [29], ad hoc networks [30], MANETs [31], WSNs [32], DTNs [33], and
OppNets [34].
Some of the existing methods use the trust attribute only [35–46] where the trust
values of nodes are not propagated across nodes which is useful in strengthening the
security of the system.
Other methods use the reputation attribute [47–50] where a global trust value for
nodes in the network is created, which is hard to apply in networks as it requires lots
of time and input from nodes in the network.
Merging trust and reputation together work better to create trust and reputa-
tion based techniques, as both attributes are important to increase the security level
in a network. Different methods are used. Some methods use monitoring nodes,
cryptography or trusted authorities to form trust and reputation [51–56] which are
hard to establish in non-structured networks due to the required high transmission
overhead and verification cost. Methods that use clusters, groups, or categories to
form trust and reputation relationships between nodes in the network [57–61] re-
quire a clustering framework which may not always be available. Context based
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models [31, 34, 62, 63] are used to form trust and reputation using context without
considering the mobility context of nodes which is very important in some networks.
More work is required in some models to prevent future betrayal [64], and make
realistic restrictions and parameters [65, 66]. More work is required to preserve the
privacy protection for users in [67,68]. Measuring the trustworthiness of a path rather
than securing it is not enough [30]. Methods that rely on the delay parameter [69]
cannot be implemented in networks that have delay as a natural feature like Opp-
Nets and DTNs. Methods that rely on the path length [70] may not be suitable in
some networks. The spam filtering technique in [71] does not solve censorship in
networks. Finally, the techniques in [33, 52, 72–74] are good to deal with packet
dropping, blackhole, and selfish attacks, but do not deal with packet modification
attacks.
Not much work has been done to protect the integrity of the packets in OppNets,
it has been observed that implementing solutions designed for other networks always
have either a limitation, or cannot be adopted in an OppNet.
1.2 Research Objectives
OppNets are commonly exposed to packet dropping and modification attacks, both
attacks manipulate the message thus breaching its completeness and integrity. Pro-
tecting the message as it travels from its source to the destination is very important,
if the message is altered during its transmission, detecting whether or not it has been
altered, the node that altered it (if the message has been altered), and the path where
the attack has happened could be difficult. When data reaches the destination incom-
plete, not only will the data be useless, the network’s performance will be greatly
degraded.
As data flows in the network, some packets may be lost for malicious reasons, or
non-malicious reasons like the expiry of the packet’s life, or not enough storage on
the node’s device, this is what makes the selective packet dropping attack detection
challenging. In this thesis, selective packet dropping and modification attacks where
some of the packets may be dropped or modified by malicious nodes is addressed.
Complete modification attacks where the malicious node modifies all of the packets
is also addressed. In addition to that, the case when the malicious node performs
a malicious act at times, and at other times, it doesn’t (an ‘on/off’ attack) is fur-
ther addressed. Not much research has been invested in considering ‘on/off’ packet
modification attacks for modifying the whole message with all of the packets, and
specifically in OppNets, as far as one can tell from the literature, no work has been
done to address this case.
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The main objective of this research thesis is to build a reliable model that se-
cures OppNets from packet dropping and modification/integrity attacks. The model
is designed to detect selective packet dropping attacks, selective or complete ‘on/off’
packet modification attacks, malicious paths, and malicious nodes in a network.
1.3 Research Problems
Existing packet dropping/modification attacks security models have limitations in
detecting the malicious node that attempted the attack, or cannot deal with random
cases where the malicious node modifies all of the packets and changes the content
of the message completely. There are plenty of trust and reputation models that are
designed to protect infrastructure-less networks, but they are either not adoptable
in OppNets or they are designed to protect the network from other attacks. Also,
existing methods don’t protect the data that flows in the network but rather focus on
detecting or avoiding the malicious node. The research questions in this thesis are as
follows:
1. How is detection of a selective packet dropping and/or selective/complete/
‘on/off’ packet modification attacks performed to reduce the packet dropping
and modification rates to improve the performance of the network?
2. Who is in charge of detecting malicious nodes, and how is the system evolved
to allow each node in the network be in charge of authenticating the packets it
receives, and be able to classify good nodes from malicious ones?
3. How is trust formed among nodes to build direct, indirect, and meeting trust
that are used to build a reputation system that is used to establish a secure
channel in OppNets to utilize only the legitimate nodes and isolate malicious
ones in the network?
1.4 Main Contributions
The main goal of this research thesis is to build a reputation system among nodes
in the network to utilize legitimate nodes and eliminate malicious ones, and to pro-
tect the completeness and integrity of data in the network so that the network can
perform effectively and efficiently. To achieve this goal, techniques and algorithms
have been proposed that are designed to check the authenticity of messages, detect
the malicious path and node, build trust from direct, indirect, meeting with the source
experiences, and to create a reputation system that allows nodes to make the correct
message forwarding decisions. The system is efficient because it does not require lots
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of conditions to achieve an accurate reputation value. A thorough search of the rele-
vant literature yields to a belief that this is the first OppNet trust and reputation based
system that deals with malicious modification attacks where the malicious node at-
tempts to modify all the packets, and have the tendency to act malicious at times, and
legitimate at other times.
The main contribution of this research thesis are:
1. Efficient algorithms to detect selective packet dropping attacks, and selective/-
complete/‘on/off’ modification attacks.
2. Efficient algorithms to build a trust/reputation system that allows each node in
the network to classify legitimate and malicious nodes and make the proper
routing decisions.
The techniques and approaches used to aid in the above contributions include:
• Merkle tree hashing technique [75]: The Merkle tree is a binary tree that is
composed of hashes in each of its levels, the number of levels a tree has de-
pends on the number of packets the message is composed of. The bottom level
of the tree is created once the packets are hashed. Each pair of hashes in the
bottom level are hashed again to create an upper level parent hash. In each
level, every pair of hashes are hashed until the top level has only one hash and
can no longer pair with another hash. This top hash is referred to as the Merkle
root. In this thesis, the Merkle tree hashing technique is used in 3 different
ways to check for dropping or modification attacks:
1. The source node embeds the Merkle root in each packet’s header and
sends them to the destination through intermediate nodes. Upon receipt,
the destination node computes a new Merkle root and compares it with
the original received Merkle root to detect if a selective packet dropping
attack has occurred.
2. Half of the Merkle tree hashes are used to detect if a selective packet
dropping attack has occurred, where a node is able to determine the num-
ber of packets it expects to receive from another node by comparing the
number of packets it receives with the number of the Merkle tree hashes
embedded within the packets’ headers.
3. The Merkle root and more than half of the tree hashes are used to authen-
ticate the integrity of the received packets. The receiving node is able to
authenticate all of the packets from the included hashes.
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• Trust: Trust is defined as the level of confidence a node has towards another
node and is used (along with reputation) as a guide for nodes to make their
routing decisions.
1. Direct trust: The direct trust is updated based on the direct experience as
a result of detection from the Merkle tree hashing technique. With packet
dropping attack detection, depending on the results of detection, the di-
rect trust is incremented/decremented by a value which is determined to
be the best value through intensive testing. With packet modification at-
tack detection, depending on the results of detection, the direct trust is in-
cremented by a value retrieved from the frequency or the encounter rate,
which is the number of contacts a node has with another over a period of
time.
2. Path trust: Destination nodes update the direct trust for each node in the
path the message was transmitted through based on the results of attack
detection. If no attack is detected, the destination increments the direct
trust values of each node in the path, if an attack is detected, then the
destination decrements the direct trust values of each node in the path.
This trust is referred to as path trust because all nodes in the path have
their direct trust values incremented/decremented equally. However, the
trust value for each node is referred to as direct trust because the value
for each node is different depending on the appearance of nodes in other
paths.
3. Indirect trust: This is updated based on the feedback a node receives
about a node from other nodes in the network. The proposed system
allows nodes to evaluate the truthfulness of the feedback before recording
the value in their trust/reputation tables.
4. Meeting trust: To deal with complete modification attacks where the ma-
licious node modifies all of the packets, when the intermediate or a des-
tination node meets with the source node later, it checks the messages it
had received from nodes that are sent from the source it’s currently meet-
ing with. Based on the results, the meeting trust for nodes is updated.
• Reputation: Each node in the network maintains a reputation table. The repu-
tation value for each node is computed from the direct, indirect, and meeting
trust depending on their availability. The reputation value changes automati-
cally when any of the mentioned trust value is updated. Reputation is then used
by nodes to allow them classify good nodes from malicious nodes and helps
them make the correct routing decisions in the network.
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1.5 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this research thesis is organized as follows:
In chapter 2, an overview on some of the existing routing protocols in OppNets
is presented. This is followed by details of some of the available non-trust/reputation
based defense mechanisms on packet dropping/modification attacks. This is followed
by an in-depth study on the existing trust and reputation based methods that are used
in different networks for detecting or eliminating malicious nodes.
In chapter 3, a malicious path and a malicious node detection mechanism that
allows destination nodes to detect malicious paths with nodes that attempt selective
packet dropping attacks using the Merkle tree hashing technique is presented. The
result of path detection (whether legitimate or malicious) is used to build path trust
by incrementing/decrementing the direct trust value for nodes in each path. The built
trust value for each node in each path the destination is involved with is stored locally
in each destination’s trust table; malicious nodes are detected when their trust values
fall below the required threshold. The advantage of using trust to identify malicious
nodes is that nodes have more than one chance to prove them themselves legitimate
in other paths before they are listed as malicious.
In chapter 4, a dynamic reputation trust based system to protect the network
against selective packet dropping attacks by establishing secure routing in OppNets is
presented. The system is incorporated by each node in each path, and uses the Merkle
tree hashing technique to check the completeness of the message. Each node in the
network maintains a reputation trust based table that it stored locally and records the
trust values of nodes it interacts with directly, or indirectly through the exchange of
reputation values with other nodes. When nodes come in contact with each other
opportunistically, they exchange their reputation values. When a node’s reputation
value falls below a specified threshold; it is classified as malicious.
In chapter 5, the trust and reputation system to protect the network from ‘on/off’
selective or complete packet modification attacks is further extended. The reputation
system allow nodes to decide how much to trust a node based on its honesty in
delivering authentic packets using the Merkle tree hashes and Merkle root. Using the
encounter rate, direct, indirect, and meeting trust, a reputation system is created for
nodes to allow them make the right message forwarding decisions.
In chapter 6, the work done in the thesis is summarized with conclusions pre-
sented, and possible improvements for future work identified.
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Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
Opportunistic networks are emerging types of delay tolerant networks (DTNs) where
connectivity between mobile wireless devices (nodes) is intermittent and the ex-
change and forwarding of data is done through opportunistic contacts between nodes
without a pre-existing network infrastructure. As there is no end-to-end path between
a sender and a destination, the forwarding opportunities of messages are usually lim-
ited, with possibly higher error rates, and longer delays [1]. Unlike DTNs, the routing
algorithm in OppNets must be opportunistic. In DTNs, when a message is to be sent,
an existing end to end route is first investigated, if none is found, the message is then
sent opportunistically. Whereas in OppNets, the message is always sent opportunis-
tically, and an existing end to end path is never checked.
2.2 Existing Routing Solutions in OppNets
To deal with the challenging features of OppNets, researchers have developed routing
solutions that are designed to deal with intermittent connectivity, no end to end path,
no pre-existing infrastructure, and delayed message delivery [76].
Usually, the developed routing solutions are categorized as either replication or
forwarding based [9].
Solutions that categorize as replication based usually create more than one copy
of the message in the network to increase its chances of arriving to its destination.
The benefits of this category, is increased delivery rates with less delays. In for-
warding based techniques, the message has only one copy in the network forwarded
based on a conditional metric. Forwarding based techniques consume less network
9
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resources and overhead than replication based techniques, however, due to their de-
creased delivery rates and increased delivery delays [9], replication based techniques
are favoured over forwarding based techniques [10].
Examples of replication based techniques include Epidemic routing [77], PRoPHET
[78], MaxProp [79], PREP [80], RAPID [81], Spray and Wait [82], Spray and Fo-
cus [83], EBR [84], and ORWAR [85].
Examples of forwarding based techniques include Direct Transmission [86], Seek
and Focus [87], CAR [88], utility-based routing [89], SimBet [90], PeopleRank [91],
and Bubble Rap [92].
2.3 Packet Dropping and Modification Attacks
Existing routing solutions do not include security, and since OppNets are exposed
to many attacks, securing OppNet routing solutions is very important to keep the
network functioning effectively and efficiently, and to protect the data as it flows
among nodes in the network.
OppNets are exposed to many different attacks and threats including imperson-
ation or spoofing, repudiation, eavesdropping [93], wormhole attacks [94], sybil at-
tacks [95], selfish attacks [96], blackhole attacks [97], packet dropping attacks [15],
and packet integrity/modification attacks.
The most common and challenging attacks are the packet dropping and modifi-
cation attacks:
• Packet dropping attacks: In selective packet dropping attacks, the malicious
node attempts to drop some packets and forwards an incomplete number of
packets. This attack results in the distortion of the message once the remaining
packets reach the destination and degrades the performance of the network.
• Packet modification or integrity attacks: The malicious node attempts to selec-
tively modify some packets and forwards them to other nodes. In some cases,
the malicious node may modify all the packets and forward the packets with
completely different content.
Both attacks threaten the network as they cause a degradation in network perfor-
mance and can sometimes completely disrupt communication in the network [11].
To effectively secure OppNets from packet dropping and modification attacks is
a challenging task. Some of the existing solutions proposed in literature to protect
networks from packet dropping and modification attacks are described below.
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2.3.1 Packet Dropping Attacks defense Mechanisms
To defend against packet dropping attacks, M. Chuah et al. [15] proposed the use of
network coding to propose a mitigation scheme to evaluate the impact of selective
packet dropping attacks. Simulation methods were used to investigate the influence
of selective packet dropping attacks on the network performance, and showed that
the performance degraded as the dropping of messages increased. This is because
some nodes did not cooperate and instead dropped some packets, this affected the
routing performance by decreasing delivery rates and increasing delivery delay and
overhead cost. To make use of this information, when the destination node received
a message, it would measure the delivery rates for the path used to pass the message
to it, and sends this information to the sender. Depending on the level of the received
delivery rates degradation, the sender dynamically assigns a redundancy factor to be
responsible for the number of replications required to generate coded packets. The
disadvantage of this scheme is the large number of message replicas which increases
the network overhead cost.
M. Obaidat et al. [12] proposed a security improvement mechanism where the
packets that go through a path that contained a malicious node were redirected to
another alternative path. However, in OppNets this mechanism might be difficult to
implement because there is no guaranty on the availability of alternative paths.
J. Sen et al. [14] presented a packet dropping attack detection mechanism based
on how nodes cooperatively participated in a mobile ad hoc network where nodes
with malicious behaviour were identified. To provide secure paths, paths with iden-
tified malicious nodes were avoided. This incurs a high cost on the network, because
alternative paths have to be provided.
Common methods that dealt with packet dropping attacks used multipath routing
as proposed by S. Lee et al. [13]. Multipath routing does not identify the malicious
node, instead an alternative path is chosen to avoid suspicious paths, and this incurs
a high communication cost on the network.
A. Baadache et al. [16] proposed a method to detect if any packets were dropped
by intermediate nodes. When an intermediate node received a packet, it needed to
acknowledge it. The source node used these acknowledgments to build a Merkle tree
to compare a pre-calculated value with the tree root value. If the 2 values equalled
each other, then the path through which the message was sent had not been attacked
by a packet dropping attack. This approach demands network resources, and in ad-
dition to that, it only detects the malicious path, and not the malicious node. The
authors assumed that an end to end path existed, and wireless paths are bidirectional.
In OppNets, this cannot be assumed.
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X. Zhang et al. [18] and B. Carbunar et al. [19] used a mechanism that was based
on acknowledgments from intermediate nodes, the source or destination used au-
thenticated acknowledgments to detect the malicious node. This mechanism incurs a
high communication cost on the network.
S. Sultana et al. [17] proposed a data provenance based mechanism to identify
the malicious node that attempted the attack. The mechanism started by detecting
lost packets on the distribution of packet delays. If there were any lost packets, the
presence of attack was then detected by comparing the average rate of detected lost
packets with the actual rate of lost packets. Then the malicious link was isolated
by using the data channel to transmit provenance information. This technique aims
more on finding the malicious path rather than the malicious node.
2.3.2 Packet Integrity/Modification Attacks defense Mechanisms
Vaithiyanathan et al. [24] presented a method to detect integrity attacks, avoid the
actions of malicious nodes, and isolate the malicious node from the network. When
a node received packets, it checked for any modification in the destination address.
If the destination address was found to be modified, then the last address from which
the packets were received from belonged to the node that attempted the malicious
act, the malicious node was added to the malicious nodes table. To eliminate the
malicious node from the network, the malicious node table was exchanged among
nodes as they exchanged messages. This method is not easily adopted in an OppNet.
C. Wang et al. [25] proposed a scheme to identify packet dropping and modifica-
tion attacks in wireless sensor networks. At the start of the network, nodes created
a tree that dynamically changed its structure around the sink. During each inter-
val, nodes added extra bits to the packet and encrypted it to hide its source before
forwarding the packet. When the sink received the packets and decrypted them, it
used the extra added bits added by each sensor node before forwarding the packets
which allowed it to recover the source again, thus allowing it to identify malicious
behaviour. The sink kept using this information at each interval to understand the
behaviour of nodes fully until it could confidently identify malicious nodes using a
heuristic ranking algorithm. The technique consumes lots of the networks sensors’
computational resources which might delay the malicious node detection process as
well.
R. Patil et al. [98] proposed a method to detect packet modification attacks per-
formed by malicious routers in a network. The scheme used information gathered
about a router from its neighbour routers. Neighbour routers monitored the incom-
ing and outgoing packets of the monitored router. Packet modification attacks could
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be detected by performing a hash based comparison algorithm on the packets re-
ceived from the monitored router. The algorithm helped detect legitimate packets
from modified ones by comparing the hash values of the received packets with the
hash values of the forwarded packets.
W. Alghamd et al. [26] proposed a random multi-path routing approach to mini-
mize problems arising due to modification attacks such as low delivery rates in wire-
less sensor networks. The source sent 3 copies of each message through 3 different
paths through sensor nodes to the destination. Using 2 routes at random, the desti-
nation assembled the message only when it received at least 2 copies of the message
which needed to be the same. This approach made it hard for malicious nodes to
modify packets from targeted nodes. This method does not offer an effective way to
identify malicious nodes in the network.
K. Ssu et al. [27] presented an overhearing based detection scheme for wireless
sensor networks to deal with malicious packet modification attacks. At the start of
the network, each node was assigned a committee structure that was composed of
committee sets. Each committee set was in charge of a transmission communication
link. The committee set was able to detect modified packets by having nodes within
range of the source node overhear the source’s packet transmission. The overhearing
technique however, consumes a large amount of energy.
X. Wang et al. [28] presented a cryptosystem based model that aimed for protect-
ing users and data privacy using reasonable network resources. The model focused
on improving communication between nodes and cloud servers. The model consid-
ered both packet dropping and modification attacks. The model conducted a cloud
server that included 2 layers, a remote and a local cloud layers. The remote cloud
layer acted as a central authority for the local clouds that included nodes that com-
municated with each other wirelessly. The algorithm was designed to predict future
contacts securely and protect messages using cryptography. The cloud server would
then validate and encrypt the message. The results of simulation showed a good de-
livery ratio, however, the model did not evaluate the trustworthiness of the remote
cloud servers and assumed they were trusted, in OppNets, the default is they are not
trusted.
L. Jaimes et al. [99] proposed an anonymous reputation system for vehicular
ad hoc networks. The message forwarding was opportunistic and was forwarded
through intermediate nodes. Intermediate nodes verified nodes using a set of
pseudonyms, and checked the reputation value of nodes before accepting or rejecting
any messages. When the message reached the destination node, the message was
verified using the signature and the public key obtained from the pseudonyms set.
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The destination reported the result of message verification to the reputation server
that updated the reputation values of the vehicles that were involved in passing the
message to the destination.
Trust and reputation is also used to defend against packet dropping/modification
attacks; this is investigated in the next section.
2.4 Trust and Reputation
2.4.1 Introduction
Trust and reputation are usually used together, however, they are not the same. Trust
is the ability of a node to evaluate the trustworthiness of nodes based on their actions
towards a given task. The more a node trusts another node, the higher the trust value
it would assign to it. Reputation on the other hand, is the overall accumulated trust
derived from past direct and indirect knowledge that nodes form towards a node in
the network. A node with a high reputation has a higher probability to perform the
task ideally as it is expected to.
Trust and reputation are used to help nodes form honest relationships among each
other, and allows them to evaluate the quality of their service in the network. Nodes
use past records from direct experiences with other nodes to build direct trust. They
also receive feedback from other nodes, and the information from the feedback is
used to build indirect trust. Nodes then merge the direct trust with the indirect trust
to form a reputation value for each node. Reputation is used to help nodes know how
much they trust other nodes, and bring awareness when malicious nodes are found.
In traditional networks, a username and password are required, and the details
are sent to the server for authentication, if authenticated, the node is allowed to enter
the network. In OppNets this is not possible, because there is no server to do the
authentication step. Because OppNets are mainly used in disasters or in network
outage, it’s difficult to ask people to present a certificate.
Trust and reputation are used to enhance and improve security in a network. Trust
is difficult mostly when mobile users find themselves in a new surrounding without
established trust or reputation available. The first time a node comes in contact with
another node, it doesn’t trust it. But the second time it comes in contact with the
same node, how does it know if it should trust it or not? On what basis is a new
node accepted into the network? A trust value is built for it. How is this trust value
built and computed? Initially, new nodes introduced into the network will have a low
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rating of trust. However, over time, their trust rating starts to increase as they move,
meet, and interact with already established nodes in the network.
Trust can be established in 2 ways: Direct trust that is established through direct
observations of other node’s behaviour from past records, and indirect trust that is
established through trust propagation based on recommendations from other nodes.
Trust and reputation have participated greatly to establish trust relationships and
secure channels in different networks such as P2P (peer to peer networks), ad hoc
networks, MANETs (mobile ad hoc networks), WSNs (wireless sensor networks),
DTNs (delayed tolerant networks), and OppNets (Opportunistic networks).
Trust and reputation are important to authenticate a node’s identity and avoid
malicious nodes. Trust is a very important feature that needs good management in
networks. Methodologies used to measure trust include methods such as: Weighted
average method [47, 48, 66], probability [35, 49, 62, 63, 100], the fuzzy reasoning
method [73], cluster based analyses [58–60], signatures [72], cryptography [36, 37],
key management [31, 41, 60], swarm intelligence [30], social networking [33, 40,
42, 64, 65, 70, 101], chain optimization [70], monitoring nodes [38, 51, 54, 55, 73],
voting [55], rating [52,57], reputation [34,38,47,48,50,55,72], game theory [51,53],
and acknowledgments [72].
Trust and reputation methods have been adopted in different networks including:
• Peer to peer networks
• Ad hoc networks
• MANETs
• Wireless sensor networks
• Delayed tolerant networks
• OppNets
2.4.2 Trust Mechanisms in Peer to Peer Networks
Peer to peer networks are widely used and they are known for being open, distributed,
dynamic, anonymous, and self-administered, which makes them easy to breach into,
and the spread of viruses, Trojans, and worms become easy since peers can easily
upload any content they want and have it spread in the network without having their
identity revealed. Peers (or nodes) supply and consume, some peers however, choose
to consume and not supply causing to have selfish peers in the system. Peers in a
15
Chapter 2 Literature Review
peer to peer network have equal privileges and there is no centralization, this feature
brings down the costs of having central servers, also if a peer become unavailable,
the network still functions normally, figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Peer to peer networks
One of the best techniques to secure peer to peer networks and to maintain the
quality of service (QoS) is to create a solid trust model to provide trusted nodes with
a high trust value. Before a peer can be a neighbour to another peer, it chooses a
peer with a good reputation, and avoids files from malicious peers. In P2P networks,
users keep track of other user’s actions and exchange their records directly with other
users.
G. Shang-Fu et al. [29] listed the most popular ways to calculate trust and repu-
tation:
• The weighted average method: Used by the most classical trust models Eigen-
trust and PeerTrust. The weight of the chosen factors such as direct trust and
recommended trust are calculated using multiplication and summation.
• Probability methods: Trust and reputation are calculated using probability and
statistics, such as the Bayesian method.
• The fuzzy reasoning method: Trust and reputation are defined at different lev-
els starting from an unknown node to a very trustworthy node.
Eigentrust [47], one of the most classical trust models in P2P networks is a rep-
utation system that used transitivity of trust to assign a unique global trust value for
each node based on its interactions with other nodes in the network. Before a node
attempted to download content from another node, it checked the global trust value
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of the node. To calculate the global trust value for node A, ratings from all nodes that
worked with node A were required. This process is demanding and time consum-
ing, as updating the global trust value for a node requires lots of input from a large
number of other nodes.
Peertrust [48] is another classical model that used reputation to build a trust
framework in P2P networks. Trust was computed from a number of parameters: Rec-
ommendations from other nodes based on the services they provided, total number
of interactions a node completed, credibility of recommendations from other nodes,
context of the interactions, and the context of the community such as creating incen-
tives to encourage recommendations. PeerTrust works with lots of parameters and
metrics making it difficult to apply with a large number of nodes in the network.
H. Xu et al. [49] presented a peer to peer trust model, PStrust that used proba-
bility and statistics. The system aimed to solve the limitations of the classical trust
models (Eigentrust and Peertrust) in which the global trust values were not precisely
calculated and did not reflect the real trust value of a peer. Peers returned feedback
once a transaction was completed. If the peer was legitimate, it gave honest feed-
back. If the peer was not legitimate, it gave false feedback. PStrust addressed the
issue (which was not addressed in Eigentrust and Peertrust) of a malicious node that
once gained a high trust by providing a good service in the network, started to give
false feedback about other peers. The system relied on honest feedback, and hypoth-
esis testing was used to eliminate false feedback. In real large complicated networks,
it might be difficult to put PStrust in practice for a couple of reasons, one of which is
the complexity of storing the global value of trust.
Y. Li et al. [100] used probability to estimate the trust value of nodes sending
honest information to other nodes. The authors developed a model that utilized le-
gitimate nodes in the network. Legitimate nodes trust values were exchanged in the
network until the trust value of legitimate nodes was spread in the network. Initially,
each node in the network was assigned a fixed trust value. Nodes then started to
exchange information. When a node received the correct information from another
node, it updated the trust value of the other node. To confirm a trust value of a node,
a node might request from a node information that it already had and can compare
with, making this request a couple of times it could confirm that the node was indeed
honest. Each node in the network kept a small list of well-behaved nodes. Nodes
with trust values meeting the required threshold went into the good list. Nodes could
then share their list of well-behaved nodes until each node had a collated list of the
well behaved nodes in the network.
M. GaneshKumar et al. [51] used game strategies to design a trust framework
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called GaTMo. The framework used individual trust for each node, and the system’s
trust (reputation) for each node in the network. The use of game theory is a strategy
used to make a decision in a given situation. It involved the use of mathematical
functions such as probability, statistics, and algebra. There were a number of strate-
gies to choose from when choosing candidates in a network: Tit for tat, self-trust, and
dynamic trust. In tit for tat strategy, when peer A wanted to deal with peer B, it used
the same previous action of peer B with peer A. If peer B was cooperative in their
last meeting, then peer A would implement the same action and became cooperative.
If peer B was not cooperative, then peer A would not cooperate with peer B. In self-
trust, peer A decided to cooperate with peer B based on its own personal experience.
In dynamic trust, peer A used its personal trust and the system’s overall trust for peer
B, and then made its choice. A monitoring node was also used in the GaTMo frame-
work, the node monitored other peers in the network and recorded their behaviour.
Peers with unacceptable behaviours were eliminated from the network. Monitoring
nodes however, require time and expensive maintenance.
W. Liu et al. [65] used social networks to propose a trust model for P2P networks.
When a peer in the network wanted to work with an unknown peer, it would first ask
its friends for opinion. When a malicious peer was found in the network, friends
informed each other to eliminate the malicious peer from the network. Probability
was used to define trust and recommendation values. The trust value was how much 2
peers trusted each other, and the recommendation value was how much a peer friend
recommended a peer to other peers. The more positive recommendations a peer got,
the higher its trust value would increment. The network started with legitimate peers,
new peers could only join the network when there was an existing peer in the network
that was able to recommend it. This condition helped prevent malicious peers from
joining the network from the beginning. The model does not consider the case where
a new peer wants to join the network but none of the existing peers know it to be able
to recommend it.
F. Liu et al. [64] also used social networks to build a trust based model for P2P
systems. The model was designed to help a peer find a trusted peer to share infor-
mation with. Before a peer could trust another peer for the first time, it started with
the propagation stage where it collected proofs of trust from other nodes who trusted
that peer, and based on the collected proofs, it calculated the trust value of that peer.
In that case, the peer used indirect trust to calculate the trust value of another peer.
Next time it came in contact with the same peer, it could calculate the trust value
using proofs from direct trust. The model used a trust-aware propagation algorithm
(which implemented the Markov process) which included direct, indirect, and path
trust. Based on those 3 factors, a peer’s trust value dynamically changed. Because of
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this dynamic feature, the model cannot keep a fixed record of mutual trust or prevent
future betrayal.
G. Yang et al [35] improved the Markov model by proposing a new algorithm and
using probability that computed indirect trust using the level factor and confidence
to measure the trust value. Where the level factor stated that the more intermediate
nodes in a path, the longer trust had to transfer, and so the weaker it became. And
confidence is what a node believed about the truthfulness of information it received
from other nodes. The algorithm relies on the transmission history of peer nodes, but
is not designed to work with cases where information between nodes is not common
or not gathered.
X. Kang et al. [66] proposed a scheme to help a node protect itself from pollution
attacks. Each node in the P2P system computed a trust value for other nodes in the
network based on direct and indirect trust. The trust values of peers in the network
were stored in each peer locally. When calculating the trust value for a targeted peer,
the peer collected recommendations from a group of other peers that had a direct
interaction with the targeted peer and the enquiring peer. The peer then summed the
values of the collected recommendations with its own direct trust with the targeted
peer, it then used the resulting weighted sum as the trust value for the targeted node,
and based on the value, it decided whether it would trust it or not. The trust value
was updated in relation to how recent a transaction was; new transactions gained
more weight than older ones. This model deals with lots of parameters that change
differently according to individual peers and their needs. In a real P2P network, a
more standardized model might fit better.
A reputation aggregation method was proposed by T. Yajima et al. [50] to solve
issues with malicious peers who send malicious content at times, and honest content
at other times. The method worked by assigning a provisional trust value to peers in
the network. When a peer received malicious content from another peer it lowered
the direct trust value of the peer that sent it malicious content, the proposed system
then allowed the receiving peer to spread the new updated trust value of the malicious
peer to other peers which lowered the reputation of this malicious peer. This process
happened every time a peer received malicious content from another peer and this
attempted to keep the reputation level of peers updated at all times. Before nodes
decided to trust a peer, they relied on the reputation or global value of the peer.
To motivate peers to corporate in P2P networks, a trust based incentive system
was proposed by C. Tian et al. [57] that aimed in dividing a large network into smaller
networks where nodes were allocated to different categories depending on the content
a node was interested in. Each category had one super node and many regular nodes.
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In a category, the trust value of the super node was the sum of the ratings of each
regular node in the category. In a category, the trust value of regular nodes in a
category was computed from direct and indirect trust (recommendations from other
peers in the same category). Super nodes communicated, kept, and managed records
of the trust values of regular nodes in a category. If the trust value of a super node in
a category decreased below the required threshold, the super node would be removed
from the group, and another reliable super node took the lead. To maintain a true trust
value, recommendations from other nodes were revised before updating a node’s trust
value. Inactive nodes were removed from the category they belonged to. It may not
always be feasible to categorize nodes and assign super nodes in a network.
The available trust and reputation methods in P2P are summarized in table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Trust and reputation methods used in P2P networks
Algorithm Objective Trust technique Trust property Trust method Metrics
Eigentrust
[47]
Reputation
management
Weighted average Transitivity of trust is used to
assign a unique global trust value
for each node based on its
interactions with other nodes
Reputation Number of authentic
and inauthentic file
downloads
PeerTrust
[48]
Reputation
management
Weighted average Trust is built from
recommendations, credibility of
recommendations, number and
context of interactions
Reputation Transaction success
rate, scalability, and
overhead
PStrust
[49]
Reputation
management
Probability and
statistics
Trust is built from honest feedback
and hypothesis testing is used to
eliminate false feedback
Reputation Successful download
ratio
[100] Reputation
management
Probability Legitimate nodes trust values are
exchanged in the network, until the
trust value of legitimate nodes is
spread in the network
Direct trust and
reputation
Probability of error
GaTMo
[51]
Trust evaluation Game theory Tit for tat, self-trust, and dynamic
trust are used when choosing a
candidate in a network
Direct trust and
reputation
Payoff
TrustP2PNET
[65]
Trust with prior
interaction
Social networks
and probability
Friends inform each other to
eliminate the malicious peer.
Probability is used to define trust
and recommendation values
Direct trust built
on
recommendations
Scalability
[64] Trust aware
propagation
Social networks Implements the Markov process, a
peer’s trust value is dynamic so
good nodes need to keep good
records
Direct, indirect,
and path trust
Propagation
[35] Trust evaluation
using Markov
Probability Level factor (number of hops) and
confidence (belief of truthfulness
of received information) are used
to measure the trust value
Indirect trust Trust inference
[66] Trust
management
Weighted average Group based trust model,
recommendations are taken from a
group of peers that had a direct
interaction with the targeted peer
and the inquiring peer. New
transactions gain more weight
Direct trust, and
recommendations
Data transmission rate,
packet loss rate, and
transaction success rate
[50] Reputation
evaluation
Reputation
aggregation
Provisional trust is assigned to
peers, trust is updated and reputed
based on honest/malicious content
Direct trust, and
reputation
Transaction success
rate
[57] Secure clustering Incentive system Group based, trust based incentive Direct and
indirect trust
Transaction success
rate, search failure rate,
and overheard of
topology
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2.4.3 Trust Mechanisms in Ad Hoc Networks
An ad hoc network is a decentralized network that does not have a pre-existing in-
frastructure, the network is dynamic and unpredictable. Nodes in ad hoc networks
move, connect, and disconnect to each other often, making communication between
nodes temporary. Nodes forward data and communicate with other nodes based on
their availability in the network. Nodes in an ad hoc network have equal privileges
like nodes in a P2P network. Nodes in ad hoc networks communicate with other
nodes that are within their bandwidth range, they decide to carry and forward data
based on their available storage space, figure 2.2. Ad hoc networks can be used in
military networks and disasters. The dynamic and the decentralization features of ad
hoc networks makes them vulnerable to malicious attacks by malicious nodes.
Figure 2.2: Ad hoc networks
A good method to increase the security of such networks is to use trust relation-
ships and past experiences between nodes to improve interactions and collaborations
among them. Trust in ad hoc networks can be built using swarm intelligence [30],
cluster based analysis [58], public key cryptography [36], and Bayesian probabil-
ity [62].
A. Pirzada et al. [30] used swarm intelligence to help find trusted routes in ad hoc
networks. The concept of swarm intelligence can be applied in ad hoc networks by
collecting behaviours from nodes interacting with each other and with the network.
In the proposed system, every node had an embedded trust agent that assigned a
trust value for all the nodes it interacted with in the network. Nodes exchanged this
value between each other to help each other find a trusted path/route. A node that
experienced an interaction with a malicious node assigned a low trust value to the
malicious node. Nodes avoided interacting with the malicious node when receiving
21
Chapter 2 Literature Review
a low trust value for the malicious node. The level of trust in a route increased or
decreased depending on the number and authenticity of packets that were transferred
in the given path. The technique focuses on measuring the trustworthiness of a path
which is not enough to deal with malicious nodes who choose to be legitimate at
times, and malicious at other times.
P. Chatterjee et. al [58] proposed a model that aimed on detecting a malicious
node using cluster based analysis. Using auto regression, nodes forecasts the trust
value of other nodes in the network where past experiences affected the current trust
value of a node. Direct and indirect trust were then united by the cluster head to mea-
sure the trust value using a probabilistic model. Trust values were checked for their
accuracy using the Proportional Integral Derivative (PID) controller. Nodes result-
ing with a low trust value would not be trusted; thus a secure route could be formed
by avoiding interactions between legitimate and malicious nodes. This technique
requires a clustering framework which might not always be available.
Using distributed trust based on public key cryptography, K. Ren et al. [36] used a
probabilistic method to deal with problems involved with initial trust establishments
in networks. At the initial stage of the network and with the help of a secret dealer
(could be a service provider), nodes were supplied with adequate amount of trust
enough to get them started in the network, nodes trusted their secret dealer. After
that stage, the network became ad hoc and any central tasks such as the secret dealer
ended there. Nodes then created direct trust when meeting each other by viewing
each other’s certificates and validating them by looking for a trusted route between
each other. At that stage, each node was self-organized, and became responsible to is-
sue public certificates for other nodes. Having the secret dealer simplifies the process
of establishing trust in this model, however, in decentralized networks, implementing
the centralized secret dealer at the start of the network might not be feasible.
H. Zong et al. [102] constructed a model that simplified, modified and extended
the TCP/IP protocol to better fit the features of ad hoc networks. Because UDP
is connectionless and required the least protocol mechanism, data transmission was
carried through the UDP protocol. The trust model used the protocol data unit (PDU)
and service data unit (SDU) to transmit the data to another node. The trust system
incorporated 4 modules: The metric, data, storage, and behaviour modules. The
metric module was used to measure the trustworthy of other nodes. The data module
gathered feedback from nodes regarding their trust level towards other nodes. The
storage module was used to record nodes data which may be shared with the metric
module. The behaviour module used the metric module to help nodes decide whether
it was safe to interact with other nodes or not. These 4 modules were used to enhance
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the functionality of the whole system. The model was designed but have not been
tested.
C. Nguy et al. [62] used context to enhance a Bayesian network trust model in
ad hoc networks. To improve trust in a network, the authors specified that context
was composed of a group of facilities that were publicly available to all nodes in the
network. For a node to choose the most suitable utility, it used past records with a
given utility provider, and then made its choice. Trust was defined in their model as
the probability of a utility provider to satisfactory provide a utility to the node that
requested its utility. This trust was measured using direct and indirect experiences
between a node and the chosen utility provider. A Bayesian network was created for
each utility’s measured trust from direct and indirect trust. The authors used context
information to make conditions that may affect the outcome of an interaction expe-
rience between 2 nodes, these conditions aimed for improving the trust evaluation
process. To recognise an experience, the model used context information which in-
cluded: The node, the utility, the service provided by the utility, and the date of the
interaction. The Bayesian network sorted these experiences based on their creation
date. The model does not consider the mobility or the density context of the network
when calculating trust.
M. Soleimani et al. [45] presented a dynamic trust model that used trust to defend
ad hoc networks from packet dropping attacks. At the initial stage of the network,
a node trusted its surrounding nodes and updated the trust value according to their
behaviour. Behaviour that decreased the trust value of a node included: Dropping
a packet, not forwarding a packet to the destination, not starting a route discovery
phase. The trust value of a node increased when it forwarded the packets in a route
targeting the destination. The nodes in the model do not propagate the trust values of
the nodes in the network.
The available trust and reputation methods in ad hoc networks are summarized in
table 2.2.
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Table 2.2: Trust and reputation methods used in Ad Hoc Networks
Algorithm Objective Trust technique Trust property Trust method Metrics
[30] Secure routing Swarm
intelligence
Embedded trust agent Direct trust
exchanged
Packet overhead
[58] Trust evaluation Cluster based
analysis
Quantitative trust using the
Proportional Integral Derivative
(PID) controller
Direct and
indirect
recommended
trust
Packet delivery ratio,
throughput (bps),
packet drop rate, and
false positive rate
against packet collision
[36] Initial trust
establishment
Public key
cryptography
Secret dealer initial trust booster,
validated trust using public
certificates
Direct trust Average length of
shortest, and shortest
indirect paths
[102] Trust
management
UDP protocol is
used for data
transmission
Subjective trust module based on
metric, data, storage, and behaviour
Direct and
indirect
recommended
trust
Results for model not
shown
[62] Enhance trust
computation
Context
information
Group based trust model using
probability and past records
Direct and
indirect trust
Quality of services, and
success rate
[45] Dynamic trust
management
Path trust model
based on
dynamic
behavioural
Trust value is affected by
behaviour such as dropping a
packet, not forwarding a packet to
the destination, not starting a route
discovery phase
Direct trust Packet delivery ratio,
and overhead
2.4.4 Trust Mechanisms in MANETs
MANETs are a type of ad hoc networks that are made up of mobile devices that move
around the network freely in any route they want without the existence of a central
node like a base station or an access point, and connect to other nodes wirelessly
using Wi-Fi, cellular, or satellite transmission to communicate with nodes that are
within their range. MANETs don’t have a network infrastructure, they could belong
to a group of mobile devices, or could connect to the Internet, figure 2.3. Because of
their flexibility and limited physical security, MANETs are exposed to many security
threats, nodes rely on their knowledge towards other nodes before they communicate
with them.
Figure 2.3: Mobile ad hoc networks
Implementing proper trust models into MANETs is very important to describe the
trustworthiness of nodes in the network, and to establish initial trust between nodes
in the network. Existing trust methods used in MANETs include: Cryptography and
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digital signatures [31, 37], probability [63], fuzzy logic [73], chain optimization and
social networks [70].
G. Yajun et al. [31] presented a trust model that used basic trust followed with ap-
plication trust. Basic trust formed as initial trust was established; the model allowed 2
nodes to exchange their credentials when they came in contact with each other for the
first time. The credentials of any node in the network contained symmetrically en-
crypted features about the node. These credentials were decrypted using a secret key
that was exchanged between 2 nodes when they became in contact with each other.
Nodes could choose which features in their credentials to share with other nodes.
Once basic trust was formed, application trust formation was followed. Application
trust was measured based on the node’s context, roles were assigned to nodes based
on their application trust which changed when a node’s context changed. The model
does not consider the mobility context of nodes.
S. Inoue et al. [37] presented a model that used certificates to evaluate the trust-
worthiness of a trust value, and the node’s ID. The model had two stages, off-line and
on-line. In the off-line stage, the certificate, called Attribute Certificate (AC), was is-
sued by a node to its neighbour, the certificate contained the neighbour’s evaluated
trust, and the issued AC was also stored in the issuing node as well. Every node in the
network issued an AC for their neighbours. In the on-line stage, when a node wanted
to send a message to a specific destination, it constructed paths to the destination. It
then requested ACs from nodes that belonged to the paths it constructed, it validated
the ACs. Using the validated ACs it measured the trust value of each route - paths
with less hop counts had higher trust, and then chose the most trustworthy route to
send its message. The method does not take advantage of spreading the trust value
for nodes to increase their awareness of malicious nodes existence, if any.
B. Wang et al. [69], introduced a trust based Quality of Service (QoS) model. The
model measured trust from direct and indirect trust. QoS ensured quality services in
a route such as bandwidth, delay, and jitter. Usually the route was checked for its
QoS before data was transmitted through it. The proposed model used delay only
to estimate a route’s QoS. The expected transmission count was used as a metric to
measure the quality of a route. To calculate direct trust, each node in the network
assigned a trust value to its neighbour according to the neighbour’s ability to authen-
tically forward packets. To calculate indirect trust, feedback from neighbours about
a node was used. Each node stored a trust table that contained the trust value of ev-
ery neighbour’s direct and indirect trust. When a source wanted to send a message
to the destination, using the stored routing table, it searched for the possible routes
that the message could be transmitted through. When a route was identified for data
transmission, its trust value was first calculated using direct and indirect trust of each
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node in the route. The route was also measured for its delay QoS level. If the accu-
mulated trust value was high, and the delay QoS level was low, the route was chosen
for data transmission. When a node was identified as malicious in a route, it was
isolated from the network, thus making the route more secure. This model might not
be feasibly applied to networks where delay is a natural feature such as DTNs and
OppNets.
To safeguard the QoS of data availability, K. Bijon et al [63] proposed a prob-
ability based model that adopted the Dempster-Shafer theory (reasoning with un-
certainty) that competently collected recommendations from intermediate nodes and
effectively discarded malicious ones. Trust values were assigned and stored in the in-
termediate nodes of a path, the recommendations were prioritized based on the trust
values of nodes in a path. Recommendations from nodes with a higher trust value
were prioritized over recommendations from nodes with lower trust values. Rec-
ommendations from shorter distanced nodes were given more priority over longer
distanced nodes. The model also enhanced the trust values of nodes by measuring
their ability to develop their trust, a node was given the choice to whether or not it
wished to trust another node regardless of its recommendation value. This technique
might not give fair results in a network with randomly mobile nodes.
To deal with uncertainty, a fuzzy recommendation based trust model for MANETs
was introduced by J. Luo et al. [73]. Each node in the network monitored its neigh-
bour’s packet forwarding patterns. Nodes recorded the results of their neighbour
monitoring patterns into a table that contained the data forwarding information. Ev-
ery time a node interacted with another node in the network it rated the interaction as
either a positive or a negative one. Using the information recorded in the table, fuzzy
direct trust was computed. Latest interactions were more valid than past interactions,
but both were used to measure the trust value of a node. To build a trusted path, direct
trust and feedback from other nodes towards nodes they interacted with were both
used to calculate the fuzzy indirect trust with fuzzy properties. This model considers
selfish attacks only and does not consider other attacks.
A model with trust chain optimization based on the stochastic Petri net technique
(bipartite graph) and social networks was proposed by J. Cho et al. to measure the
trust and social values of multiple nodes in a path [70]. When nodes evaluated each
other’s trust they combined social trust with QoS trust to compute the total trust value
of a node. Social trust was measured from direct and indirect trust derived socially
from own experiences with other nodes, or the reputation of the node in the social
network. QoS trust was measured from a node’s ability to provide good services
and conduct positive interactions with other nodes in the network. When trust was
measured in a path, its distance and number of nodes affected the computed trust,
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where longer chains of nodes in a path weakened the trust value of a path. This
technique relies on path length, which might not give accurate results for legitimate
longer paths.
The available trust and reputation methods in MANETS are summarized in ta-
ble 2.3.
Table 2.3: Trust and reputation methods used in MANETS
Algorithm Objective Trust technique Trust property Trust method Metrics
[31] Trust
establishment
Cryptography Basic trust (encrypted credential
exchange) and application trust
(context)
Direct trust Results for model not
shown
[37] Secure routing Attribute
certificates
Attribute certificates requested and
validated upon path construction
Direct trust Overhead (B), and
delivery rate
[69] Secure routing Trust based on
QoS
Secure path is chosen by the
accumulated trust of all nodes in
the path
Direct and
indirect trust
Delivery ratio, delay,
routing packet
overhead, and detection
ratio
[63] Trust
management
Probability Dempster-Shafer theory.
Recommendations from nodes with
a higher trust or from shorter
distance nodes are given more
priority
Direct
recommended
trust
Time, average of
recommendation hop
lengths
[73] Secure routing Fuzzy logic Interactions are rated by nodes as
either positive or negative, new
interactions are more valid
Direct and
indirect trust
Packet forwarding
ratio, energy
consumption ratio, and
convergence speed
[70] Secure routing Chain
optimization and
social networks
Stochastic Petri net technique.
Social trust is combined with QoS
trust to compute the total trust
value of a node
Direct and
indirect trust
Packet forwarding
ratio, energy
consumption ratio, and
convergence speed
2.4.5 Trust Mechanisms in Wireless Sensor Networks
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are composed of spatially distributed large number
of small sized low powered nodes that are connected to sensors, the nodes observe
specific environments and collects data about these environments, they convert the
collected sensed data into electrical signals and sends them to the base station (which
can be a computer).
The lifetime of a node is defined by its energy durability, energy is consumed
while a node performs its tasks in the network, the tasks of a normal node in WSNs
is to sense, compute, receive and send data through multiple hops. WSNs are used
in the military, healthcare, and environmental sensing. Unlike P2P networks, WSNs
are wireless where nodes communicate wirelessly, thus they have limited bandwidth
and resources. Due to their open, large, and distributed nature, and because nodes
are self-controlled, WSNs are vulnerable to both types of attacks, internal (inside the
network) and external (outside the network). There are many techniques to secure
WSNs in the literature such as key management, cryptography, privacy, reputation
and trust, and software protection [32].
Trust has received a lot of attention in research as it has shown to be an effective
security mechanism that is used to build trustworthiness among nodes in a network.
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Methods to build trust in WSNs include: Reputation models [38], cluster based trust
& honey bee mating [59], fuzzy logic [60], voting methods & monitoring nodes [55],
and QoS based trust [103].
M. Probst et al. [38] proposed a model that minimized the influence of malfunc-
tioned or malicious nodes in a WSN using reputation. Reputation was built among
nodes from the confidence level that nodes had towards each other. A high confi-
dence level, meant high trust. Data flowed between nodes that had a high confidence
interim, as the level of confidence started to fall, the system directed the data flow
to other nodes that had a high confidence interim, this technique helped in reducing
energy consumed by nodes in the network. Nodes collected direct and indirect ex-
periences with other nodes to build a trust value and a confidence interim for them.
An experience record of a node could be sensing data, forwarding or receiving data,
or creating an experience record for another node. To collect direct experiences,
nodes evaluated their neighbours by monitoring the communications performed by
them and recorded these communications as experiences in an experience record.
Nodes used these experience records to assign a trust value for other nods. Nodes
then weighed the experiences they collected for a node to calculate its confidence
interim. To collect indirect experiences, a node first evaluated the accuracy of its
next hop neighbour node in recording experiences. It started by monitoring the expe-
riences associated with its neighbour node, it then compared those experiences with
its own experiences, if the differences were small, then it meant its neighbour node
was accurately recording its experiences, and can be trusted and weighted the trust
value to calculate its neighbour’s confidence interim. The model addresses the trust-
worthiness of nodes in a WSN, but not the trustworthiness of the data that flows in
them. The model doesn’t consider the broadcasting of trust values, which is useful
in strengthening the reputation of a system.
A clustering based model based on a honey bee mating algorithm was proposed
in WSNs by R. Sahoo et al. [59]. The proposed model was designed to address the
energy consumed by nodes to increase the lifetime of a node. Nodes were grouped
in clusters, and each cluster was assigned a cluster head. The cluster head was cho-
sen based on the pre-requisites of having the highest energy, and had no records of
malicious behaviour. The cluster head had to provide services such as managing the
cluster that was assigned to it, and forwarding data to other clusters and base sta-
tions. These extra services that the cluster head had to provide over a normal node,
increased the energy consumed by cluster heads over normal nodes. Other factors
that increased the energy consumption of a cluster head was the distance of a cluster
to a base station, and the size of the cluster. The further the distance of the cluster
from a base station, and the larger the cluster, the more energy a cluster head con-
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sumed. The proposed model put these factors into consideration, and tried to balance
the load of the cluster head in the network. To increase the lifetime of the network,
when the energy level of a cluster head fell below the required threshold, a pre-
elected cluster head took the position of the previous cluster head. The trust value of
nodes was calculated based on direct and indirect trust of nodes inside each cluster.
The trust value of nodes increased with successful transactions, and decreased with
unsuccessful ones. The requirements of a clustering framework may not always be
available in a network.
R. Raje et al. [60] proposed a cluster based approach that was used in conjunction
with fuzzy rules to make appropriate routing decisions in a WSN. To maintain trust
in the network, nodes were grouped to form clusters and a key management design
was used. The network started with grouping nodes to form clusters. Each cluster in
the network had an active cluster head that was in charge of forwarding data to other
cluster heads or to a base station, the cluster head made these routing decisions based
on applied fuzzy rules. Similar to the P2P technique presented by C. Tian et al. [57],
if the cluster head’s services started to drop below the required threshold, then it
would be replaced with another potential cluster head. The potential cluster head
should be active in the network and would be chosen based on its ability to provide
services in the network such as its rate in delivering, transmitting, and receiving
packets. Each cluster head in each cluster was assigned a master key and was in
charge of maintaining that key. The master key was public to nodes in the same
cluster, the key was used to communicate with base stations and other clusters. The
trust level of nodes in the network was monitored based on their ability to deliver data
to base stations. The model needs to be validated through testing and simulation.
A communal reputation and an individual trust based model in a WSN was pre-
sented by T. Zia et al. [55]. The model built reputation from trust formed by feedback
from nodes about each other. To build trust in the network the model used voting and
implemented the watchdog mechanism [104] where each node monitored its neigh-
bour. Each node issued a trust vote for other nodes, and recorded their trust vote in
a trust table. The node issued a trust vote by first monitoring the node it transmitted
the message to, it watched to see if it kept the integrity of the message while for-
warding it. It then compared the message upon successful transmission and checked
if the message forwarded was an exact copy of the original. It recorded a positive
vote for the node that forwarded the message without any changes to the message,
otherwise, it recorded a negative vote for the node in its trust table. Each node in the
network did this process, by monitoring nodes they forwarded messages to, and then
voting positively or negatively, and then updating and recording the trust value based
on their vote in their trust table. Positive votes (resulting from successful message
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delivery) increased the trust value of a node, and negative votes decreased the trust
value of a node. If a node’s trust value fell below the required threshold, it would
be notified and reported as malicious to other nodes to bring awareness regarding
this malicious node. Once this awareness reached the cluster head through multiple
nodes, it would isolate the malicious node from the cluster by informing the nodes in
the cluster to abandon any messages from the reported malicious node. In addition to
the trust table that each node maintained in the network, each node also maintained
a reputation table that included the evaluated reputation values for all other nodes in
the network. Each node built the reputation table from its own trust table and other
node’s trust tables which were broadcast occasionally in a cluster. Nodes broadcast
their reputation tables as well, when nodes received other node’s reputation tables,
they used the evaluated trust values of nodes to update their own reputation tables by
averaging the total values of each node’s reputation value. Using monitoring nodes
requires to have nodes transmit messages within the same transmission range, also
the scheme consumes a large overhead on the network.
B. Zhang et al. [44] presented a novel trust management framework for WSNs
that built trust among nodes using 3 levels of trust - subjective or direct trust, objec-
tive or indirect trust, and recommended trust for unfamiliar nodes. Each node in the
network maintained a local trust list that recorded the 3 levels of trust for nodes in
the network. Each node could establish direct trust towards another node using its
direct past experiences with a node, if it never had a past experience with a node it
could seek feedback from trusted neighbours towards their trust to a node, and past
performance ability of a node to perform reliably in the network. Indirect trust is
built from the reputation of a node as viewed by other nodes in the network that had
previous interactions with the node, and a node’s reputation in regards to its ability
in preventing malicious behaviour. Nodes built recommended trust for unfamiliar
nodes in the network by using both direct and indirect trust. The model does not
consider the dynamic movement of nodes, and the sharing features of trust values
among nodes.
N. Karthik et al. [39], presented an algorithm that evaluated the trust value of a
node based on the security, mobility, and reliability attributes of a node in a WSN
network. The algorithm performs 2 steps, in step 1, it starts by calculating the initial
trust value of a node which is also called the indirect trust. When node A wants to
interact with node B, node A calculates the trust value of node B using its own past
experiences with node B and using the feedback from other nodes in the network
that had interactions with node B. If node A finds that the calculated trust of node
B is above threshold, it interacts with node B. If not, then step 2 of the algorithm
is conducted, which involves calculating the direct trust. To calculate the direct trust
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value of a node, node A first evaluates node B’s first model, the security model. If
the trust value of the security model is within the threshold range, it interacts with
node B, if not, node A evaluates node B’s second model, the mobility model. If the
trust value of the mobility model is within the threshold range, it interacts with node
B, if not, node A evaluates node B’s third model, the reliability model. If the trust
value of the reliability model is within the threshold range, it interacts with node B,
if not, node A calculates the overall trust by adding the indirect trust it calculated in
step 1, and the direct trust it calculated in step 2. If the result is above the required
threshold, node A interacts with node B, if not, it disagrees to interact with node B.
The algorithm can be improved to consider the scalability and fault tolerance of the
network, and the algorithm needs to be simulated to validate the model.
D. Qin et al. proposed a trust sensing-based secure routing mechanism [103]
that protected WSNs from malicious attacks. The mechanism used semiring theory
which involved the use of trust degree and QoS to improve security in WSNs. The
trust degree of nodes was computed based on the mobility and energy usage of sensor
nodes in a WSN. The mechanism adopted the watchdog detection technique to detect
malicious behaviour among sensor nodes. The mechanism also used an incentive
factor to encourage cooperation between node, and punish those that misbehaved.
Direct trust, indirect trust, and the incentive factor were all used to find the trust
degree, which was used for decision making.
The available trust and reputation methods in WSNs are summarized in table 2.4.
Table 2.4: Trust and reputation methods used in WSNs
Algorithm Objective Trust technique Trust property Trust method Metrics
[38] Trust evaluation Static trust
establishment
Confidence level. Nodes monitor
other nodes experiences to
calculate direct and indirect trust
Direct and
indirect trust
System life, confidence
interval width, and
sensor failure reaction
[59] Secure clustering Honey bee
mating
Trust value of nodes is calculated
based on direct and indirect trust of
nodes inside each cluster
Direct and
indirect trust
Energy consumption,
and average residential
energy
[60] Secure clustering Fuzzy rules Nodes are grouped to form clusters
and a key management design is
used
Direct trust Not shown
[55] Reputation
evaluation
Voting Voting is used and watchdog
mechanism is implemented where
each node monitors its neighbour
Direct trust,
indirect trust, and
reputation
Time taken to detect
malicious nodes
[44] Trust evaluation Multiple level
trust
management
Past experiences and performance
are used to calculate direct trust,
indirect trust is built from the
reputation of a node in regards to
its ability in preventing malicious
behaviour
Direct and
indirect trust
Reputation aggregation
accuracy, malicious
detection accuracy, and
malicious
recommendation
detection accuracy
[39] Trust evaluation Attribute based Indirect trust is calculated from
past experiences and feedback.
Direct trust is calculated from the
security, then mobility, then the
reliability model of a node
Direct and
indirect trust
Not shown
[103] Secure routing Semiring theory
and watchdog
detection
Trust degree and QoS Direct and
indirect trust
Average packet
delivery rate, and
routing overhead
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2.4.6 Trust Mechanisms in DTNs
DTNs, evolved from MANETs, provide connectivity between nodes without pre-
existing infrastructure. They were designed for interplanetary networks in providing
Internet services to support space investigations. Unlike WSNs and MANETs, in a
DTN, there is no end to end path from the source to the destination. Nodes in a DTN
stores the received messages in their buffers, and when they become in range with
other nodes, they forward the message to them, this process is repeated as necessary
until the message reaches its destination. Connectivity is intermittent, and messages
usually take time until they are sent, they could delay for hours or even days to reach
their destinations. This delaying process is not considered in MANETs, and affects
the delivery rates in MANETs but not in DTNs. Connectivity in DTNs could be
through mobile devices, satellite links, or the traditional dial-up links, figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: Delay tolerant networks
DTNs are exposed to a variety of attacks especially internal attacks that decreases
the network’s performance. To detect malicious acts in a DTN, trust and reputa-
tion methods for DTNs has received a lot of attention from researchers and, existing
trust methods used in DTNs include: Social and QoS trust [33, 101], iterative algo-
rithms [52], game theory [53], acknowledgments & digital signatures [72], public key
distribution [41], watchdog detection [74], and the stochastic Petri net technique [56].
I. Chen et al. [33, 101], proposed an encounter based trust management model
for DTNs that dealt with both malicious and selfish misbehaving nodes. They used
both social trust and traditional Quality of Service (QoS). They used the properties of
healthiness and unselfishness to measure the social trust of a node, and the properties
of connectivity and energy to measure the trust value of an encountered node. These
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4 factors were composed to make a trust metric to assess the trust of each node in
a DTN. The trust metric was affected by direct trust information such as encounter
events, and indirect trust information such as recommendations. This model deals
with packet dropping, self-promoting, bad mouthing, and ballot stuffing attacks, but
does not deal with packet modification attacks which is a common yet complex at-
tack.
A malicious node detection model using graph based iterative trust and reputation
methods was introduced by E. Ayday et al. [52]. Nodes in the network used past
experiences to evaluate the trust value of other nodes. Nodes were either service
providers where they provided a service, or were service consumers where they used
the services provided by service providers. After an interaction, service consumers
would rate the service provider of whom they used a service from. Using the rate
values and after examining them for their level of honesty, a reputation system was
built for nodes in the network. These ratings were recorded in a table and were
used by the iterative detection mechanism to keep the reputation of all nodes in the
system updated regularly, where nodes with a low reputation were removed from
the network. The gathered tables of each node in the network were then used to
create a bipartite graph. Lots of time and network overhead were required to build
the reputation system in this model. The complex in this model makes it hard to
implement on networks that may deal with emergency situations.
H. Zhu et al. [53] introduced a scheme that used trusted authorities to measure
the trust value of nodes, the scheme was modelled using game theory. Initially,
nodes recorded their history interactions with other nodes, and later sent their his-
tory records to the trusted authority (TA) which validated the trustworthy of nodes
in the network by observing their history records. The TA rewarded nodes with
good behaviour to encourage positive behaviour, and punished misbehaving nodes
to minimize negative behaviour. A probabilistic misbehaviour detection scheme was
used where TAs could validate nodes or not, and where nodes could misbehave or
not. A reputation system was then created for nodes in the network where positive
behaviour increased a node’s reputation in the network, and a negative behaviour de-
creased a node’s reputation in the network. TAs are costly and hard to provide in
large networks.
A reputation system was proposed by G. Dini et al. [72] where every node locally
assigned a reputation value to nodes it interacted with and used this reputation value
in the future by choosing nodes with a high reputation to forward its message to. The
integrity of messages was protected using digital signatures. Each node maintained
the reputation of other nodes using acknowledgments from the destination, a node
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list, and aging. When a source sent a message to a certain destination through in-
termediate nodes, the destination would send an acknowledgment back to the source
once it received the message. When the acknowledgment arrived at the source; the
source would update the reputation of intermediate nodes. Every message contained
the list of nodes that contributed in passing the message along to the destination,
which once received the message, it would update the reputation value of the nodes
that forwarded the message. Also, the reputation of a node was affected by aging, in
which if it stopped interacting with nodes, its reputation value decreased. Because
the reputation system was built locally among nodes, this technique reduced the over-
head cost of having to maintain a reputation system globally. The system eliminates
self-attacks by eliminating selfish node instead of dealing with and tolerating them.
A public key distribution without a centralised PKI model based on trust was pre-
sented by C. Djamaludin et al. [41]. To establish initial trust in a network, a Leverage
of Common Friends system was also introduced. The model was decentralised and
used the Web of Trust principle. Nodes authenticated other nodes based on their
confidence level that the node indeed owned its public key. The confidence level in-
creased when nodes noticed lots of occurrences of a node’s public key in the network
as it would be difficult for a malicious node to tie itself with the identity of a node
that was already known in the network. The more a node came in contact with nodes
and the more friends a node had in the network, the higher its trust value became and
the more confidence other nodes would have towards it. The model was not tested
with multiple malicious nodes in the network, when in reality, the number malicious
nodes cannot be predicted.
P. Asuquo et. al [74] proposed a trust management scheme that uses the Bayesian
watchdog detection to detect selfish, blackhole, and packet dropping attacks. The
scheme was proposed to allow communication between nodes in emergencies where
support services are required. The watchdog monitors traffic for any dropped pack-
ets. Nodes that transmit all the packets have full trust. Nodes that have trust values
below the required threshold are list as malicious. The proposed method was able to
detect and eliminate malicious nodes from the network.
J. Cho et al. [56] proposed a history based trust model for DTNs. The model
examined the data that is received from nodes in addition to the nodes that passed
the data. The stochastic Petri net technique was used to evaluate the model. Legiti-
mate nodes used a group key to interact with each other, the key was managed by a
trust authority. Trust was formed from direct and indirect experiences, and changed
dynamically according to environmental changes. The model worked effectively in
dealing with increased network overhead when selfish and malicious nodes started
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affecting the network. However, even though the model used trusted authorities for
group management only, they are costly and hard to provide in large networks.
T. Babbitt et al. [46] proposed a trust based security model for DTNs that was
based on contact time and the number of message copies. Using the contact time of
nodes, the model was designed to use trust to decrease the exposure of messages to
malicious nodes. The number of message copies allowed nodes to make the correct
routing decisions. The model was extended to handle blackhole attacks. The model
can be enhanced by considering different mobility patterns.
The available trust and reputation methods in DTNs are summarized in table 2.5.
Table 2.5: Trust and reputation methods used in DTNs
Algorithm Objective Trust technique Trust property Trust method Metrics
[33] [101] Dynamic trust
management
Social and QoS
trust
Healthiness and unselfishness
measure the social trust of a node.
Connectivity and energy measure
the trust value of an encountered
node
Direct and
indirect trust
Delivery ratio, delay,
and message overhead
[52] Trust
management
Bipartite graph
based iterative
trust
Rate values are used after
examining them for their level of
honesty to build a reputation
system
Reputation Confidence of
detection success, and
packet delivery ratio
[53] Trust evaluation Game theory A probabilistic misbehaviour
detection scheme is used where
trusted authorities could validate
nodes or not
Reputation Malicious node
detection rate, false
rate of misidentified
nodes, cost,
transmission overhead
[72] Reputation
evaluation
Digital signatures
and acknowledg-
ments
The integrity of messages is
protected using digital signatures.
Nodes maintain the reputation of
other nodes using
acknowledgments from the
destination, a node list, and aging
Direct trust and
reputation
Node list length,
delivery ratio,
attraction ratio, average
delay, and number of
sent messages
[41] Initial trust
establishment
Public key
distribution
Web of trust principle through a
leverage of common friends’
system
Direct and
indirect trust
Public key distribution
efficiency, malicious
key distribution,
detected approved keys
distributed, and false
public keys distributed
[74] Trust
management
Bayesian
watchdog
detection
Contact history and encounter
records
Direct and
indirect trust
Delivery probability,
latency, and overhead
ratio
[56] Trust evaluation Provenance/history
based trust
Historical pattern of evidence such
as positive or negative evidence
Direct and
indirect trust
Average delay, and
ratio of correct
message delivery
[46] Secure routing Contextual trust Contact time and number of
message copies
Adjusted trust Delivery rate and
delivery delay
2.4.7 Trust Mechanisms in OppNets
OppNets have emerged from delay tolerant networks (DTNs) where connectivity is
intermittent. The nodes are often disconnected from each other and use Bluetooth,
Wi-Fi, or any other wireless connectivity to exchange and forward data in an oppor-
tunistic hop by hop manner [105] as in figure 2.5. Because there is no end-to-end
path between a sender and a destination, the message forwarding opportunities are
usually limited, with possibly higher error rates, and longer delays [1].
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Figure 2.5: Opportunistic networking
Trust is a very important feature that needs good management in OppNets, some
of the trust methods used in OppNets include: Ontology using reputation [34, 61],
spam filtering [71], watchdog monitoring nodes and the Positive Feedback Message
(PFM) [54], social trust [40, 42, 67, 68], and encounter based trust [43].
A trust model based using ontologies was proposed by M. Gonçalves et al. [34].
Using reputation, the ontology classified nodes in the network according to their
trustworthiness in the network. A node used its past experiences with a target node
to evaluate its direct reputation value, and used recommendations from other nodes
towards a target node to evaluate its indirect reputation value. Direct and indirect rep-
utation were both combined and then used as a decision parameter for nodes to look
at before trusting other nodes. The model does not consider trust changes according
to a node’s location, and this is a relevant feature in OppNets.
Another ontology based trust model was presented by E. Tamez et al. [61]. A
Semantic Web Framework was provided for nodes to help them make decisions re-
garding trusting other nodes in the network. The semantic service included a list of
all the possible services that may be needed by nodes. The model classified nodes
into 4 different groups as either private unknown helpers, public unknown helpers,
trusted known helpers, or OppNet reservists. The trust value was assigned to the
whole group based on the direct and indirect trust value of the group. The model
needs to be validated using simulation.
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S. Trifunovic et al. [71] proposed a Trust Based Spreading (TBS) approach to
allow nodes to collaborate with each other to filter spam messages by exchanging
assessments to allow or block the spreading of the message between nodes in a
network when they came in contact with each other opportunistically. The system
started when a node received a message, it classified the content of the message as
legitimate or spam. The node then placed legitimate content in a whitelist, and spam
content in a blacklist. When nodes came in contact with each other, they exchanged
their white and black lists whether they exchanged content or not. A threshold of
required assessments must be met to confirm an assessment. The model works effec-
tively against spam but does not solve censorship in OppNets.
A trust-based framework was proposed by N. Li et al. [54] that evaluated a node’s
capability to distribute data based on a node’s reputation using watchdog monitoring
nodes and the Positive Feedback Message (PFM). The authors designed a Watchdog
mechanism that fits with OppNets where there was no end to end path. When a source
node wanted to forward a message, it searched for nodes with a high reputation
and then forwarded the message and monitored the behaviour of the node that got a
forward of the message. When the node delivered the message to the destination, the
destination formed a positive feedback message (PFM) which requested to increase
the reputation of all the nodes that delivered the message. When the source node
received the PFM from the destination, it updated the reputation of the nodes listed
in the PFM. The watchdog kept track of the number of PFM’s nodes had as they
encountered and forwarded messages with each other. Nodes that didn’t have a PFM
returned to the sender for their attempt to forward a message didn’t prove their good
forwarding behaviour. The collected PFMs were used to create a reputation system
of nodes in the network to help improve the future data forwarding where nodes sent
their messages to nodes with a higher reputation. The source node received the PFM
from the destination through epidemic routing, and the advantage of doing that was
to speed up the process of updating the reputation of nodes, but it also increased the
overhead cost on the network.
S. Trifunovic et al. [40], designed a reputation based system using social explicit
and implicit trust to secure routing in OppNets. Explicit trust was built from the
level of friendship among friends meeting each other. Implicit trust relied on the
familiarity (encounter duration) and the similarity (to which extent 2 familiar nodes
stayed in the same location) of nodes, the larger the encounter duration, the more
trust that peer gained. Implicit trust helped in determining if a node was legitimate or
not. The authors did not test with different weights for explicit and implicit trust, also
it would have been good to add reputation to the network to spread the trust values
of nodes.
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Another social based trust system was presented by S. Gupta et al. [42] where
nodes in the network were grouped based on their social position in the network.
Each group was assigned a value that indicated the importance of the group in the
social network. The destination received the message forwarded to it from the source
node through intermediate nodes, it used the number of hops to measure the trust
value of each intermediate node. The trust value of nodes that participated in for-
warding the message was updated. The model does not consider random misbe-
haviour of malicious nodes in the network, thus requiring a dynamic function for
calculating the social trust value for nodes.
A social based dynamic trust model was proposed by L. Yao et al. [67]. As
nodes moved in the network, they exchanged messages with nodes that had a higher
social similarity with destination nodes. The more common features nodes had with
each other, the more trust they had towards each other. The trust that was formed
is dynamic though, which meant it would change when the behaviour of a node
changed, thus trust was formed as a result of social similarity as well as the routing
behaviours of nodes. The proposed model achieved improved performance against
different attacks by allowing packets to flow through trusted nodes only, and isolating
malicious and selfish nodes. More work is required to preserve the privacy protection
for users, as the model relied on the assumption that users always share their social
features to help other nodes.
L. Li et al. [68] proposed a secure routing mechanism for OppNets based on so-
cial trust. The model evaluated social trust between nodes using different attributes
such as the encountering and duration rates, forwarding rates, and similarity between
nodes. The model considered network coding for data transferring, and buffer man-
agement to achieve secure OppNet routing. The model was designed to secure rout-
ing against packet dropping, trust boosting, and defamation attacks. The model can
be improved to preserve the privacy of nodes as the make their routing decisions.
M. El-Sherief et al. [43] took the activity of nodes in the network into consider-
ation when designing an OppNet trust system. An active node in the network had
more opportunities to come in contact with other nodes, hence had a higher chance
of meeting the destination. Direct trust was calculated using the activity parameter,
an active node was determined by the number of encounter rates with other nodes. To
avoid having highly active malicious nodes with a high trust value, indirect trust was
measured using the cooperation, honesty, and similarity parameters of nodes towards
other nodes in the network. The model needs to be improved to maintain the high
delivery rate but with decreased delay.
The available trust and reputation methods in OppNets are summarized in ta-
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ble 2.6.
Table 2.6: Trust and reputation methods used in OppNets
Algorithm Objective Trust technique Trust property Trust method Metrics
[34] Trust evaluation Ontology using
reputation
Past experiences are used to
measure direct reputation, and
recommendations from other nodes
are used to evaluate indirect trust
Direct and
indirect
reputation
Influence of the fade
factor, indirect
reputation, and updated
recommendations
[61] Trust
management
Ontology using
reputation
Group based trust model Direct and
indirect trust
Not shown
[71] Trust evaluation Trust based
spreading
Filter Spam messages by
exchanging assessments to allow or
block the spreading of the message
Direct and
indirect trust
Reach and availability
of content
[54] Trust evaluation Watchdog
monitoring nodes
and the Positive
Feedback
Message (PFM)
Collected PFMs are used to create
a reputation system
Direct and
indirect
observation
Ratio of data attracted
and delivered, and
average delay
[40] Reputation
evaluation
Social trust Reputation is built from explicit
(friendship) and implicit trust
(familiarity and similarity)
Reputation Implicit social trust
[42] Group based trust Social trust Each group is assigned a value that
indicates the importance of the
group in the social network
Direct and
indirect
reputation
Dropped message,
overhead ratio,
malicious count,
delivery probability,
and aborted message
[67] Trust
management
Social trust Common interest and social
similarities
Direct and
indirect trust
Delivery ratio, average
delay, dropped packets,
delivery cost, detection
time, and detection
accuracy
[68] Trust
management
Social trust Encountering, duration, and
forwarding rates, and similarity
between nodes
Direct and
indirect trust
Delivery ratio, delivery
latency, delivery cost,
average trust value
[43] Trust
management
Encounter based
trust
Encounter rate is used to measure
indirect trust. Cooperation,
honesty, and similarities
parameters are used to measure
indirect trust
Direct and
indirect trust
Delivery ratio, and
average delay
Our
approach
Reputation
management and
evaluation
Weighted average Merkle trees and frequency,
indirect and meeting trust are used
to build a reputation system
Direct and
indirect trust
Packet
dropping/modification
rate and malicious path
and node detection
2.5 Summary
This chapter started with an introduction on OppNets, and generally outlined the
classifications of routing protocols of OppNets with a highlight of their advantages
and disadvantages. The available non-trust and reputation based solutions to defend
against packet dropping and modification attacks were defined and presented. The
strengths and drawbacks of existing non-trust and reputation based techniques used
to deal with packet dropping and modifications attacks were clearly stated.
This was then followed by introducing the major trust and reputation mechanisms
used in the literature for different types of networks such as P2P, ad hoc networks,
MANETs, WSNs, DTNs, and OppNets. Some of the presented models used the trust
attribute only without spreading the trust value between nodes in the network which
would increase the security level in a network dramatically. Other models used the
reputation attribute by itself, working with a global reputation value is not easily
managed in a network. Models that used both of trust and reputation showed better
39
Chapter 2 Literature Review
outcomes during network evaluations. The strengths and drawbacks of those models
were also highlighted.
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A Trust Based Strategy Protecting
against Selective Packet Dropping
Attacks in OppNets
In this chapter, a novel trust based node and path detection technique against selec-
tive packet dropping attacks is presented. Using the trust attribute with the Merkle
hashing technique, a node’s identity can be validated, and malicious nodes can be de-
tected. The proposed technique is integrated with Epidemic and PRoPHET routing,
and simulation is used to show how effective the technique works against selective
packet dropping attacks. Simulation results show that the technique accurately de-
tects malicious paths. The results also show that with time, malicious node detection
accuracy also increases as intermediate nodes have more time to establish trust with
destination nodes. Simulation results show that delivery rates increase with increased
storage. Further, results for the performed comparative study show how the devel-
oped trust model improves and secures routing compared to non-trust models.
3.1 Introduction
Opportunistic networks (OppNets) are networks with no infrastructure. When a
source node needs to transfer a message to the destination node, there is no estab-
lished or fixed path to the destination. Interrupted connectivity between nodes is nor-
mal. OppNets have inherited these features from delay tolerant networks (DTNs),
and due to these features, message delivery is not guaranteed, and message delivery
time is unbounded. The message transfer in OppNets happen when nodes come in
contact with each other in the network opportunistically.
To effectively secure OppNets from packet dropping is a challenging problem. In
selective packet dropping attacks, the malicious node attempts to drop some packets
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and forwards an incomplete number of packets. This attack results in the distortion of
the message once the remaining packets reach the destination and results in degrada-
tion of network performance and can sometimes completely disrupt communication
in the network [11]. Many defense methods have been developed to better secure the
completeness of data in OppNets. The techniques used in [12–23] aimed to deal with
packet dropping attacks. The limitations of those methods include; detecting the ma-
licious path but not the malicious node, the necessity of having multiple paths, the
complications of using monitoring nodes, high network costs, and decreased delivery
rates.
When the message reaches the destination, if the message had missed some pack-
ets due to a dropping attack, the destination node might be able to detect a packet
dropping attack, but knowing which node attempted the malicious act is the difficult
part. Also, what makes selective packet dropping attacks difficult to detect is that
packets are dropped not solely due to malicious nodes, there could be other reasons
why a packet gets dropped such as collision, end of a packet’s life (TTL), battery
usage, storage limitation, or physical damage of the device.
This is where trust and reputation play an important role in networks security, the
two attributes are essential to validate a node’s identity and avoid malicious nodes.
Attracting a lot of interest from researchers, trust and reputation are used in P2P
networks [29], ad hoc networks [30], MANETs [31], WSNs [32], DTNs [33], and
OppNets [34].
The methods in [47–50] work with assigning global trust values for nodes in the
network. Maintaining global values is difficult and requires lots of time and input
from nodes in the network. Trust and reputation based methods that used monitoring
nodes, cryptography trusted authorities, clusters, groups, or categories [51–55, 57–
61] are either hard to establish in non-structured networks due to the required high
transmission overhead and verification cost, or require a clustering framework which
may not always be available.
More work needs to be done to create a trust and reputation based model that is
designed to suit an OppNet. As some of the existing methods rely on context but
don’t consider mobility which is very important in OppNets [31, 34, 62, 63]. The
work in [65, 66] requires unrealistic restrictions and parameters. Methods that rely
on path length [70] or the delay parameter [69] cannot be implemented in OppNets
because delay is one of its features.
To deal with the complications of adopting existing methods into OppNets, a trust
based system that protects the network from packet dropping attacks is proposed. In
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the proposed system, trust is defined as how much confidence a node has towards
another node and is used as a guide for nodes to make their routing decisions. For
instance, assume 2 nodes - A and B - opportunistically came in contact with each
other in a network. Node A needs to forward a message to the destination, so node A
has the choice to decide whether it will trust node B to pass the message to it or not.
NodeAwill make its decision based on how much confidence it has towards nodeB,
or how much it trusts node B. The level of trust node A has towards node B defines
the level of honesty and the good service that node A believes node B will provide.
So, in the proposed work, trust defines the level of honesty and the good service a
node has in the network, and this is derived and built from direct past interactions a
node has with others.
A malicious path and a malicious node detection mechanism that detects ma-
licious paths with nodes that attempt selective packet dropping attacks using the
Merkle tree hashing technique [75] is presented in this chapter. Based on the results
of path detection (whether legitimate or malicious) a trust value is built for nodes in
each path. The built trust value for each node in each path the destination is involved
with is stored locally in each destination’s trust table. Malicious nodes are detected
when their trust values fall below the required threshold. The advantage of using
trust to identify malicious nodes is that nodes have more than one chance to prove
themselves legitimate before they are listed as malicious. The algorithms will be
tested and evaluated using the Opportunistic Network Environment simulator [106],
a simulator designed for evaluating routing protocols in OppNets.
Contribution. The main contributions of this chapter are:
1. Efficient algorithms to detect a malicious path using the Merkle tree hashing
technique, where the Merkle root will be used to detect if a selective packet
dropping attack has occurred. (Algorithms 1 and 2).
2. An efficient algorithm that builds a trust value for nodes as they forward com-
plete packets to destination nodes. Destination nodes create local trust tables
for nodes with their trust values that are then used by destination nodes to
classify malicious nodes and non-malicious nodes. (Algorithm 3).
3.2 Overview of Solution
In this section, an overview of the solution is presented. The proposed method has
the following features: The Merkle tree is a complete but not a perfectly complete
binary tree (completely filled by the system). The Merkle root is sent along with each
packet’s header, and detection is done at the destination. Path trust is built and used
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by destination nodes only, and direct trust is dynamic. Selective packet dropping
attacks, malicious paths, and malicious nodes are detected.
An example of a selective packet dropping attack is shown in figure 3.1. The path
includes 5 nodes (represented by Nx). N2 receives 4 packets from N1, when N2 is in
contact with N3, it forwards to N3 the 4 packets it received from N1 (in their original
format). N3 intentionally drops 2 packets, and when it becomes in contact with N4 it
forwards to it only 2 packets.
Figure 3.1: A selective packet dropping attack
With the implementation of the developed algorithms, the path in figure 3.1 will
be detected as malicious, and the trust values for the intermediate nodes N2, N3,
and N4 will be impacted negatively. When any node’s trust value falls below the
minimum threshold; it is then classified as malicious.
3.2.1 Assumptions
The following are assumed:
• Intermediate nodes may be malicious but the source and destination nodes are
assumed to be legitimate.
• Since the model is dealing with selective packet dropping attacks, it is assumed
that at least one legitimate packet reaches the destination.
3.2.2 Malicious Path Detection using Merkle trees
A Merkle tree [75] is a special binary tree that starts with hashing every packet using
a one-way hash function that takes an input and turns it into a unique hash using a
mathematical algorithm. The resulting hashes of these packets are called the leaves of
the tree located at the leaves level ([H00], [H01], [H02], and [H03] in figure 3.2). Every
pair of leaves are then concatenated and hashed to derive child hashes ([H10], and
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[H11] in figure 3.2). Depending on the size of the tree, the child hashes are then also
concatenated and hashed to derive further child hashes. This process is repeated until
only one value is left, the root, or the Merkle root ([H20] in figure 3.2). The Merkle
root can be used to authenticate messages, and can also reduce the authentication
overhead needed.
In OppNets, Merkle trees will be used to verify that data transferred in a path is
complete. If one packet is removed, the hash of its parent will change. Which will
change the hash of its parent, and so on, resulting in the Merkle root’s hash to change
as well.
Figure 3.2: A Merkle tree
A hash function must produce a hash with a fixed length output. An important
step in the hash construction process, which is called the Merkle-Demgrad construc-
tion, is that the last hashed packet should be clearly padded with the length of the
message [75]. The Merkle-Demgrad construction is also resistant to collisions. Pop-
ular functions include SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-3, and MD5. In the proposed system,
SHA-1 was used. The hash (h) formula for any packet (p) in the Merkle tree is
h(p) = h(h(p.left) + h(p.right)) where p.left and p.right are left and right sub
trees of that packet. Therefore, the hash for the root h(A) = h(h(B) + h(C)).
When choosing a cryptographic hash function, it is important that it has the fol-
lowing features:
• Easy to compute the hash value for any given data.
• You cannot generate the original data from a given hash (one-way only) [107].
• You cannot change a packet without changing its hash.
• 2 different data cannot have the same hash (no collisions).
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Merkle trees are perfectly complete when the number of leaves/packets is even,
and in each level of the tree (except the root), the number of hashes is also even. If
the number at any level of the tree is odd, the tree is referred to as a complete (but not
perfect) tree. In the proposed method, both perfectly complete trees and trees that
require completion are considered. If the number of hashes is not even at any level
of the tree, the odd hash is concatenated with itself to form a new parent hash value.
Further explanation follows:
• Perfect complete binary tree: Has an even number of packets that results in an
even number of elements at each level in the tree from bottom-top (except the
root). For example, as shown in figure 3.3, there are 8 packets which result in
8 hashes, results to 4 parent hashes, then 2, then 1. As can be seen from the
figure, the number of elements in each level is even, or perfectly completely
filled.
Figure 3.3: A perfect complete binary Merkle tree
• Complete binary tree: The number of packets can be any number and there
are no restrictions on requiring the tree to have a perfect complete number of
packets. However, the tree needs to be completed in order to build the tree.
This can be addressed in 2 ways:
1. If there is an odd number of hashes at any level of the tree, the last
packet’s hash value is concatenated with itself to form a new hash value
that is used as input to the hash function to compute the parent hash value.
An example is shown in figure 3.4, the leaf hash value of the fifth packet
is single (H04), so it will be concatenated with itself to generate the parent
hash value (H12). At level 1, H12 is concatenated with itself to generate
the parent hash value (H21), and at level 2, H21 is merged with the rest of
the tree. The concatenation process needs to happen at every level of the
tree only when the resulting hashes in the level is not even. For example,
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in Fig 3.4, the hashes needed self-concatenation at the "Leaf hashes" and
"Level 1" levels, but not in "Level 2".
Figure 3.4: A Merkle tree with number of hashes that needs completion
Having an even number of packets does not guarantee having even num-
ber of hashes at each level in the tree. Sometimes, the number of leaves is
even, but at some point in the tree, an element has to be concatenated with
itself to compute the value of the parent element, as shown in figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: A complete Merkle tree with 18 packets
2. If the source wants to send number of packets less or more than a num-
ber that makes a perfectly complete binary tree, then dummy packets are
created to complete the tree, these dummy packets will be used to create
filler hashes.
In the proposed approach, the first option is chosen to be used as it is easier
to work with existing hashes than having the source node create filler hashes
from extra dummy packets.
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Advantages of using Merkle trees for this chapter include:
1. The advantage of using Merkle trees over cryptographic verifications is that
packets can be verified using the root only first, if the received Merkle root
matches with the calculated Merkle root, then there is no need to do further
calculations, thus limiting the amount of data transferred which saves time and
network resources [108].
2. They save computational resources needed to verify each packet. Hash calcu-
lations perform significantly fast because of their small size (between 100-200
bits long), thus they don’t consume a lot of computational resources when
compared to cryptographic verifications.
3. Sending and verifying all of the hashes individually is more expensive than the
verification process performed using Merkle trees where only the Merkle roots
are verified.
In the proposed technique, the sender (source node) performs algorithm 1, em-
beds the Merkle root in each packet’s header and sends them to the destination
through intermediate nodes, figure 3.6. Upon receipt, the destination node performs
algorithm 1 to compute a new Merkle root.
Figure 3.6: Source sends the packets with embedded Merkle root to the destination
The reason why the root is chosen to be sent in each packet’s header, is to guar-
antee the arrival of the root even if only one packet is received.
In algorithm 1:
• The source/destination hashes each packet to generate leaf hashes (lines 2 to
3).
• It builds a Merkle tree from the leaf hashes (lines 4 to 12).
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• And computes the Merkle root (lines 13 to 15).
The source sends the packets along with the Merkle root inside each packet’s
header. The destination receives the packets; it performs algorithm 1 to compute the
hashes for the packets, builds a Merkle tree, and computes a new Merkle root.
Algorithm 1 Hash each packet, build Merkle tree, and compute the Merkle root
1: READ: packets
2: For all packets
3: hash[i] = createHash(packet[i])
4: For all hashes in each level
5: if numberOfHashes = even then
6: hash[i] = createHash(hash[i] + hash[i])
7: else
8: if !lastHash then
9: hash[i] = createHash(hash[i] + hash[i + 1])
10: else
11: hash[i] = createHash(hash[i] + hash[i])
12: end if
13: if level = last then
14: rootValue = hash[i]
15: end if
16: end if
The complexity of the algorithm depends on the number hashes which is depen-
dent on the number of packets, and is "order N": O(N). The complexity of the algo-
rithm is expressed as linear-time, meaning, the complexity increases as the packets
increases.
The destination then performs algorithm 2 to use the computed Merkle root to
compare with the original Merkle root sent by the source. If the 2 roots match, it
means that the destination received the correct number of packets. If the 2 roots
don’t match, the destination reports the path as malicious, and reports that a selective
packet dropping attack has occurred. At this stage, the destination cannot identify
the malicious node, and thus suspects that any node in the path could be malicious.
In algorithm 2:
• If the 2 roots are not equal, the destination reports that the path is malicious,
and the path is added to the malicious paths list (lines 2 to 6).
Original hash sent by the source is denoted with the symbol (’).
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Algorithm 2 Identify malicious paths
1: READ: merkleRoot’
2: if merkleRoot 6= merkleRoot’ then
3: Path is malicious
4: maliciousPaths[maliciousPathCounter] = currentPath
5: maliciousPathCounter++
6: end if
3.2.3 Malicious Node Detection using Trust
In the proposed approach, the first time a node comes in contact with another node,
the default is, it trusts it. However, over time, the trust ratings start to increase or
decrease as nodes communicate with each other.
All nodes in the network are assigned an initial trust value of 0.5 in the network.
If a node’s trust value decreases below 0.2 (nodes with trust values of 0.1 or 0.0), it
is classified as malicious. Destination nodes perform the detection process based on
the data they receive from source nodes through intermediate nodes.
As detection is done at the destination, the destination in this case acts as a central
authority. Each destination maintains a trust table that records the direct/path trust
value of each node that contributed in passing the message along a given path.
When the destination authenticates the message by matching the received Merkle
root with the calculated Merkle root, it increments the direct trust value of each node
in the path by x, where x could be any value in the range 0.1 and 0.4. The best
value for x was identified through evaluations and happened to be 0.1. If the 2 roots
don’t match, the destination subtracts x from the direct trust value of each node in
the path, as indicated in algorithm 3. Because at this stage, the destination cannot
identify the exact node that may have dropped the packets, and cannot know if they
were dropped for malicious or non-malicious reasons. It subtracts x from the trust
value of each node in the path and only counts a node as malicious if its direct trust
value falls below 0.2 to give them an opportunity to prove in other paths that they
are not malicious (if they are indeed legitimate). If a node’s trust value falls below
0.2, and encounters the destination, the destination would still run algorithms 1 and 2
because that node may have been falsely identified as malicious. The roots are still
checked even if the node’s trust value is below threshold. If the roots equal each
other, the trust value of that node increases by x. That made the proposed trust
mechanism dynamic to consider falsely detected malicious nodes and non-malicious
packet dropping reasons.
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In this approach both path and direct trust are used. To elaborate, it is called path
trust when destination nodes increment/decrement the trust values of all nodes in the
path equally. However, the trust value for each node is referred to as direct trust
because the value for each node becomes different according to how they reoccur in
paths.
In algorithm 3:
• If the 2 roots are equal, then no packets were dropped. The trust value for each
node in the path that passed the message is increased by x (lines 2 to 4).
• If the 2 roots are not equal, the trust value for each node in the path that passed
the message is decreased by x (lines 5 to 7).
Original hash sent by the source is denoted with the symbol (’).
Algorithm 3 Build trust
1: READ: merkleRoot’
2: if merkleRoot = merkleRoot’ then
3: Packets are all legitimate
4: trustValueForEachNode = trustValueForEachNode + x
5: else
6: trustValueForEachNode = trustValueForEachNode - x
7: end if
Destination nodes utilize the trust tables they construct to identify good nodes
from malicious ones. In the proposed approach, only destination nodes make use of
the trust table. If the destination comes in contact with a node that it did not work
with before as an intermediate node in passing a message, then it assumes the default
trust value assigned to it at the start of the network, which is 0.5.
For example, the trust table of destination node [D] right at the start of the net-
work is shown in figure 3.7, the first node it comes in contact with is node [t24],
which happens to be malicious. Since the Merkle roots don’t match, the destination
node decreases the trust value of node [t24] by x, where x is 0.1.
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Figure 3.7: Trust table maintained by destination node [D] at path 1
The trust table of destination node [D] at path 2 is shown in figure 3.8, when the
Merkle roots didn’t match, the destination node decreased the trust value of nodes
[t20] and [t24]. It cannot identify at this stage the malicious node, but using this trust
mechanism, eventually, it will detect the malicious node later in the network.
Figure 3.8: Trust table maintained by destination node [D] at path 2
The trust table of destination node [D] later during network activity is shown in
figure 3.9. At this stage destination [D] was able to detect nodes [t20] and [t24] as
malicious as well as other malicious nodes.
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Figure 3.9: Trust table maintained by destination node [D] later in the network
3.3 Mathematical Analysis
In this section, an expression for the probability of having a malicious path, resulting
from a selective packet dropping attack with the condition that at least one legitimate
packet reaches the destination is developed. The notations used are as follows:
• n is the total number of nodes in the path
• m is the number of malicious nodes in the path
• k is the number of packets
• p is the probability that a packet is dropped by a malicious node
• β is the probability that at least one legitimate packet reaches the destination
• Dj is the probability of dropping j packets out of k packets
Since β is the probability that at least one legitimate packet reaches the destina-
tion. Thus:
β = 1− probability of no packets reaching the destination
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Given p, representing the probability that a packet may be dropped by a malicious
node, therefore a packet to survive a malicious node is 1 − p . This means that the
probability for a packet to survive a malicious path of m nodes is (1 − p)m. As a
result, the probability of a packet to be dropped along a malicious path of m nodes is
1− (1−p)m, which is denoted by λ. Therefore, the probability for k packets to be all
dropped in a path of m malicious nodes is (λ)k, which means that the probability of
no packets reaching the destination equals (1− (1−p)m)k. Hence the formula which
represents the probability that at least one legitimate packet reaches the destination
is,
β = 1− (1− (1− p)m)k
From this formula, the minimum number of packets required to ensure packets
delivery can be found to be:
1− β = (1− (1− p)m)k
This means,
log(1− β) = k log(1− (1− p)m)
Therefore,
k =
log(1− β)
log(1− (1− p)m)
Now the probability of dropping j packets out of k packets in a path that has m
malicious nodes can be represented by Pr(Dj) and can be calculated as:
Pr(Dj) =
(
k
j
)
λj(1− λ)k−j
However, the probability of that there is j packets dropped out of k packets sent,
with one legitimate packet reaching the destination can be calculated as:
k−1∑
j=1
Pr(Dj) =
k−1∑
j=1
(
k
j
)
λj(1− λ)k−j
So the probability of having a malicious path, which represents the probability
that a selective packet dropping attack has happened, given that there is at least one
legitimate packet reaching the destination can be written as:
Pr(D|β) =
k−1∑
j=1
(
k
j
)
λj(1− λ)k−j
β
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The probability of receiving at least one legitimate packet at the destination with
1, 2, and 5 malicious nodes is shown in figures 3.10 to 3.12 respectively. The math-
ematical analysis showed that when the number of malicious nodes was low, the
probability of receiving at least one legitimate packet at the destination node was
high, and when the number of malicious nodes increased, the probability of receiv-
ing at least one legitimate packet at the destination node decreased. This was because
the higher the number of malicious nodes, the higher the chances of dropping all (k)
packets. The results of the probability also showed that the probability of receiving
at least one legitimate packet to reach at the destination increased when the transfer
of packets increased.
Figure 3.10: Probability of receiving at least one legitimate packet at the destination with 1
malicious node in a path
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Figure 3.11: Probability of receiving at least one legitimate packet at the destination with 2
malicious nodes in a path
Figure 3.12: Probability of receiving at least one legitimate packet at the destination with 5
malicious nodes in a path
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Figure 3.13: Probability of detecting a malicious path with 1 malicious node
Figure 3.14: Probability of detecting a malicious path with 2 malicious nodes
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Figure 3.15: Probability of detecting a malicious path with 5 malicious nodes
The probability of having a malicious path with 1, 2, and 5 malicious nodes in
the path is shown in figures 3.13 to 3.15. The results of the probability showed that
the probability of packet dropping increased when the number of packets increased.
The probability of having a malicious path increased with the increasing probability
of dropping the packets. With a high number of malicious nodes, the probability of
packet dropping would be high, as a result the probability of having a malicious path
would be high.
The relationship between the number of packets and the probability of at least one
legitimate packet being dropped (β) across malicious paths with 1, 2, and 5 malicious
nodes in the path is shown in figures 3.16 to 3.18. In order to detect a malicious node
dropping a packet, the condition of dropping the packet by a malicious node needed
to be achieved. A higher probability of packet dropping was achieved when higher
number of packets were sent. When increasing the number of malicious nodes, larger
number of packets needed to be sent in order to achieve β values of 0.85, 0.90, and
0.95.
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Figure 3.16: Number of packets needed to achieve β = (0.85, 0.90, 0.95) in a path with 1
malicious node
Figure 3.17: Number of packets needed to achieve β = (0.85, 0.90, 0.95) in a path with 2
malicious nodes
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Figure 3.18: Number of packets needed to achieve β = (0.85, 0.90, 0.95) in a path with 5
malicious nodes
3.4 Evaluation using Simulation
3.4.1 Simulation Settings
The proposed methods were evaluated using the ONE simulator where a scenario
was constructed to generate a dataset that contained many paths and different types
of nodes with varying numbers. From the reports generated, a dataset was built to
form different paths with multiple nodes. The outcome dataset did not include any
malicious nodes and was called a legitimate dataset.
The scenario was defined to last for 1 hour, with 0.5 seconds of update intervals.
For connectivity, Bluetooth was chosen with transmit range of 10 meters of nodes
radio devices, and transmit speed of 8 Mbps. Different groups of nodes composed
of pedestrians, cars, and trams were created. All nodes in all groups had Bluetooth
interface.
Pedestrians and cars had up to 10MB of RAM just for storing and forwarding
messages in their mobile devices. When the buffer was full in a node, it wasn’t able
to accept more messages unless old messages were dropped from the buffer. Pedes-
trians and cars used the MapBasedMovement movement model, where nodes moved
randomly on roads and walkways defined for them by the imported map data, this
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model was chosen because it was realistic. Roads, main roads, pedestrian paths, and
shops were added to the map. There were 10 pedestrians, they all moved at random
speeds between 1-5 km/h with wait time of 10-30s after reaching the destination.
The 10 cars drove on roads only, and moved at speeds between 35-60 km/h, with
wait time of 10-30s.
There were 10 trams, since they had bigger buffers in their communication de-
vices; their buffers had up to 50 MB of RAM. The movement model for trams was
MapRouteMovement which was used for trams to follow a constructed tram line, a
circular route path was chosen for all trams. Trams drove at speeds of 25-35 km/h
with wait time of 10-30s at each configured stop.
Epidemic routing was used. Messages were generated every 1 to 5 seconds per
node, with message sizes varying between 500kB and 700kB. The network area was
4500m2 × 3400m2, Helsinki area. With movement warm-up of 10 seconds, this was
the time nodes took to spread before they started transmitting messages.
2 programs were written in C++ to test the algorithms:
• Program 1: Read the legitimate dataset and made a legitimate node malicious
by dropping a random number of packets from randomly chosen nodes de-
pending on the number of malicious nodes input by the user. The outcome
result of program 1 was a new dataset with malicious nodes created and was
called a corrupted dataset.
• Program 2: Started by reading the corrupted dataset, and implemented algo-
rithms 1 to 3 to detect any malicious paths and built trust values for nodes
accordingly.
3.4.2 Simulation Results and Analysis
The following metrics were used to evaluate algorithms 1 to 3:
1. Malicious path detection accuracy: The ratio of the total number of detected
malicious paths to the total number of actual malicious paths.
2. Malicious node detection accuracy: The ratio of the total number of correctly
detected malicious nodes to the total number of actual malicious nodes.
3. Malicious node detection false positive rate: The ratio of legitimate nodes clas-
sified as malicious.
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The malicious path detection accuracy was always 100% for each simulation time
because the proposed technique relied on the root values. To achieve a 100% mali-
cious path detection accuracy through evaluation, a path was marked as malicious
based on the equality of the Merkle roots. To maintain the 100% path detection
accuracy, the destination still ran algorithms 1 to 3 for nodes with trust values be-
low 0.2. That was done to give an opportunity for good nodes that had been falsely
classified as malicious which later appeared in good paths to have their trust values
incremented.
The malicious node detection accuracy and the false positive rate for node de-
tection over 1 hour, 2 hour, and 3 hour duration of simulation time are shown in
figures 3.19 to 3.24. The malicious node detection accuracy and the false positive
rate for node detection are shown on the y-axis, and the percentage of malicious
nodes increasing until all intermediate nodes acted malicious is shown on the x-axis.
The results were plotted using the simulation settings defined in section 3.4.1, but
with increasing the simulation time from 1 hour to 3 hours to show how the results
changed over time. Each point on the graph was a result of averaging 30 values
resulting from 30 simulation runs.
Figure 3.19: Malicious node detection accuracy, 1 hour of simulation time
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Figure 3.20: Malicious node detection accuracy, 2 hours of simulation time
Figure 3.21: Malicious node detection accuracy, 3 hours of simulation time
As can be seen in figures 3.19 to 3.21, when the simulation time increased, the
malicious node had a higher chance to be repeated in paths, so the accuracy was
higher. As the number of malicious nodes increased, the algorithms still maintained
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the accuracy level for detecting the malicious node. Also, the accuracy was its highest
when x = 0.4, then 0.3 and 0.2, and lowest when x = 0.1, but as can be observed next,
the increased accuracy came at the cost of increased false positive rate.
It can be observed from figures 3.22 to 3.24 that when the simulation time in-
creased, the false positive rate also increased. Although the malicious node detection
rate increased (in figures 3.19 to 3.21), however, because the algorithms were based
on path detection, legitimate nodes were affected as well which resulted in increased
false positive rates. With a shorter simulation time, a node had a less chance of be-
ing identified as malicious, because the node may have not had the time to appear
in enough paths to be falsely classified as malicious. With the increase of malicious
node percentage, the false positive rate decreased as the proposed method was relying
on path based calculations to build trust among nodes, the nodes became malicious
indeed. When x = 0.1, the false positive rate was the lowest, and highest when x =
0.4. x = 0.1 resulted in a constant rate for the 3 hours of simulation time, while keep-
ing a good malicious node detection accuracy. When x = 0.4, good nodes didn’t get
the chance to prove themselves legitimate in other paths, increasing the simulation
time did not make a difference in this case.
Figure 3.22: Malicious node detection - false positive rate, 1 hour of simulation time
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Figure 3.23: Malicious node detection - false positive rate, 2 hours of simulation time
Figure 3.24: Malicious node detection - false positive rate, 3 hours of simulation time
From the figures it has been observed that the detection accuracy increased when
the value of x increased and when the simulation time increased, but the increase in
node detection accuracy came with an increased false positive rate. Based on this,
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the chosen value of x was 0.1 when running the algorithm, because although the
accuracy was not the highest (however, very reasonable), but the false positive rate
was the lowest.
3.4.3 The Developed Trust Based Approach in Epidemic and PRoPHET
Routing
The malicious node detection accuracy (obtained above in figures 3.19 to 3.21)
through Epidemic routing, and obtained and compared with PRoPHET routing (with
x = 0.1 in algorithm 3) is shown in figures 3.25 to 3.27. PRoPHET achieved an
accuracy similar to Epidemic routing, only slightly more. This was because both
Epidemic and PRoPHET routing replicated multiple copies of the message in the
network to increase the chances of message delivery.
Figure 3.25: Malicious node detection accuracy using Epidemic/PRoPHET routing, 1 hour
of simulation time
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Figure 3.26: Malicious node detection accuracy using Epidemic/PRoPHET routing, 2 hours
of simulation time
Figure 3.27: Malicious node detection accuracy using Epidemic/PRoPHET routing, 3 hours
of simulation time
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3.5 Impact of Mobility Speed and Storage on Mali-
cious Node Detection Accuracy
The evaluation was extended to study the impact of mobility speed and storage on the
malicious path and malicious node detection accuracy. Algorithms 1 to 3 (with x =
0.1 in algorithm 3) were tested using the simulation settings defined in section 3.4.1,
but with nodes being as:
• Trams only.
• Cars only.
• Walkers only.
The malicious node detection accuracy, and the false positive rate for node detec-
tion are shown in figures 3.28 to 3.33.
Figure 3.28: Malicious node detection accuracy (impact of mobility speed and storage), 1
hour of simulation time
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Figure 3.29: Malicious node detection accuracy (impact of mobility speed and storage), 2
hours of simulation time
Figure 3.30: Malicious node detection accuracy (impact of mobility speed and storage), 3
hours of simulation time
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Figure 3.31: Malicious node detection - false positive rate (impact of mobility speed and
storage), 1 hour of simulation time
Figure 3.32: Malicious node detection - false positive rate (impact of mobility speed and
storage), 2 hours of simulation time
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Figure 3.33: Malicious node detection - false positive rate (impact of mobility speed and
storage), 3 hours of simulation time
It can be observed from figures 3.28 to 3.30 that trams achieved a 100% detection
accuracy at all times when increasing the percentage of malicious nodes in the net-
work, and when increasing the simulation time. Cars started off with achieving 50%
accuracy, and when increasing the simulation time, the accuracy increased to 75%
then up to 100%. Pedestrians achieved the lowest detection accuracy that started to
decrease with the increase in percentage of malicious nodes. The accuracy did not
show much rise over time. Because of their slow speed and limited storage, pedes-
trians were not repeated in enough paths to be detected as malicious.
It can further be observed from figures 3.31 to 3.33 that trams always had the
highest false positive rate. This was because of their frequent occurrences in paths
which resulted in misclassifying other good nodes that existed in the same path.
Whereas cars and pedestrians didn’t occur in paths as much as trams to mis-classify
good nodes as malicious.
When looking at the settings in table 3.1, it was noted that although cars drove
faster than trams, trams still achieved a higher detection rate because they were able
to carry information more than other nodes and this was due to their large buffers.
The large buffers gave trams the space for storing messages, thus they accepted more
new messages. So, trams were chosen by nodes to transfer messages which stayed
on their buffers until reaching destination nodes, unlike cars and pedestrians who
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were more likely to drop the message when their buffers were full. This made trams
appear in many paths, so when a malicious node was a tram, the number of malicious
paths increased. In a previous study by M. Alajeely et al. [109], the authors show
that trams could carry and exchange information faster and improve connectivity in
OppNets.
Table 3.1: Node speed, transmit speed, transmit range, and buffer settings
Node Type Speed Transmit Speed Transmit Range Buffer Space
Pedestrians 1-5 km/h 8 Mbps 10 meters 10MB
Cars 35-60 km/h 8 Mbps 10 meters 10MB
Trams 25-35 km/h 8 Mbps 10 meters 50 MB
3.6 Comparison Analysis
In this comparison section, a comparison analysis showing the performance of the
proposed trust-based approach with other non-trust based OppNet routing approaches
is presented. The most popular OppNet protocols are Epidemic routing and PRoPHET.
These protocols are non-trust based. The comparison was done with non-trust meth-
ods for the purpose of showing the level of importance of using trust in an Opp-
Net, and to determine if trust based methods contributed in controlling the packet
dropping rate in an OppNet. A quick brief about Epidemic routing and PRoPHET
follows:
• The basic idea of Epidemic routing (Vahdat and Becker [77]), is that when 2
nodes come in contact with each other in a network, they first exchange their
summary vectors which has a record of all the messages a node is storing. The
2 nodes then look into the received summary vectors to see which messages
they don’t have and request those messages from the other node.
• PRoPHET [78] improves Epidemic routing by adding the delivery predictabil-
ity (calculated from past records) in the summary vector which gives further
information to nodes about the probability of a node to reach the destination.
If the delivery predictability of a node is high, then it will get a copy of the
message, otherwise it won’t.
The metric used to compare the developed technique with the 2 OppNet protocols
mentioned above is the packet dropping rate, which is defined as the ratio of the total
dropped packets to the total number of packets in the network.
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The packet dropping rate over time tested in a network with 50% (50% was cho-
sen because it was the moderate rate) malicious nodes using the developed algo-
rithms (with x = 0.1 in algorithm 3) and 2 non-trust OppNet protocols is shown in
figure 3.34.
Figure 3.34: Epidemic and PRoPHET routing with and without implementing the developed
technique
As can be observed from the figure, the packet dropping rate decreased as the sim-
ulation time increased. The algorithms worked as they minimized packets dropped
when destination nodes identified malicious nodes and prevented them from forward-
ing incomplete packets. Thus, over time, the dropping rate was controlled and re-
duced, and this proved the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms.
The dropping rate however, increased in Epidemic routing and PRoPHET and as
malicious nodes were added to the network, the number of packets dropped more.
And since there wasn’t a trust method implemented in these protocols, the dropping
rate was not controlled. The results further show that a trust model worked more effi-
ciently than a non-trust model, results have shown how the proposed trust mechanism
improved routing by controlling the packet dropping rate.
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3.7 Summary
In this chapter, a solid trust based node and path detection technique against selective
packet dropping attacks was presented. Using the Merkle root, and the trust attribute,
destination nodes were able to validate a node’s identity and the malicious path and
node were hence detected. The trust based model has been tested using Epidemic
and PRoPHET routing embedded in an OppNet routing simulator named the ONE.
Using the simulator alongside the programs designed to add trust to the network,
the effectiveness of the technique in detecting selective packet dropping attacks were
shown. With time, the results showed how the node detection accuracy increased as
intermediate nodes had more time to establish trust with destination nodes. Further
testing have shown how delivery rates increased with increased storage. Further,
results for the performed comparative study showed how the proposed trust model
improved and secured routing compared to non-trust models.
The model restricted detection to be done by destination nodes only, and did not
have the feature where trust was propagated through the network. In the next chapter,
the model improves on this to not only allow destination nodes to perform the detec-
tion, but also intermediate nodes in each path. This will increase the performance
of the network and increase the detection accuracy. In addition, the model will al-
low nodes to share their trust values thus making use of reputation, another powerful
attribute in improving the security of the network. In the next chapter, the use of
Merkle tree expands to allow nodes detect the number of dropped packets which is
important for tracking the packet dropping rate.
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A Dynamic Trust and Reputation
Based Selective Packet Dropping
Defense Mechanism
In this chapter, a dynamic trust/reputation system designed to protect an OppNet
from selective packet dropping attacks is presented. The system uses the Merkle tree
hashing technique to detect if the message has lost parts of it, and uses the direct
and indirect experiences of nodes to calculate a reputation value for each node. The
reputation value of a node changes according to its behaviour towards other nodes
in the network. The robust system has shown its effectiveness in detecting selective
packet dropping attacks, the node that performed the attack, and the path at which
the malicious node has performed the attack. To improve the performance of the
network, and to eliminate communication with malicious nodes, each node in the
network adopts this system. Simulation results show how the dynamic reputation
utilizes legitimate nodes and improves routing in an OppNet. Results also show that
the packet dropping rate drops over time, thus improving the performance of the
network. Further results show how storage plays a big role in OppNets, and how the
proposed dynamic trust/reputation system compared to a non-trust/reputation based
system improves routing by controlling the packet dropping rate.
4.1 Introduction
In chapter 3, a trust based system that enabled destination nodes to detect malicious
paths and nodes was presented. In this chapter, the system is improved to allow each
intermediate node in addition to destination nodes to perform the algorithms and
detect selective packet dropping attacks using the Merkle tree hashing technique. In
addition to trust, the system is improved further to incorporate reputation as well.
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Trust and reputation are used to help nodes form honest relationships among each
other, and allows them to evaluate the quality of their service in the network.
Trust can be established in 2 ways: Direct trust established through direct obser-
vations of other node’s behaviours from past records, and indirect trust established
through trust propagation of recommendations from other nodes. In this chapter,
reputation is calculated by using both of direct and indirect trust. Further, nodes can
evaluate the truthfulness of feedback they receive from other nodes before accepting
and using the feedback to update their reputation values.
Trust is what a node thinks of another node in the network based on its own
interactions with that node from past experiences. Reputation is what the node itself
thinks of a node from its direct experiences, and what other nodes think of a node
through feedback received from them. In this chapter, to deal with the complications
of maintaining a global reputation value, the reputation value is stored locally in each
node’s table so that they can have quick access to it. The benefits of having reputation
used is to make use of the feedback received from the experiences of other nodes,
while still using direct experiences to deal with cases where false feedback is given
from other nodes. So the trust/reputation system in this chapter makes use of both
types of information, the feedback of a node about another node is the indirect trust,
used with the direct trust is called the reputation value.
Contribution. The main contributions of this chapter are:
1. An algorithm to detect selective packet dropping attacks using the Merkle tree
hashing technique, where half of the Merkle tree hashes are used to authen-
ticate the number of packets received. Based on the results, direct trust is
calculated. (Algorithm 4).
2. An efficient algorithm that uses direct and indirect trust to calculate a reputa-
tion value for nodes in the network. Upon encounter, nodes share their reputa-
tion values, and update their values accordingly. The reputation value is used
to classify malicious nodes and legitimate nodes. (Algorithm 5).
4.2 Overview of Solution
In this section an overview of the solution is provided. The proposed method has
the following features: The Merkle tree is a perfect complete binary tree. Half of
the Merkle tree hashes are sent along with the packets in each packet’s header, and
detection is done at each node. Direct and indirect trust (reputation) are used by
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nodes in the network, and direct trust is dynamic. Selective packet dropping attacks,
malicious paths, and malicious nodes are detected.
In node by node detection, the node performs the detection process based on the
data it receives from the previous node. The previous node sends the packets along
with half of the Merkle tree’s hashes, the receiving node performs algorithm 4 to
detect if a packet dropping has happened or not.
The technique used in this chapter is designed to detect the number of dropped
packets which allows the system to calculate the packet detection accuracy. The
technique is designed to have better detection accuracy because it is designed to stop
dropped packets propagation once malicious nodes are detected, but allows legiti-
mate packets to flow in the network.
The advantage of adopting this technique is that intermediate nodes are able to
detect packets dropped instead of having destination nodes responsible for the detec-
tion. This helps increase the detection accuracy, thus improving the performance of
the network.
4.2.1 Assumptions
The following are assumed:
• Intermediate nodes may be malicious but the source and the destination nodes
are assumed to be legitimate.
• Since the model is dealing with selective packet dropping attacks, at least one
legitimate packet reaches the destination.
4.2.2 Malicious Path and Packet Dropping Detection using Merkle
Trees
As discussed in chapter 3, Merkle trees are usually binary trees, and they are perfectly
complete when the number of leaves/packets are even, and at each level in the tree
(except the root), the number of nodes/hashes is also even. If the number in any level
of the tree is odd, then the tree is referred to as a complete (but not perfect) tree. In
the proposed method, only perfect complete binary trees are considered.
A perfect complete binary tree has an even number of packets that result in an
even number of hashes at each level in the tree from bottom-top (except the root).
For example, there are 16 packets shown in figure 4.1 which result in 16 hashes,
resulting to 8 parent hashes, then 4, then 2, then 1. As can be seen from the figure,
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the number of elements in each level is even (except the root). For example, the
following number of packets always result in a perfectly complete binary tree: 2 (1
level), 4 (2 levels), 8 (3 levels), 16 (4 levels), 32 (5 levels), 64 (6 levels), 128 (7
levels), 256 (8 levels), etc. From this pattern, it can be derived that when the number
of packets is a result of the following formula: 2k, where k is an integer number
such as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc., then the resulting tree is a perfectly complete binary tree.
The technique is based on this type of Merkle tree, perfectly complete ones, and
from this, a technique to identify the number of packets expected to arrive at the
destination node, thus identifying selective packet dropping attacks is developed.
Because it’s a perfect complete binary tree, it is possible for the receiving node
to know how many packets to expect. The source node sends the packets, and inside
their headers, it embeds half the Merkle tree hashes. The receiving node uses the
number of hashes inside the packet’s header to know the number of packets it should
receive. With perfectly complete trees, half of the hashes of the Merkle tree including
the root is always equal to the number of packets sent by the source.
The reason the Merkle hashes are chosen to be sent in each packet’s header, is to
guarantee the arrival of the hashes even if only one packet is received.
For example, in figure 4.1, there are 16 packets, the packets and half of their
Merkle tree hashes (in orange colour) are the ones that are sent by the source, which
also, equals to 16.
Figure 4.1: A perfect complete Merkle tree with 16 packets
The receiving node receives the packets; it performs algorithm 4 to calculate the
direct trust for the node it received the packets from. Direct trust is calculated as
follows:
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1. The receiving node receives the packets and embedded within their headers are
half of the Merkle tree hashes, it counts the number of the embedded hashes,
and compares the result with the number of packets it received (lines 2 to 3).
2. If they are equal, then no packets were dropped. The trust value of the previous
node is increased by updateTrustV alue (a value used to update the direct trust
value of a node) (lines 3 to 4).
3. If they are not equal, then a selective packet dropping attack is detected. The
trust value of the previous node is decreased by updateTrustV alue. The num-
ber of dropped packets is calculated, and the path is indicated as malicious
(lines 5 to 9).
4. When the path is indicated as malicious, the path is added to the malicious
paths list (lines 10 to 13).
Algorithm 4 Direct trust
1: READ: half of merkle tree hashes
2: count numberOfHashes
3: if numberOfHashes = numberOfPackets then
4: Packets are all legitimate, trustValueForPreviousNode = trustValueForPrevi-
ousNode + updateTrustV alue
5: else
6: A selective packet dropping attack have occurred, trustValueForPreviousNode
= trustValueForPreviousNode - updateTrustV alue
7: droppedPackets = numberOfHashes - numberOfPackets
8: pathIsMalicious = true
9: end if
10: if pathIsMalicious then
11: maliciousPaths[maliciousPathCounter] = currentPath
12: maliciousPathCounter++
13: end if
The complexity of the algorithm depends on the number hashes which is depen-
dent on the number of packets, and is "order N": O(N). The complexity of the algo-
rithm is expressed as linear-time, meaning, the complexity increases as the packets
increases.
4.2.3 Malicious Node Detection using Trust and Reputation
In the proposed method, trust is affected by packet dropping detection. All nodes in
the network are assigned an initial trust value (referred to as
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defaultStartingTrustV alue). If a node’s trust value decreases below the assigned
threshold value (threshold), it is classified as malicious. In node by node detection,
the malicious node is detected before it reaches the destination, so there is no central
authority. In this case, each node maintains its own reputation table and stores it
locally. The table records a node’s direct and indirect experiences with other nodes
in the network, both values are then used to calculate the reputation of each node. The
reputation value is exchanged among nodes in the network to increase awareness if
malicious nodes are found.
A node authenticates a message it receives from another node by comparing the
received half of the Merkle tree hashes with the number of packets it received, if
they are equal, it increases the trust value of the node it received the message from
by updateTrustV alue, and updates the direct trust value of the node in its locally
saved table, and exchanges the reputation values of other nodes it has in its table with
the node that transferred it the message. If they are not equal, the node decreases the
trust value of the node it received the message from by updateTrustV alue, and
updates the direct trust value of the node accordingly, as explained in (algorithm 4).
Consider the following path:
[Source] –> [t24] –> [t22] –> [t20] –> [Destination]
In this path, assuming that node [t24] is malicious, and considering the following
message transfer (simplified for ease of explanation purposes) in figure 4.2:
Figure 4.2: Path - from the source node to node [t22]
The source hashes each packet and builds a Merkle tree from the leaf hashes and
embeds half of the Merkle tree hashes in each packet’s header, it sends the pack-
ets upon node encountering. Because node [t24] is malicious, it drops 4 packets.
When in contact with node [t22], node [t22] runs algorithm 4 to calculate the direct
trust of node [t24]. Node [t22] compares the number of received Merkle tree hashes
with the number of packets it received. Because they are not equal, node [t22] sub-
tracts updateTrustV alue from the trust value of node [t24], and updates the direct
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trust value of the node accordingly. Although when the 2 values don’t match, it
could be concluded that the previous node is malicious. Depending on the value
of updateTrustV alue, the node can still prove in other paths that it did not drop
the packets for malicious reasons, but rather for other non-malicious reasons such
as storage limitations, for this reason, nodes continue to exchange their reputation
tables until they are confirmed as malicious.
Based on the assumption that the defaultStartingTrustV alue is 0.5, the
updateTrustV alue is 0.1, and threshold value is 0.2, the reputation table of node
[t22] is shown in figure 4.3. Because this is at the start of the network, the first node
[t22] contacts is [t24]. Because node [t22] did not come in contact with anyone yet
who came in contact with node [t24] before, it does not have an indirect trust value
for node [t24], so by default, the direct trust value is assigned as the reputation value.
Figure 4.3: Node [t22] reputation table
Upon nodes encountering and during their contact time (the time nodes spend to
communicate with each other), nodes exchange the computed reputation value from
their reputation tables and update their reputation values accordingly using algorithm
5. When a node receives a reputation value for a node from another node, it evaluates
and saves the reputation value in the indirect trust column in its reputation table
and the reputation value is automatically updated to reflect the new information it
received. If there is no direct contact between two nodes, then each node relies on
the default trust value assigned to nodes at the start of the network.
A salient feature of this approach is nodes rely on the reputation values of nodes
inside their reputation tables, and use these reputation values not only to classify
malicious and legitimate nodes, but also to evaluate the truthfulness of the reputation
values they receive from them when they meet them again. For example,
• When a reputation value is received from node B to node A, node A will
multiply the received reputation value by how much it trusts node B using the
reputation value of node B in node’s A reputation table.
• The value of the received reputation is measured by the reputation value of the
node giving the feedback. The higher the reputation value of a node, the higher
the value of the given feedback.
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• If the received reputation value is from a node that it has not come in contact
with before, and did not assign a trust value to it, it multiplies the received
recommended feedback by the default starting trust value.
The reputation value is the one nodes exchange with other nodes, it is computed
as: Reputation = (Direct Trust * DR) + (Indirect Trust * IR). (Where DR and IR are
the direct and indirect trust weights that will be assigned when testing the algorithms
respectively).
The reputation value is updated upon each direct and indirect contact with nodes.
To further demonstrate this, the reputation tables of nodes [t22] and [t24] after they
exchange their reputation values is shown in figure 4.4, assuming the weights 70%
for DR, and 30% for IR.
Figure 4.4: Nodes [t22] and [t24] exchange their reputation values and update their reputation
tables
Both nodes perform algorithm 5 during their contact time to calculate the indi-
rect trust and reputation values in their reputation tables. So node [t22] gives to node
[t24] its reputation value for node [t20], which is 0.39. Node [t24] has never come in
contact with node [t22], so it will assume the defaultStartingTrustV alue. So, the
indirect trust value would be 0.19 (0.39 * defaultStartingTrustV alue). The final
reputation value for node [t20] in node’s [t24] reputation table would be 0.34 (DR
(which is 70%) of direct trust and IR (which is 30%) of indirect trust). Node [t22]
trusts node [t24] by 0.4 from its direct experience, so it assigns the reputation value it
receives from node [t24], 0.13 (0.34 * 0.4), this is how node [t22] evaluates the reputa-
tion values it receives from node [t24]. Because [t22] did not come in contact directly
with node [t20], it assigns to its direct trust value the defaultStartingTrustV alue
which is 0.5, and the reputation value for node [t20] in node’s [t22] reputation table
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would be 0.39 (70% of direct trust and 30% of indirect trust). Node [t22] does not
exchange its reputation value for node [t24] with node [t24], because node [t24] can-
not create a record of itself inside its own reputation table. Also, the next time node
[t22] receives a reputation value for node [t20] from another node, it averages the old
value for indirect trust with the new value to calculate an updated indirect trust for
[t20] or any other node.
Each node in the network maintains its reputation table. Nodes use their reputa-
tion tables and look at the reputation value of a node to decide whether they should
trust a node or not. Of course, tables shown above only look like that at the start of
the network and start to expand as the traffic in the network flows. When a reputation
value of any node in the network falls below the required threshold value, its status
automatically changes from Legitimate to Malicious. Nodes reject to receive any
messages from nodes with a Malicious status in their reputation tables, this is done
to reduce the packet dropping rate in the network.
Indirect trust and reputation in algorithm 5 are calculated as follows:
• If the received feedback (the recommended reputation value of another node)
is given from a known node, the feedback is evaluated by multiplying the rep-
utation value of the node giving the feedback with the value of the feedback
(lines 2 to 3).
• If the received feedback is from an unknown node, the feedback is multiplied
by defaultStartingTrustV alue (lines 4 to 6).
• If it is the first time indirect trust is assigned into the receiving the node’s table,
then the feedback is assigned as the indirect trust value (lines 7 to 8).
• If the receiving node already has a value for the node in its indirect trust, then
the indirect trust value is calculated by summing and averaging the existing
indirect trust value with the new received feedback value (lines 9 to 11).
• The reputation value is calculated by adding DR of direct trust with IR of
indirect trust (line 12).
4.3 Mathematical Analysis
In this section, an expression for the probability of having a malicious node is devel-
oped, resulting from a selective packet dropping attack with the condition that at least
one legitimate packet reaches the next node. The probability of having a malicious
node is equal to the node’s reputation.
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Algorithm 5 Indirect trust and reputation
1: READ: feedback
2: if feedback is from a known node then
3: feedback = feedback * reputationValueOfNodeGivingFeedback
4: else
5: feedback = feedback * defaultStartingTrustV alue
6: end if
7: if indirectTrust = firstTimeToAssign then
8: indirectTrust = feedback
9: else
10: indirectTrust = (indirectTrust + feedback) / 2
11: end if
12: reputationValue = (directTrust * DR) + (indirectTrust * IR)
Let N = The set of all neighbouring nodes.
Let Rt(x, y) = The reputation of node x upon node y at time t
Let DR(x, y) = Direct reputation
DR(x, y) =

γ if there is no neighbour reputation
αDR(x, y) + (1− α) IR(x, y)
if IR(x, y) >= 0, otherwise 0
γ is the default value of trust, in the proposed method, initially at the start of
the network, all nodes are trusted. Trusting nodes at the start of the network allows
nodes to interact with each other easily which helps them form trust and reputation
relationships which allows them to classify legitimate and malicious nodes.
α is the value assigned for direct trust that nodes build through their direct expe-
riences with other nodes.
IR(x, y) = Indirect reputation
IR(x, y) =

N∑
i=1
R(zi, y)
N
if there is ziN
such that R(zi, y) > 0
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When nodes come in contact with each other, they exchange the reputation values
stored in their tables, the value they exchange is IR(x, y). A node that nobody knows
gets a zero value for its reputation in neighbour nodes.
An expression for the probability of having a malicious path is developed. That is
the probability of a dropping attack happening in a malicious path given that at least
one legitimate packet reaches the destination. The notations used are as follows:
• N is the total number of nodes in the path
• DR(ni, ni+1) is the direct trust for node ni to its neighbour nj which is the
next node to carry the packets towards the destination.
• k is the number of packets
• β is the probability that at least one legitimate packet reaches the destination
• Dj is the probability of dropping j packets out of k packets
Since β is the probability that at least one legitimate packet reaches the destina-
tion. So, 1 - β means that no packets reach the destination.
Since DR(ni, ni+1) represents the probability of that a packet survives the next
node ni+1. This means that the probability that a packet may survive a malicious
path of n1, n2, n3, ..., nN nodes is,
N∏
i=1
(DR(ni, ni+1))
As a result, the probability that a packet may drop in any malicious path of N
malicious nodes is:
1−
N∏
i=1
(DR(ni, ni+1))
Which can be denoted by σ. Therefore, the probability for the k packets to be
dropped in a path of N malicious nodes (σk) equals:
(1−
N∏
i=1
(DR(ni, ni+1)))
k
Hence,
β = 1− (1−
N∏
i=1
(DR(ni, ni+1)))
k
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This means,
log(1− β) = k log(1− (1− (DR(ni, ni+1)))m)
And so,
k =
log(1− β)
log(1− (1− (DR(ni, ni+1)))m)
Now the probability of dropping j packets out of k packets in a path that has N
malicious nodes can be represented by Pr(Dj) and can be calculated as:
Pr(Dj) =
(
k
j
)
σj(1− σ)k−j
However, the probability of that there is j packets dropped out of k packets sent,
with one packet reaching the destination can be calculated as:
k−1∑
j=1
Pr(Dj) =
k−1∑
j=1
(
k
j
)
σj(1− σ)k−j
So the probability of having a malicious path, which represents the probability
that a selective packet dropping attack has happened, given that there is at least one
legitimate packet reaching the destination can be written as:
Pr(D|β) =
k−1∑
j=1
(
k
j
)
σj(1− σ)k−j
1− (1−∏Ni=1(DR(ni, ni+1)))k
The probability of detecting a malicious path, with nodes that have high, medium,
and low reputation values is shown in figure 4.5. The figure shows a representation
of the probability of packet dropping in a malicious path, and the probability of
detecting the malicious path. It can be observed from the results of the probability,
that the probability of detecting a malicious path increased as the reputation values
of nodes decreased. And this was because the algorithms were designed to detect
malicious paths based on the low reputation values of nodes. And as the number of
packets increased in the network, the probability of detecting a malicious path also
increased. It was clear that when the probability of delivering the packet was low,
the probability of dropping the packet was high.
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Figure 4.5: Probability of detecting a malicious path with nodes with high, medium, and low
reputation values
The reputation values of nodes for each range (high, medium, and low) are shown
in table 4.1, and categorized as follows:
• Nodes with high reputation values have values between 0.7 to 0.99.
• Nodes with medium reputation values have values between 0.4 to 0.69.
• Nodes with low reputation values have values between 0.0 to 0.39.
Table 4.1: Reputation range values
Nodes in
path
High
reputa-
tion
Medium
reputa-
tion
Low rep-
utation
Node 1 0.8 0.4 0.1
Node 2 0.89 0.59 0.3
Node 3 0.7 0.6 0.22
Node 4 0.8 0.7 0.21
Node 5 0.9 0.45 0.15
Node 6 0.79 0.65 0.25
Node 7 0.9 0.51 0.2
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4.4 Evaluation using Simulation
4.4.1 Simulation Settings
The ONE simulator had built-in routing protocols for OppNets that allowed nodes
to send and receive messages, provided various movement models for nodes, and
generated various reports. Using the simulator, the below scenario was created, and
the simulator was observed as it visualized the mobility of nodes while exchanging
messages upon the opportunistic contacts between nodes.
The simulation time for this scenario ran for 1 hour, 2 hours, and 3 hours. The
routing protocol chosen for this scenario was Epidemic routing. All nodes communi-
cated with each other using Bluetooth with a transmission range of 10 meters, and a
transmission speed of 8 Mbps. All nodes created new messages every 1 to 5 seconds
with a size ranging between 500kB and 700kB. Nodes were defined with different
mobility speeds and storage space, as follows:
• 10 walkers were defined to walk on the MapBasedMovement map model with
a walking speed of 1-5 km/h, and a buffer size of 10MB.
• 10 cars were defined to drive on roads on the MapBasedMovement map model
with a driving speed of 35-60 km/h, and a buffer size of 10MB.
• 10 trams were defined to drive on the MapRouteMovement map model with a
driving speed of 25-35 km/h, and a buffer size of 50 MB.
The algorithms were tested to see how effectively they functioned in an OppNet
with malicious nodes, programming was required as the simulator did not provide
further options such as making a node behave maliciously and purposely drop pack-
ets.
After the simulation was completed; it was possible to produce a dataset from the
specified generated reports. The dataset was composed of many paths with various
nodes with different speeds and types as specified in the scenario. At this point, all
the nodes in the constructed dataset were legitimate. The dataset was then fed into a
written C++ program that manipulated the data by turning legitimate nodes into ma-
licious nodes depending on the number of malicious nodes required. The malicious
node dropped a random number of packets (but not all) and forwarded the rest to
the next hop node. Another program was written in C++ to implement algorithms 4
and 5 and created a dynamic trust/reputation system that detected malicious nodes
who attempted selective packet dropping attacks.
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4.4.2 Simulation Results and Analysis
The metrics used to evaluate algorithms 4 and 5, are:
1. Malicious path detection accuracy: The ratio of the total number of detected
malicious paths to the total number of actual malicious paths.
2. Packet dropping detection accuracy: The ratio of the total number of detected
dropped packets to the total number of actual dropped packets.
3. Packet dropping rate: The ratio of the total dropped packets to the total number
of packets in the network.
4. Malicious node detection accuracy: The ratio of the total number of correctly
detected malicious nodes to the total number of actual malicious nodes.
5. Malicious node detection false positive rate: The ratio of legitimate nodes clas-
sified as malicious.
Extensive simulation tests were completed in order to find the best values for
the direct and indirect trust by varying the values for threshold, the default starting
network trust value, and the update trust value. 5 sets of variations were made, the
best 3 of the variation sets were chosen to be presented in this section. A complete
set of all the graphs for all the 5 variations are included in appendix A. From each of
the 3 sets, the values that achieved the highest accuracy, the least false positive rate,
and the least packet dropping rate are presented.
Table 4.2, summarizes the aim of each variation and the overall aim of the 3
variations.
Table 4.2: Aim of each variation
Variation Aim of variation Aim of the 3
variations
1 Find the best threshold
value
Find the best
values for
direct and
indirect trust
2 Find the best value for
the default starting
network trust value
3 Find the best value for
the update trust value
The malicious path detection accuracy and the packet dropping detection accu-
racy always gave 100% at all times and for all variations, therefore, their graphs will
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not be presented in this section. For the other 3 metrics however, they are shown on
the y-axis, and the number of malicious nodes increasing until 9 (which is 75% of
intermediate nodes) intermediate nodes acted malicious is shown on the x-axis, for
the packet dropping rate graph, time is shown on the x-axis. The results were plotted
using the simulation settings defined in section 4.4.1. Each point on the graph was a
result of averaging 30 values resulting from 30 simulation runs. For each variation
set, the results are presented in this order:
1. Malicious node detection accuracy
2. Malicious node detection false positive rate
3. Packet dropping rate (only for the trust values that gave the best results for the
detection accuracy with a zero false positive rate).
The following letters on the graphs represent:
• t = threshold
• d = default starting network trust value
(defaultStartingTrustV alue)
• u = update trust value by (updateTrustV alue)
• DR = direct trust weight
• IR = indirect trust weight
4.4.2.1 Variation 1: Varying the threshold Value
The first variation to start testing with is shown in table 4.3. This variation focuses
on finding the best threshold value.
Table 4.3: Variation 1
Threshold Default
starting
network trust
value
Update
trust value
by
0.1 0.5 0.1
0.2 0.5 0.1
0.3 0.5 0.1
It has been observed from the results, a threshold value of 0.3 gave the best
results as shown in figures 4.6 to 4.11. It can be observed from the results that the
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best accuracy with a zero false positive rate was when DR = 0.5, and IR = 0.5, the
packet dropping rate for these trust weights combination is shown in figure 4.12.
Figure 4.6: Malicious node detection accuracy, 1 hour of simulation time (variation 1)
Figure 4.7: Malicious node detection accuracy, 2 hours of simulation time (variation 1)
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Figure 4.8: Malicious node detection accuracy, 3 hours of simulation time (variation 1)
Figure 4.9: Malicious node detection - false positive rate, 1 hour of simulation time (variation
1)
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Figure 4.10: Malicious node detection - false positive rate, 2 hours of simulation time (vari-
ation 1)
Figure 4.11: Malicious node detection - false positive rate, 3 hours of simulation time (vari-
ation 1)
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Figure 4.12: Packet dropping rate with direct trust (DR) = 0.5, and indirect trust (IR) = 0.5
(variation 1)
4.4.2.2 Variation 2: Varying the Default Starting Network Trust Value
The second variation is shown in table 4.4. This variation focuses on finding the best
value for the default starting network trust value.
Table 4.4: Variation 2
Threshold Default
starting
network trust
value
Update
trust value
by
0.3 0.4 0.1
0.3 0.5 0.1
0.3 0.6 0.1
It has been observed from the results that a default starting network trust value
of 0.4 gave the best results as shown in figures 4.13 to 4.18. It can be seen from the
results that the best accuracy with a zero false positive rate was when DR = 0.7, and
IR = 0.3, the packet dropping rate for these trust weights combination is shown in
figure 4.19. The accuracy had increased, and the packet dropping rate had reduced
in this variation compared to variation 1.
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Figure 4.13: Malicious node detection accuracy, 1 hour of simulation time (variation 2)
Figure 4.14: Malicious node detection accuracy, 2 hours of simulation time (variation 2)
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Figure 4.15: Malicious node detection accuracy, 3 hours of simulation time (variation 2)
Figure 4.16: Malicious node detection - false positive rate, 1 hour of simulation time (varia-
tion 2)
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Figure 4.17: Malicious node detection - false positive rate, 2 hours of simulation time (vari-
ation 2)
Figure 4.18: Malicious node detection - false positive rate, 3 hours of simulation time (vari-
ation 2)
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Figure 4.19: Packet dropping rate with direct trust (DR) = 0.7, and indirect trust (IR) = 0.3
(variation 2)
4.4.2.3 Variation 3: Varying the Update Trust Value
The third variation is shown in table 4.5. This variation focuses on finding the best
value for the update trust value.
Table 4.5: Variation 3
Threshold Default
starting
network trust
value
Update
trust value
by
0.3 0.4 0.1
0.3 0.4 0.2
0.3 0.4 0.3
It has been observed from the results that an update trust value of 0.2 gave the
best results as shown in figures 4.20 to 4.25. It can be seen from the results that the
best accuracy with a zero false positive rate was when DR = 0.7, and IR = 0.3, the
packet dropping rate for these trust weights combination is shown in figure 4.26. The
accuracy had increased, and the packet dropping rate had decreased in this variation
compared to variations 1 and 2.
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Figure 4.20: Malicious node detection accuracy, 1 hour of simulation time (variation 3)
Figure 4.21: Malicious node detection accuracy, 2 hours of simulation time (variation 3)
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Figure 4.22: Malicious node detection accuracy, 3 hours of simulation time (variation 3)
Figure 4.23: Malicious node detection - false positive rate, 1 hour of simulation time (varia-
tion 3)
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Figure 4.24: Malicious node detection - false positive rate, 2 hours of simulation time (vari-
ation 3)
Figure 4.25: Malicious node detection - false positive rate, 3 hours of simulation time (vari-
ation 3)
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Figure 4.26: Packet dropping rate with direct trust (DR) = 0.7, and indirect trust (IR) = 0.3
(variation 3)
4.4.2.4 Summary of the 3 Variations: threshold, Default Starting Network,
and Update Trust Values Selection Analysis
From the 3 variations, and based on the summary in table 4.6 the following can be
concluded:
• The malicious node detection accuracy increased with time (figures 4.6 to 4.8,
4.13 to 4.15 and 4.20 to 4.22), this was because the malicious node had a higher
chance to be repeated in paths to be classified as malicious or legitimate. As
the number of malicious nodes increased in the network, the algorithm still
maintained the accuracy level for detecting the malicious node.
• The false positive rate increased as the value for the indirect trust increased
(figures 4.9 to 4.11, 4.16 to 4.18 and 4.23 to 4.25), this was because a high
weight was given for feedback from other nodes which could be false.
• The packet dropping rate decreased over time (figures 4.12, 4.19 and 4.26).
This showed the effectiveness of the algorithm as it minimized packets to be
dropped by identifying malicious nodes and preventing them from forwarding
incomplete packets. The dropping rate increased as the number of malicious
nodes increased in the network, and this was natural as the more malicious
nodes, the more packets they tended to drop.
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• As the value of threshold increased, the detection accuracy also increased.
This was because malicious nodes had less time to be listed as malicious, but
the chances of having legitimate nodes to be falsely classified as malicious had
also increased.
• As the default starting network trust value decreased, the detection accuracy
also increased, however the false positive rate increased as well.
• Overall, the accuracy was the highest, and the packet dropping rate was the
lowest in variation 3. Based on that, and while maintaining a high accuracy
and zero false positive rates, DR = 0.7 and IR = 0.3 were chosen to be the best
values for direct and indirect trust weights, with threshold 0.3, a default trust
value of 0.4 (algorithm 5), and a 0.2 for updating the trust value (algorithm 4).
Table 4.6: Summary of results
Variation Threshold-default starting
network trust value-update
trust value by
Best
direct-indirect
trust values
Variation 1 0.3-0.5-0.1 0.5-0.5
Variation 2 0.3-0.4-0.1 0.7-0.3
Variation 3 0.3-0.4-0.2 0.7-0.3
Node by node detection in addition to the trust/reputation system used by nodes
had resulted in a good node detection accuracy rate.
4.4.3 The Developed Trust/Reputation Based Approach in Epi-
demic and PRoPHET Routing
The malicious node detection rate (including the results for accuracy in Epidemic
routing in figures 4.20 to 4.22 for DR = 0.7 and IR = 0.3) obtained with PRoPHET
routing using the following settings (which were the same as the settings used to
obtain the results in figures 4.20 to 4.22) are shown in figures 4.27 to 4.29.
• Updating the trust value = 0.2 (in algorithm 4).
• threshold value = 0.3
• Default starting network trust value = 0.4, DR = 0.7, and IR = 0.3 (in algo-
rithm 5).
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As can be seen from the graphs, PRoPHET achieved an improved detection ac-
curacy (with a zero false positive rate) over Epidemic routing. And this was because
PRoPHET conditioned its routing decisions using the past records of nodes to decide
whether or not to forward the message to them.
So with PRoPHET, intermediate nodes were chosen by the simulator based on
their past records, making them occur more often in paths, which were picked up
quickly by the algorithms. Whereas with Epidemic routing, the message forwarding
was not conditional, and when nodes were in contact with each other, the message
was forwarded regardless of its probability of reaching the destination. This was
why the occurrence of nodes in paths was more random in Epidemic routing than
PRoPHET.
Thus, a node in Epidemic routing could appear only once in all paths, which
might not be picked up by the algorithm when malicious, whereas with PRoPHET
routing, only a node with a high probability of encountering a certain destination gets
a forward of the message, making it more likely to appear as an intermediate node to
be detected as malicious when it became malicious.
Figure 4.27: Malicious node detection accuracy using Epidemic/PRoPHET routing, 1 hour
of simulation time
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Figure 4.28: Malicious node detection accuracy using Epidemic/PRoPHET routing, 2 hours
of simulation time
Figure 4.29: Malicious node detection accuracy using Epidemic/PRoPHET routing, 3 hours
of simulation time
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4.5 Impact of Mobility Speed and Storage on Mali-
cious Node Detection Accuracy
Evaluation and analysis were completed to learn how mobility speed and storage
could impact the malicious node detection accuracy. The results gave an indication
to the level of importance of mobility speed and storage in OppNets. The results
were plotted using the simulation settings defined in section 4.4.1, but with nodes
being as:
• Trams only.
• Cars only.
• Walkers only.
With an update trust value of 0.2 in algorithm 4, and a threshold value of 0.3,
a default starting trust value of 0.4, and DR = 0.7 and IR = 0.3 in algorithm 5,
results are shown in figures 4.30 to 4.32. The line showing All was the accuracy
from figures 4.20 to 4.22 with DR = 0.7 and IR = 0.3.
The false positive rate for these settings was zero, therefore, their graphs are not
shown.
Figure 4.30: Malicious node detection accuracy (impact of mobility speed and storage), 1
hour of simulation time
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Figure 4.31: Malicious node detection accuracy (impact of mobility speed and storage), 2
hours of simulation time
Figure 4.32: Malicious node detection accuracy (impact of mobility speed and storage), 3
hours of simulation time
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With 1, 2, and 3 hours of simulation time, it can be observed from the results that
trams achieved and maintained the highest detection accuracy even when the number
of malicious nodes increased. With time, the detection accuracy increased dramat-
ically for cars. After 2 hours of simulation time, the detection accuracy improved
slightly for walkers, with a noticeable rise was shown at 3 hours of simulation time.
The settings for node speed and storage space defined were captured in table 4.7.
Walkers and cars had the same storage capacity, while trams had a larger storage
capacity. Cars had the highest speed, then trams, and walkers had the lowest speed.
It was noted that storage space was more important than the speed of nodes in an
OppNet. In OppNets, it was more important for a node to keep the message stored
in its buffer rather than having it to meet with the destination fast. Although, both
were favoured, however, a fast node with limited storage was more likely to have the
packets dropped before reaching the destination. And this explained why cars had a
lower detection accuracy with 1 hour and 2 hours of simulation time when compared
with trams.
Table 4.7: Storage space and node speed
Node Type Node speed Storage space
Trams 25-35 km/h 50 MB
Cars 35-60 km/h 10MB
Walkers 1-5 km/h 10MB
4.6 Comparison Analysis
The focus of this section is to show the importance of using trust and reputation to
secure routing between nodes in a network. To accomplish this, the performance
of the proposed trust/reputation system was compared with Epidemic routing and
PRoPHET; two routing protocols that don’t use trust and reputation to protect the
network from malicious nodes and selective packet dropping attacks. The aim of this
comparison approach was to see if there was a difference in the network performance
between trust and reputation based routing methods and non-trust and reputation
based methods in terms of the packet dropping rate.
The packet dropping rate is shown in figure 4.33. The graph shows the packet
dropping rate when 50% of intermediate nodes were malicious. The rate is shown
for Epidemic routing and PRoPHET, and for the proposed reputation based approach
in Epidemic routing and PRoPHET. In Epidemic routing and PRoPHET, the packet
dropping rate increased with time because malicious nodes continued to attempt se-
lective packet dropping attacks. Also, because Epidemic routing and PRoPHET were
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replication based techniques, they consumed large amounts of storage and battery us-
age of nodes, this also affected the dropping rate, as nodes were more likely to run out
of storage and drop the packets as they carried them. It can be noted as well, that the
packet dropping rate was slightly less in PRoPHET than Epidemic routing. And this
was because of the controlled routing decisions PRoPHET did. The packet dropping
rate decreased with time in the proposed trust/reputation approach both in Epidemic
routing and PRoPHET. The algorithms showed their effectiveness as they detected
malicious nodes and prevented them from performing selective packet dropping at-
tacks, thus controlling and limiting the packet dropping rate over time. Again, the
packet dropping rate was slightly less with the proposed approach in PRoPHET than
the proposed approach in Epidemic routing for the controlled flooding PRoPHET
provided.
From the results, it can be observed that the proposed method improved routing
by controlling the packet dropping rate and dealt with malicious nodes accordingly.
This comparison approach has shown the importance of trust and reputation based
methods in routing protocols in OppNets.
Figure 4.33: Epidemic and PRoPHET routing with and without implementing the developed
technique
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4.7 Summary
In this chapter, a dynamic trust/reputation system was presented and designed to pro-
tect an OppNet from selective packet dropping attacks. Using the Merkle tree hash-
ing technique, the system allowed nodes to detect the number of dropped packets,
the path at which the attack happened, and the node that performed the attack. Each
node in each path was able to build direct and indirect experiences between nodes.
The reputation value was computed from both the direct and indirect trust. Each node
kept a reputation table that included the reputation values of nodes it interacted with
directly or indirectly. Nodes that had a reputation value below the required threshold
were identified as malicious. Nodes would accept messages from legitimate nodes
only, and reject messages from malicious ones. The system had been evaluated us-
ing the ONE simulator. Results showed a decrease in packet dropping rates with
time thus improving the performance of the network. Further results showed how
storage played a big role in OppNets, and how the proposed trust/reputation system
compared to a non-trust/reputation based system improved routing by controlling the
packet dropping rate.
Chapter 4 improved upon chapter 3 by using the Merkle tree technique in a dif-
ferent way to identify the number of packets dropped and not only identify that an
attack had happened. In the proposed method was node by node detection instead of
destination detection, where the intermediate node could detect the attack and abort
the message transfer in case of packet dropping or malicious node detection. This
had the advantage of detecting packets dropped by each intermediate node instead of
destination nodes which increased the detection accuracy, and reduced the network
overhead. This chapter also incorporated reputation in addition to trust, this allowed
nodes to bring awareness of malicious nodes existence which increased the detection
rates, thus improving the performance of the network. The benefits of using reputa-
tion not only increased the malicious node detection accuracy, but had also resolved
the issue of misclassifying good nodes as malicious.
In the next chapter, the system is evolved to detect selective or complete packet
modification attacks. The system considers malicious behaviour where the malicious
node performs an attack at times, and at other times, remains legitimate. The system
uses the encounter rate to update the direct trust. Direct and meeting trust are also
used to calculate the reputation value of a node.
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As data gets transferred from node to node in an OppNet, chances are that it is likely
to get modified if malicious nodes exist in the network. To make sure that data re-
mains unchanged and in its original form, a technique is proposed in this chapter that
allows nodes to authenticate the packets they receive by constructing hash trees, also
referred to as called Merkle trees. The Merkle tree is used to check and authenti-
cate all the packets, direct trust is formed as a result of this. Direct trust is updated
based on the authenticity of the packets and the encounter rate with the node. As
nodes come in contact with each other during the packet transmission period, they
give each other feedback on how much they trust other nodes. This feedback, in
addition to the direct experience with a node is used to derive a reputation value.
The reputation value allows nodes to make the correct packet transmission decisions
when meeting with nodes. The technique has been implemented using an OppNet
protocol, and the results reflect the effectiveness of the technique by successfully
detecting the modified packets, the node that performed the attack, and the path at
which the attack has happened. As modified packets are detected and their trans-
mission is stopped, over time, the packet modification rate drops, thus improving
the performance of the network. Further results show how the proposed trust/repu-
tation based technique compares with non-trust/reputation based techniques in terms
of controlling the packet modification rate.
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5.1 Introduction
In chapters 3 and 4, the proposed system aimed to detect selective packet dropping
attacks. This chapter aims to secure OppNets from packet integrity attacks, or some-
times they may be referred to as packet modification attacks. In this type of attack,
the malicious node attempts to selectively modify some packets and forwards them
to other nodes. The receiving node may have received all the packets, but their con-
tent have changed. In some cases, the malicious node may modify all the packets
and forward the packets to another node with completely different content that was
originally sent by the source. Also, the malicious node may attempt to be malicious
at times and modify some or all the packets, and at other times (other paths) decides
to be legitimate and forwards the packets in their original state. This attack is called
an ‘on/off’ attack. In this chapter, the proposed methods aim to address selective or
complete modification attacks done by malicious nodes that choose to be malicious
all the time, or at certain times only.
In this chapter, a variety of techniques and attributes are used to deal with the
malicious behaviours mentioned in the previous paragraph. The trust attribute is
used to form trusted relationship between nodes in the network. Merkle trees [75]
and reputation are used to measure trust relationships between nodes in an OppNet.
Trust is defined as the level of honesty and authenticity a node has shown to have
in the network. As trust relationships start to form in the network, nodes are able
to identify malicious paths, modification attacks, and malicious nodes. Using rep-
utation, nodes spread their experiences with other nodes with regards to nodes they
think are legitimate or malicious. The reputation value is computed by a node using
different attributes such as direct trust, indirect trust, and meeting trust. Each node
in the network maintains a reputation table that has reputation values of nodes it had
interacted with directly or indirectly. When nodes come in contact with each other,
they share the reputation values they have for other nodes in their reputation tables
with each other. The frequency is also used to measure the direct trust for nodes,
where frequency is the number of times a node meets with the same node over a
period of time. Using the ONE simulator, the algorithms were tested and the results
have shown the effectiveness of the proposed technique as will be presented later in
the results section.
It is believed that this is the first OppNet trust and reputation based system that
deals with malicious modification attacks where the malicious node attempts to mod-
ify all the packets, and have the tendency to act malicious at times, and legitimate at
other times. The main contributions of this chapter are:
1. An algorithm to detect selective packet integrity/modification attacks using the
112
Chapter 5 A Trust and Reputation Based Packet Integrity Defense Mechanism in
OppNets
Merkle tree hashing technique, where the Merkle root and more than half of
the Merkle tree hashes are used to authenticate the integrity of the packets
received. (Algorithm 6).
2. An algorithm to detect malicious paths based on the results from algorithm 6.
(Algorithm 7).
3. An algorithm that calculates the direct trust value where the value is either
incremented or dropped to zero and becomes static which means it will not
be incremented in later paths even if it chose to be legitimate again. If the
direct trust is incremented, then it is incremented by a value retrieved from
the frequency where the frequency is the number of meetings with a particular
node over time. The more a node meets with the same node, the higher the
frequency of meetings (Algorithm 8).
4. An algorithm that calculates the indirect trust based on how much the node
receiving the feedback trusts the node giving the feedback. (Algorithm 9).
5. An algorithm that calculates the meeting trust when an intermediate or a des-
tination node come in contact with the source that originated the message and
checks the messages with the source. Based on the results, a meeting trust
value is assigned to nodes. This algorithm is designed to detect malicious
nodes that attempt complete modification attacks and are not detected in algo-
rithm 6. (Algorithm 10).
6. An effective algorithm that uses the direct trust value computed from algo-
rithm 8, the indirect trust value computed from algorithm 9, and the meeting
trust value computed in algorithm 10 to compute a reputation value. The rep-
utation value is then used by nodes to allow them classify good nodes from
malicious nodes and helps them make the correct routing decisions in the net-
work. (Algorithm 11).
5.2 Overview of Solution
An overview of the proposed solution is presented in this section. The proposed
method has the following features: The Merkle tree is a perfect complete binary tree.
The Merkle root, packets, and more than half of the Merkle tree hashes are sent in
each packet’s header, and detection is done at each node. The encounter rate, direct,
indirect, and meeting trust are used by nodes in the network, and direct trust is static.
Selective packet modification attacks, complete ‘On/off’ packet modification attacks,
malicious paths, and malicious nodes are detected.
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An example of a packet integrity/modification attack in a path with 5 nodes (rep-
resented by Nx) is shown in figure 5.1, the red packet is the modified packet. As can
be seen in the figure, node N3 is malicious and attempted a selective modification
attack by modifying the third packet. With the proposed system, node N4 should be
able to detect the attack and stop the message transmission.
Figure 5.1: A packet integrity/modification attack
5.2.1 Assumptions
It is assumed that any intermediate node may be malicious but the source and desti-
nation nodes are assumed to be legitimate.
5.2.2 Malicious Path and Packet Modification Detection using Merkle
Trees
For a node to be able to detect a modified packet, Merkle trees are used as the founda-
tion of the proposed solution. In the proposed method, perfect complete binary trees
are used where the number of packets always result in even number of hashes at each
level of the tree. For an intermediate or destination node to be able to authenticate
the packets, the source needs to send to the next hop node, the packets and embedded
inside each packet’s header, half of the hashes of the complete Merkle tree from each
level above the leaves level, and all the leaf hashes from the leaves level (the orange
hashes in figure 5.2). The receiving node will be able to authenticate all the packets
from those included hashes. It is vital to have all the leaf hashes from the leaves
level (not just half) to be sent by the source, because if both packets P0 and P1 were
modified for example, it would be impossible to know that both were modified only
if both of their hashes were sent and are available.
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Figure 5.2: A perfect complete Merkle tree with 8 packets
Once the receiving node receives the packets, it constructs a new Merkle tree
from the packets. It performs algorithm 6 which starts by comparing just the Merkle
root it computed with the Merkle root embedded in the packet’s headers. If the roots
don’t match, then it would need to compare the hashes created at each level with the
rest of the embedded hashes to search for the modified hashes. The modified packets
are needed to be identified to calculate the packet modification detection accuracy,
and the packet modification rate.
Algorithm 6 is performed to check for packet integrity attacks:
• The receiving node compares its computed Merkle root with the embedded
Merkle root. If they match, then no attack is detected (lines 2 to 3).
• If they don’t match, then the packets will be checked for modification detection
(lines 4 to 22).
• Each level (except the leaves level) in the tree is checked, starting from the
level below the Merle root level. Hashes in each level are checked (lines 6 to
8).
• The computed hashes are compared with the embedded hashes, if they equal,
the hash location is updated so that this part of the tree is skipped from further
testing (lines 9 to 16).
• Once the level reaches the leaves level, the computed hashes are compared with
the embedded hashes for the hashes that require further testing, the modified
packets are detected and counted (lines 18 to 21).
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Algorithm 6 Find modified packets
1: READ: hashes
2: if computedMerkleRoot = embeddedMerkleRoot then
3: packetsAreLegitimate = True
4: else
5: packetIntegrityAttack = True
6: while level 6= 0 do
7: level = level - 1
8: For all hashes in level
9: if hash [level, hashLoc] = hash [level, hashLoc]’ then
10: All packets that fall below this hash are legitimate {Left side}
11: updateHashLoc()
12: end if
13: if hash [level, hashLoc]’+ hash [level, hashLoc+1] = hash [level+1,
hashLoc] then
14: All packets that fall below this hash are legitimate {Right side}
15: updateHashLoc()
16: end if
17: end while
18: if hash [level, hashLoc] 6= hash [level, hashLoc]’ then
19: modifiedPackets[modifiedPacketsCounter] = packet[hashLoc]
20: modifiedPacketsCounter++
21: end if
22: end if
The complexity of the algorithm depends on the number hashes which is depen-
dent on the number of packets, and is "order N": O(N). The complexity of the algo-
rithm is expressed as linear-time, meaning, the complexity increases as the packets
increases.
Below is a detailed explanation of algorithm 6 in reference with figure 5.2, as-
suming packets P0, and P3 are the modified packets. Noting that usually the left
child node is labelled with 0 (or an even number), and the right child node is labelled
with 1 (or an odd number), for example, H[30] indicates that the hash is in the 3rd
level, left side at location 0, which is the first hash in the level. Original hash sent by
the source is denoted with the symbol (’).
• Level 3: The receiving node starts by checking root H[30] with H[30]’
– If they are equal, all the packets are authenticated, else
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– A packet integrity attack is detected, go to level 2
• Level 2:
– Left hash: The receiving node compares H[20] with H[20]’, if they are
equal, it authenticates packets P0 to P3
– Right hash: The receiving node computes the hash for (H[20]’+ H[21]),
if the resulting hash is equal to H[30]’, it authenticates packets P4 to P7
– Go to level 1
• Level 1:
– Left hash: The receiving node compares H[10] with H[10]’, if they are
equal, it authenticates packets P0 and P1
– Right hash: The receiving node computes the hash for (H[10]’ + H[11]),
if the resulting hash is equal to H[20]’, it authenticates packets P2 and
P3
– Go to the leaves level
• Leaves level:
– For the located hash at leaves level, the receiving node compares
H[level,hashLocation] with H[level,hashLocation]’
∗ If they are equal, it authenticates the packet located at the same lo-
cation as the leaf hash, else
∗ The packet at hashLocation is modified.
Malicious paths are detected as shown in algorithm 7:
• If any modified packets are detected, the path is detected as malicious and gets
recorded (lines 2 to 5).
Algorithm 7 Find malicious paths
1: READ: packetIntegrityAttack (from algorithm 6)
2: if packetIntegrityAttack then
3: maliciousPaths[maliciousPathCounter] = pathNumber
4: maliciousPathCounter++
5: end if
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5.2.3 Malicious Node Detection using Trust and Reputation
At the start of the network, nodes initially trust each other depending on the value of
trust assigned to nodes at the start of the network. The starting trust value is referred
to as the defaultStartingTrustV alue. Usually, this value is above the threshold
value, which means, nodes normally trust each other when they come in contact with
each other for the first time.
Nodes in the network maintain their local reputation tables. Every time a node
makes contact with another node, it creates a record for it in its reputation table. If
a record is already created in the reputation table, then the record is updated. Each
record in the reputation table contains trust information such as direct, indirect, and
meeting trust. The encounter rate is also taken into consideration when calculating
the direct trust from a direct experience. Using the trust values of direct, indirect,
and meeting trust, a reputation value is calculated. When a node’s reputation value
is above the threshold value, it remains legitimate. But when it falls below the
threshold value, it is marked as malicious.
The following attributes are needed to calculate the reputation value for each node
that has a record in a reputation table:
• Direct trust (algorithm 8): When a node comes into contact with another node
directly and receive packets from it, it will authenticate the packets. If the
packets are authenticated in algorithm 6, the direct trust value is incremented
based on the frequency or encounter rate of meetings. The frequency is the
number of contacts with a node over the time period since their first meeting
time till the current one. If the packets are detected to be modified in algo-
rithm 6, the direct trust is assigned a zero value, and becomes static. In this
case, the frequency of meeting with the node, can’t affect the direct trust value
any longer. This is because packet modification attacks cannot be justified to
be done other than for malicious purposes.
• Indirect trust (algorithm 9): The feedback a node receives about a node from
other nodes in the network. The value of the feedback depends on how much
the receiving node trusts the node giving the feedback.
• Meeting trust (algorithm 10): To deal with complete modification attacks where
the malicious node modifies all the packets, when the intermediate or a destina-
tion node comes in contact with the source node later; it checks the messages it
had received from nodes that were sent from the source it’s currently meeting
with. Based on the results, the meeting trust for nodes is activated and updated.
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Using the above, the reputation value of a node is calculated in algorithm 11. An
explanation of each algorithm follows.
Algorithm 8 is performed to calculate the direct trust and frequency:
• If the packets checked in algorithm 6 are legitimate and the direct trust has not
been set to static previously, then direct trust is incremented by the
updateTrustV alue depending on the frequency value, and the value for direct
trust remains dynamic (lines 2 to 13).
• On the first meeting with a node, the time for the first meeting is recorded to
be used in future meetings, however, on the first meeting the frequency is not
dependent on time, but just on the number of meetings (lines 3 to 6).
• If it’s not the first meeting with the same node, the time of current meeting is
recorded, and the number of meetings is incremented. (lines 8 to 9).
• Frequency of meetings is calculated using the number of meetings over time.
Where time is the first meeting time subtracted from the last meeting time (line
10).
• The updateTrustV alue is updated and will be used to update the direct trust.
The updateTrustV alue is the current value for direct trust multiplied by the
frequency. So the higher the frequency, the higher the value for
updateTrustV alue (line 12 to 13).
• If the packets checked in algorithm 6 are modified, then a zero value is assigned
to the direct trust of the node passing the packets, the status for the direct trust
becomes static which means the value for direct trust can no longer change
(lines 14 to 16).
• If the node has a meeting trust value activated and the meeting trust value is 1,
it means it was legitimate at other times. The meeting trust value is assigned a
zero (lines 17 to 19).
The following is a mathematical representation of algorithm 8. The local or direct
reputation value is DR, µ is the number of meetings, and the default starting trust
value equals to γ:
DR =

(
(µ× 0.1)×DRγ
)
+DRγ if first time meeting((
µ
Tlast−T0 + (µ× 0.1)
)×DRold)+DRold if it met it before
0 if it is not legitimate
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Algorithm 8 Direct trust and frequency
1: READ: packetsAreLegitimate (from algorithm 6)
2: if packetsAreLegitimate AND !directTrustIsStatic then
3: if firstTimeToMeetNode then
4: getFirstMeetingTime()
5: numberOfMeetings = numberOfMeetings + 1
6: frequency = numberOfMeetings * 0.1
7: else
8: getLastMeetingTime()
9: numberOfMeetings = numberOfMeetings + 1
10: frequency = (numberOfMeetings / (lastMeetingTime - firstMeetingTime))
+ (numberOfMeetings * 0.1)
11: end if
12: updateTrustV alue = directTrust * frequency
13: directTrust = directTrust + updateTrustV alue
14: else
15: directTrust = 0.0
16: directTrustIsStatic = true
17: if meetingTrustIsActivated AND meetingTrustValue = 1 then
18: meetingTrustValue = 0.0
19: end if
20: end if
Because the proposed system is dealing with modification attacks, when the 2
Merkle roots don’t match, it means that the previous node is malicious, based on that,
the direct trust for the previous node is assigned a zero, the direct trust value becomes
static which means it cannot be incremented again even if the same malicious node
transfers the packets unmodified the next time to the same node. Also, the frequency
doesn’t update the direct trust value as soon as the status of direct trust becomes
static.
It is also important to note here that making the direct trust static, means the
direct trust for a node cannot increase in the future, but it doesn’t mean the reputation
value won’t change since indirect trust can still be updated as feedback from other
nodes is still accepted. Also, if a node is detected as legitimate its direct trust value
is increased but remains dynamic because it could perform an attack in later paths.
When a node is malicious, frequency of meetings does not increase its direct trust.
Algorithm 9 is performed to calculate the indirect trust for nodes:
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• Before the feedback is saved into a node’s reputation table, it is first evaluated
by assigning a weight based on how much the node trusts the node giving the
feedback.
• If the feedback received is from a known node, the node trusts the feedback
based on the reputation value of the node giving the feedback (lines 2 to 4).
• If the feedback received is from a node it has not come in contact with before,
the node trusts the feedback based on the value of defaultStartingTrustV alue
(lines 5 to 7).
• If the feedback received is from the destination node, the node trusts the feed-
back fully (lines 8 to 10).
• The feedback is multiplied by how much the node trusts the feedback (line 11).
• If a value for indirect trust already exists (activated) in a record inside the
reputation table, then the new value is added to the feedback, and their average
will replace the old indirect trust value (lines 12 to 13).
• Otherwise, the feedback is added directly into the indirect trust field (lines 14
to 16).
• The indirect trust value is activated which is important when calculating the
indirect trust for the same node later, and when calculating the final reputation
value in algorithm 11 (line 17).
The following is a mathematical representation of algorithm 9:
Let η represent the set of all neighbours to node i. The indirect reputation value
is IR, Rj represents the reputation of the node upon the neighbouring node j, FBj
is the feedback received from node j, and the default starting trust value equals to γ:
The feedback of the node upon a node i,
FBj =

FBj ×Rj if feedback is from a known neighbouring nodes j, , η
FBdes if feedback is from a destination node FBdes
FBj × γ if feedback is received from a new node j
IR =

(
IRold + FBnew
)
2
if indirect trust exists in a record
δ if indirect trust does not exist in a record
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Algorithm 9 Indirect trust
1: READ: feedback
2: if feedback is from a known node then
3: howMuchToTrust =
reputationValueOfNodeGivingFeedback
4: end if
5: if feedback is from an unknown node then
6: howMuchToTrust =
defaultStartingTrustV alue
7: end if
8: if feedback is from a destination node then
9: howMuchToTrust = 1
10: end if
11: feedback = feedback * howMuchToTrust
12: if indirectTrustIsActivated then
13: indirectTrust = (indirectTrust + feedback) / 2
14: else
15: indirectTrust = feedback
16: end if
17: indirectTrustIsActivated = true
Algorithm 10 is important for detecting nodes that performed complete modifi-
cation attacks. In algorithm 6, nodes are able to detect selective modification attacks.
However, what if the malicious node attempts to modify all the packets, insert new
packets, creates a new hash tree and embeds the new hashes in the packet’s header,
and sends them to the next node? In this case, the receiving node and after perform-
ing algorithm 6 gets an equality check for the Merkle roots. This case is presented in
figure 5.3.
The following path in figure 5.3 is considered:
Figure 5.3: How a malicious node can go undetected, example 1
The path consists of 5 nodes. The source S, destination D, nodes N1 and N3 are
legitimate. N2 is malicious. Node N2 modifies all the 4 packets, embeds new hashes
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in each packet’s header, and forwards the modified packets to node N3. Node N3
will not detect N2 as malicious, and continues to transmit the packets. Node N3 in
this case marks node N2 as legitimate, but keep its direct trust as dynamic, and relies
to meet with the source node to check on the integrity of the leaf hashes that were
embedded in the packet’s header it received from N2. If the source declines sending
those leaf hashes, node N3 updates the meeting trust value in its reputation table for
node N2, which will change the reputation value as well, as will be explained in
algorithm 11.
In this case, and every time the packets pass the authentication check done at
algorithm 6 and the transmission of packets is not stopped, nodes would assume
that the node delivering the packets is legitimate until they come in contact with the
source node and confirm. So, each node saves the details of the message into the
meeting question table to check with the source that sent the message later when
it comes in contact with it. The details include: Message ID, received from which
node, from which source node, the saved leaf hashes (from the leaves level), and
whether the leaves matched the ones with the source or not. The source records
similar details, and records all the messages it sends out to nodes in its meeting trust
table.
The result of the hash check process results in a meeting trust value. Which
is activated when the message is checked with the source. Once this attribute is
activated, the reputation value is updated according to the new received information.
The meeting trust value is either a value of one or zero. Messages with mismatching
hashes result in a meeting trust value of zero, while messages with matching hashes
result in a meeting trust value of one. However, nodes that send matching hashes
maintain a meeting trust value of 1, but if they ever deliver mismatching hashes, they
have their meeting trust dropped to zero, and cannot have the value incremented later.
Also, when the destination node or intermediate node checks with the source if the
message is authentic, and when it’s not, the source would also stop forwarding the
message to the node that delivered the message to the node meeting with the source.
Nodes clear messages from their meeting trust table once they check the mes-
sages with the source, messages that have been checked and are legitimate get re-
placed with new messages.
Algorithm 10 is performed to calculate the meeting trust during the contact time
between intermediate nodes and the source node:
• As intermediate nodes come in contact with a source node, intermediate nodes
check the saved messages that resulted in equal hashes in algorithm 6 with the
source node (lines 1 to 2).
123
Chapter 5 A Trust and Reputation Based Packet Integrity Defense Mechanism in
OppNets
• If this source has originated any of the messages stored by the intermediate
node, and if the message is to be checked for the first time by the intermediate
node, then the hashes for the message with the source node are compared with
the hashes (only leaf hashes need to be saved) stored with the intermediate
node (lines 3 to 5).
• If the hashes are not the same, the number of modified packets are counted
(lines 6 to 9).
• If the hashes are not the same, zero value is given to the meeting trust for the
node delivering the message, the hash matching result for the intermediate and
source node is marked as false. If the message was not checked at the source
previously, the modified packets are detected, and the source records the name
of node that delivered the message with mismatching hashes (lines 10 to 17).
• If the same message with mismatching hashes was checked with the source
previously by other intermediate nodes in the same path, the source and current
intermediate node update the name of node that delivered the message with
mismatching hashes and update the meeting trust accordingly (lines 18 to 22).
• If the hashes are the same, the value one is given to the meeting trust for the
node delivering the message. It is important to check that the meeting trust for
this node has not been activated before. Because if the node ever gets a zero
value for meeting trust, then it can’t be one again in this part of the algorithm.
The value of meeting trust can only change from zero to one when the source
node authorizes this and uses a special function to do so. (lines 24 to 26).
• The meeting trust is activated, the message at the source and intermediate
nodes are marked as checked (lines 28 to 30).
• If this is not the first time the intermediate node checks this message with the
source node, it checks to see if the details are up to date. Because the source
node may have come into contact with other nodes in the same path for the
same message, the source node may have updated its record on the node that
have modified the packets, this is especially important when there are multiple
nodes in the path which will be explained in details in the next section (lines
31 to 38).
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Algorithm 10 Meeting trust
1: For all messages with intermediate node
2: For all messages with source node
3: if messageIDAtIntermediateNode = messageIDAtSourceNode then
4: if !messageCheckedAtIntermediateNode then
5: For all hashes
6: if leafHashesAtSourceNode 6= hashesAtIntermediateNode then
7: hashesAreDifferent = true
8: numberOfModifiedHashes = numberOfModifiedHashes + 1
9: end if
10: if hashesAreDifferent then
11: meetingTrust = 0.0
12: messageMatchAtIntermediateNode = false
13: if !messageCheckedAtSourceNode then
14: totalDetectedModifiedPackets = totalDetectedModifiedPackets +
numberOfModifiedHashes
15: messageMatchAtSourceNode = false
16: lastNodeToDeliverHashesAtSource = getNodeName()
17: end if
18: if messageCheckedAtSourceNode AND !messageMatchAtSourceNode
then
19: lastNodeToDeliverHashesAtSourceNode = updateNodeName()
20: lastNodeToDeliverHashesAtIntermediateNode = updateNodeName()
21: updateMeetingTrust()
22: end if
23: else
24: if !meetingTrustIsActivated then
25: meetingTrust = 1.0
26: end if
27: end if
28: meetingTrustIsActivated = true
29: messageCheckedAtIntermediateNode = true
30: messageCheckedAtSourceNode = true
31: else
32: if !messageMatchAtIntermediateNode then
33: if lastNodeToDeliverHashesAtIntermediateNode 6= lastNodeToDeliver-
HashesAtSourceNode then
34: updateNodeName()
35: updateMeetingTrust()
36: end if
37: end if
38: end if
39: end if
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The complexity of the two loops in the algorithm which is dependent on the
number hashes which is also related of the number of packets, and is "order N":
O(N2). The complexity of the algorithm is expressed as linear-time, meaning, the
complexity increases as the packets increases.
The following is a mathematical representation of algorithm 10:
The meeting trust value is MR.
MR =
0 if the hashes don’t match1 if the hashes match
Each node in the network maintains a reputation table similar to the table in
figure 5.4. The table includes the attributes calculated in the previously explained
algorithms. To calculate the final reputation value that changes automatically upon
any changes in any of the attributes in the record, each attribute is given a weight.
The reputation value is computed from the direct, indirect, and meeting trust.
Sometimes all of them are available, sometimes only one is available.
Figure 5.4: Destination D’s reputation table
In algorithm 11, the weight value assigned to each attribute is symbolized as
follows:
• DR: Is the weight assigned for direct trust
• IR: Is the weight assigned for indirect trust
• MR: Is the weight assigned for meeting trust
The best weight value for each attribute is tested and will be presented in the
simulation, results and analysis section.
Algorithm 11 is performed to calculate the reputation value for a node:
• If meeting trust is activated, then multiply the value of meeting trust by the
weight assigned for the meeting trust (lines 1 to 2).
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• If indirect trust is activated, then the formula for calculating the reputation
value is calculated to include the direct, indirect, and meeting trust (lines 3 to
4).
• If there is no indirect trust for this record, then the reputation value is calculated
using direct trust and meeting trust (lines 5 to 7).
• If there is no meeting trust, but there is indirect trust, then the reputation value
is calculated using direct and indirect trust (lines 8 to 10).
• If there is no meeting and indirect trust, then the reputation value is equal to
direct trust (lines 11 to 13).
Algorithm 11 Reputation
1: if meetingTrustIsActivated then
2: meetingTrust = meetingTrustValue * MR
3: if indirectTrustIsActivated then
4: reputationValue = (((directTrust * DR) + (indirectTrust * IR)) * (1 - MR))
+ meetingTrust
5: else
6: reputationValue = (directTrust * (1 - MR)) + meetingTrust
7: end if
8: else
9: if indirectTrustIsActivated then
10: reputationValue = (directTrust * DR) + (indirectTrust * IR)
11: else
12: reputationValue = directTrust
13: end if
14: end if
The following is a mathematical representation of algorithm 11:
DRw is the weight assigned for the direct trust DR, IRw is the weight assigned
for the indirect trust IR, where DRw + IRw = 1. MRw is the weight assigned for
the meeting trust MR, and R is the reputation value.
The normalized direct trust is DRn, the normalized indirect trust is IRn, and the
normalized meeting trust is MRn.
DRn =

DR×DRw if indirect trust exists
DR× (1−MRw) if meeting trust exists without indirect trust
DR if only direct trust exists
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IRn =
{
IR× IRw if indirect trust exists
MRn =
{
MR×MRw if meeting trust exists
R =

(
(DRn + IRn)× (1−MRw)
)
+MRn if indirect and meeting trust exist
DRn +MRn if meeting without indirect trust exist
DRn + IRn if indirect without meeting trust exist
DR if only direct trust exists
Nodes can check the reputation value in their reputation tables of a target node
before they decide to trust it. Using the table, nodes can identify good nodes from
malicious ones, and reject to receive any messages from nodes with reputation values
below the assigned threshold value, and won’t accept to exchange their reputation
values with each other.
In addition to the case presented in figure 5.3, another case where the malicious
node in a path may go undetected is shown in figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5: How a malicious node can go undetected, example 2
The path consists of 5 nodes, the source S, the destination D, and node N3 are
legitimate (green colour is used to represent legitimate nodes and packets). Nodes
N1 and N2 are intermediate nodes, and are both malicious (red colour is used to
represent malicious nodes and modified packets). Node N1 modifies the third and
the fourth packet and forwards them to node N2. Node N2 then modifies the first,
third, and fourth packet (the bigger red packets mean they have been modified again)
and forwards the packets to node N3. Node N3 will detect node N2 as malicious but
not node N1. In this case, and depending on its appearance and behaviour in other
paths, node N1 will more likely be identified in other paths and its reputation will be
spread quickly in the network.
This is why it is not expected to achieve 100% for path, packets, and node detec-
tion rate in cases when all packets are modified and not detected until the node meets
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with the source, when there is more than 1 malicious node in the path that attempt to
modify the packets, and when a node attempts ‘on/off’ attacks before it is caught as
malicious.
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5.3 Examples on Trust and Reputation from Test Re-
ports
In this section, a demonstration of how the proposed trust/reputation system solves
unusual cases where malicious behaviour is not easily detected, is presented.
5.3.1 ‘On/off’ Attacks
Considering the following path: [S] -> [t28] -> [D] in figure 5.6. Node t28 is ma-
licious but does not modify any packets and sends them all legitimate to destination
node D. The destination does not detect the attack and since this is its first time to
deal with node t28, it classifies it as legitimate and increases its direct trust. Destina-
tion D saves the leaf hashes to check their integrity later with the source. In another
path however, in figure 5.7, node t28 performs a selective modification attack thus
transmission is stopped by the destination node. The direct trust for node t28 in
destination D’s reputation table becomes zero and static. So the next time node t28
sends legitimate packets, the direct trust for it cannot increase. Node t28 is likely to
be detected in other paths and its reputation will spread to other nodes who will come
to know that node t28 is malicious.
Figure 5.6: ‘On/off’ attack - off
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Figure 5.7: ‘On/off’ attack - on
5.3.2 Complete Packet Modification Attacks and Meeting with
Source Node
Considering the following path: [S] -> [c15] -> [D] in figure 5.8. Node c15 modifies
all the packets, and the attack is not detected by destination D. As seen from the fig-
ure, node c15 embeds new tree hashes into the packets headers, and when destination
D reconstructs the tree from the received packets, it finds that the roots equal each
other. Destination D assumes that node c15 is legitimate. What it does however, is
it saves the message details into its meeting question table to check with the source
later as shown in figure 5.9.
Figure 5.8: A complete packet modification attack
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Figure 5.9: Meeting question table for destination D, before meeting with source S
Later, destination node D becomes in contact with source S and checks all the
messages sent from source S it saved in its meeting question table with messages that
it detected as legitimate (it doesn’t save messages it already detected with modified
packets), figure 5.10. The source declines sending those hashes for the message ID
forwarded by c15, figure 5.11.
Both nodes S and D give node c15 a zero for meeting trust value. The meeting
trust value changes how the reputation value is calculated.
Figure 5.10: Meeting question table for destination D, after meeting with source S
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Figure 5.11: Meeting question table for source node S after meeting with destination D
The reputation table (cropped) for destinationD is shown in figure 5.12. Initially,
the direct trust was incremented by the (frequency * direct trust) for meeting with
node c15 in path 2 in figure 5.8). The destination node up to this point had not
received any indirect feedback from other nodes about node c15. Meeting trust is
now zero, which means that destination D had already checked with source S that
the hashes embedded and sent by node c15 are not authentic. The reputation value
and according to the proposed algorithms assuming that 40% is assigned for meeting
trust, and since there is no indirect trust, the weight goes for direct trust only, is
calculated as follows: Reputation value = (0.45 * 0.6) + (0 * 0.4) = 0.27. Assuming
the threshold value is 0.3, the reputation value for node c15 falls below 0.3, thus
node c15 is detected by node destination D as malicious.
Figure 5.12: Reputation table for node D
5.3.3 Complete Packet Modification Attacks with Multiple Nodes
in a Path and Meeting with Source Node
Considering the following path: [S] -> [t21] -> [t26] -> [t27] -> [D], where node t21
is malicious and the rest are legitimate. Node t21 modifies all the packets, embeds
new hashes, and forwards them through. The message transfer from the source to the
destination nodes is shown in figures 5.13 to 5.15.
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Figure 5.13: Modifying all packets with multiple nodes in a path - S -> t21 -> t26
Figure 5.14: Modifying all packets with multiple nodes in a path - t26 -> t27
Figure 5.15: Modifying all packets with multiple nodes in a path - t27 -> D
As can be seen from the graphs, legitimate nodes do not detect the attack, because
node t21 had modified all the packets and embedded new tree hashes into the packets
headers, and when each receiving node reconstruct the tree from the received packets,
it finds that the roots equal each other. Nodes t26, t27, and D assume that node t21
is legitimate, however, all of them save the message and their leaf hashes into their
meeting question table to check with the source later.
In later paths, the first node to come in contact with source node S is node t27.
The meeting question table for node t27 is shown in figure 5.16.
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Figure 5.16: Meeting question table for node t27 after meeting with source S
At this point, node t27 and source S believe that node t26 has performed the
attack, thus assign a zero value for node’s t26 meeting trust value in their reputation
tables. The meeting trust value will change how the reputation value is calculated
depending on how much weight is assigned to the meeting trust value.
Later, node t26 becomes in contact with source S. The meeting question table
for node t26 is shown in figure 5.17.
Figure 5.17: Meeting question table for node t26 after meeting with source S
Since the source had already checked the same message with node t27, it will
check with node t26 further to update the details for this message ID. Since the
hashes node t26 has from node t21 are different from those source S has for the
same message ID, node t26 knows that node t21 is the malicious node. And source
S updates its record in its meeting question table and records that the message was
modified by node t21. Because the source knows that there isn’t another node before
node t21, since it knows that it had forwarded the packets to node t21 as it had
recorded in its table. Source S replaces node t26 with node t21 to be malicious.
Source S changes the meeting trust value for node 26 to one instead of a zero. Node
t27 still doesn’t know about this update until it meets with the source again.
As can be seen in figure 5.18, when destination D meets with source S, it checks
the message, and records that the node which modified all the packets is node t21
and updates the meeting trust value accordingly.
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Figure 5.18: Meeting question table for destination D after meeting with source S
The meeting question table for node t27 after meeting with source S is shown
in figure 5.19, it updates its record details for the message by replacing node t21 to
be the node attempting the attack instead of node t26, and changes the meeting trust
value for node t26 to one, and zero for node t21.
Figure 5.19: Meeting question table for node t27 after meeting with source S again
After discussing the above case, this is why the source will keep checking mes-
sages it had checked before, when there are no more intermediate nodes in a path,
the source node would know which node attempted the complete modification at-
tack. And when intermediate nodes come in contact with the source, they always
check with the source if it has updated information regarding the same message and
if it has any updates regarding the malicious node. Although the probability of hav-
ing this case is not that high because malicious nodes don’t always perform complete
modification attacks, and this feature is set to random in the proposed system. And
if complete modification attacks randomly happen, they may happen in a path with
multiple nodes or may not. However, this case is addressed regardless of how often
it may happen.
It is good to note that the reputation system plays an important role and is the
main mechanism in detecting malicious nodes, and eventually the undetected mali-
cious node would be detected with time in other paths, even if intermediate nodes
don’t come in contact with the source.
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5.4 Mathematical Analysis
In this section, an expression is developed for the probability of detecting a modi-
fied packet given that at least one unmodified packet reaches the destination. The
notations used are as follows:
• N is the total number of nodes in the path
• k is the number of packets
• αi is the probability that a packet is modified by malicious node i.
• P is the probability of having at least one non-modified packet reaching the
destination.
Given that αi is the reputation of the node, then, (1-αi) is the probability that a
packet is modified by malicious nodes.
Since P represents that at least one unmodified packet reaches the destination. P
= 1 - probability that all the packets that reach the destination are modified.
If the node has a reputation of αi, then the probability that the packet will not be
modified by node i is 1− αi.
Therefore, for a packet to reach the destination without modification through a
path of N nodes that has a reputation of α1, ..., αN is:
N∏
i=1
αi
And therefore, the probability that a packet maybe modified in malicious path of
N nodes is:
ψ = 1−
N∏
i=1
αi
So, for the k packets the probability that all packets are modified in this path is:
(
1−
N∏
i=1
αi
)k
And hence, the probability of at least one unmodified packet reaching the desti-
nation is:
1−
(
1−
N∏
i=1
αi
)k
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Let j represent the probability of j packet. With the probability that j packets out
of k packets are modified before they reach the destination is:
P (xj) =
(
k
j
)(
1−
( N∏
i=1
αi
))j(
1−
N∏
i=1
αi
)k−j
So, the probability of having a malicious path which represents the probability
that a packet or more are modified, given that at least one unmodified packet reaches
the destination is:
P (xj|P ) =
k−1∑
j=1
(
k
j
)(
1−
( N∏
i=1
αi
))j(
1−
N∏
i=1
αi
)k−j
1−
(
1−∏Ni=1 αi)k
5.5 Evaluation using Simulation
5.5.1 Simulation Settings
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed methods, extensive simulation
studies were undertaken using the ONE simulator.
The routing protocol used was PRoPHET with map-based simulation area being
Helsinki. Nodes were set to transmit messages in the network through Bluetooth
within a 10 meters’ transmission range and an 8 Mbps speed. Messages with sizes
between 500kB and 700kB were created every 1 and 5 seconds. For the map move-
ment model, walkers and cars used the MapBasedMovement, and trams used the
MapRouteMovement.
For nodes mobility speed, walkers walked at speeds between 1-5 km/h, cars drove
at speeds between 35-60 km/h, and trams at speeds of 25-35 km/h. For nodes storage
ability, walkers and cars stored up to10MB of messages, trams stored up to 50 MB.
The scenario ran for up to 3 hours.
The scenario produced a dataset with a variety of nodes and paths. The dataset
was used in a written C++ program that modified packets using a random number
of packets to be modified. The program also chose random nodes to be malicious
at paths, and remained legitimate at other paths. Another C++ program was written
to implement algorithms 6 to 11 programmed to create a trust/reputation system that
detected modified packets, malicious nodes and paths.
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5.5.2 Simulation Results and Analysis
The following metrics were used to evaluate algorithms 6 to 11:
1. Malicious path detection accuracy: The ratio of the total number of correctly
detected malicious paths to the total number of actual malicious paths.
2. Malicious path detection false positive rate: The ratio of legitimate paths clas-
sified as malicious.
3. Packet modification detection accuracy: The ratio of the total number of de-
tected modified packets to the total number of actual modified packets.
4. Packet modification rate: The ratio of total modified packets to the total number
of packets in the network.
5. Malicious node detection accuracy: The ratio of the total number of correctly
detected malicious nodes to the total number of actual malicious nodes.
6. Malicious node detection false positive rate: The ratio of legitimate nodes clas-
sified as malicious.
In order to learn the best settings for the results, it was required to identify the
best values for threshold, defaultStartingTrustV alue, the right weights for the
direct, indirect, and meeting trust.
1. In order to learn the best values for threshold and the default starting network
trust value, tests were conducted with incrementing their values starting from
0.1 to 0.6. It has been observed that a threshold value of 0.2 or 0.3, and a
default starting network trust value of 0.4 or 0.5 gave the best results. As the
threshold value increased and became closer to the default starting network
trust value, the accuracy also increased but with node false positive rates oc-
curring. This was because nodes had less time to be listed as malicious, thus
the increase in accuracy with the consequence of having good nodes with a
higher probability to be listed as malicious. Whereas with a lower value of
threshold nodes were listed as malicious when their reputation value went be-
low it, giving them more time to be listed as malicious, with a less probability
of having good nodes listed as malicious, because nodes had enough time to in-
crease their trust through direct and indirect experiences. Varying the weights
for direct and indirect experiences also affected the accuracy and false positive
rates.
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2. In order to learn which trust weight was best for direct and indirect trust, for
each variation, tests were conducted with different weights for direct and indi-
rect trust starting with increased weight for direct trust and decreased weight
for indirect trust. The variations experimented with are shown in table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Varying weights for direct and indirect trust values
Set # Direct trust
weight
Indirect trust
weight
1 0.8 0.2
2 0.7 0.3
3 0.6 0.4
4 0.5 0.5
5 0.4 0.6
6 0.3 0.7
3. In order to learn the best value for the meeting trust weight, tests were con-
ducted to observe what happens as the values started with a low weight, and
incremented starting from 0.1 to 0.9. Changing the weight of the meeting trust
did not show major changes to the results. This was because evaluating the
reputation value did not rely directly with meeting trust like threshold and the
default starting trust value. Also, the meeting question was a sort of a confir-
mation to legitimate and malicious nodes. Even if a node was not detected at
meeting question, it would most likely be caught in other paths. That is why
meeting question was helpful, but was not used as the main method to update
the reputation value. The meeting trust also depended on the number of ma-
licious nodes in the network, the number of ‘on/off’ attacks, and the number
of complete modification attacks. And not all nodes had their meeting trust
activated, but even when they did, it was most likely close to the reputation
value which was good to have, to confirm existing values. Therefore, for the
meeting trust, a weight of 0.4 is confidently assigned to it.
From the above analysis, results for 2 variations that are believed to show the best
results are presented. The variations were tested with threshold values of 0.2 and
0.3, and with default starting network trust value of 0.4 and 0.5. The variations are
presented in tables 5.2, and 5.3.
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Table 5.2: Variation 1 - changing threshold value with a default starting network trust value
of 0.4
Threshold Default starting
network trust value
0.2 0.4
0.3 0.4
Table 5.3: Variation 2 - changing threshold value with a default starting network trust value
of 0.5
Threshold Default starting
network trust value
0.2 0.5
0.3 0.5
From the results of the 4 variations, the following was noted:
1. All variations had given a good accuracy, but the least was shown in variation 2
with threshold 0.2 and default starting network trust value of 0.5. The packet
modification rate was similar in all variations with slight differences that are
considered insignificant. The false positive rates for paths was zero for all
variations. For false positive rates for nodes, a threshold of 0.3 showed some
false positive rates. The packet detection accuracy was similar in all variations,
almost 100%, and the path detection accuracy was similar in all variations.
2. It had been observed that when threshold was 0.2, it gave better results than
when it was 0.3. When threshold was 0.2, slightly better results had been
noticed when the default starting network trust value was 0.4, this is because
the default starting network trust value was farther to the threshold making
legitimate nodes farther to becoming falsely classified as malicious. This is
why this set in variety 1 was chosen, and the results for this variety only are
presented in this section, however, complete results for all the 4 variations are
presented in appendix B.
3. The Malicious path detection accuracy, false positive rates for malicious path
detection, packet detection accuracy, and packet modification rate, the results
were similar in each set in table 5.1. For the malicious node detection accuracy,
all trust values gave similar results in each set (in table 5.1) showing a slight
increase with 2 and 3 hours of simulation time for sets 3, 4, 5, and 6. The
false positive rates for node detection was low for all sets except in variety 1
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when threshold was 0.3, the false positive rates appeared with 2 and 3 hours
of simulation time with sets 3, 4, 5, and 6. And for variety 2, when threshold
was 0.3 false positive rates appeared with 2 and 3 hours of simulation time
with sets 5 and 6.
When working with a threshold value of 0.2 and a default starting network trust
value of 0.4, the packet modification rate for each set (in table 5.1) of trust weights
was similar, for this reason, the graphs for each set are not presented, presenting the
results of any set is enough to show the packet modification rate over time.
The following letters on the graphs represented:
• t = threshold
• d = default starting network trust value (defaultStartingTrustV alue)
• DR = direct trust weight
• IR = indirect trust weight
The graphs are shown in the order of the metrics listed above, the malicious path
false positive rate is not presented as all the values were zero.
The metrics are shown on the y-axis, and the number of malicious nodes increas-
ing until 9 (which is 75% of intermediate nodes) intermediate nodes acted malicious
is shown on the x-axis, for the packet modification rate graph, time is shown on the
x-axis. The results were plotted using the simulation settings defined in section 5.5.1.
Each point on the graph was an average of 30 simulation runs.
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Figure 5.20: Malicious path detection accuracy, 1 hour of simulation time
Figure 5.21: Malicious path detection accuracy, 2 hours of simulation time
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Figure 5.22: Malicious path detection accuracy, 3 hours of simulation time
It can be observed from figures 5.20 to 5.22, the path detection accuracy in-
creased with time. The detection accuracy was not 100% because when all packets
were modified, the malicious node was not detected as explained in cases similar to
figure 5.3. When the node came in contact with the source the packets were detected,
but the path was not. Because the path had already transmitted modified packets, and
at that point in time, it remained malicious.
144
Chapter 5 A Trust and Reputation Based Packet Integrity Defense Mechanism in
OppNets
Figure 5.23: Packet modification detection accuracy, 1 hour of simulation time
Figure 5.24: Packet modification detection accuracy, 2 hours of simulation time
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Figure 5.25: Packet modification detection accuracy, 3 hours of simulation time
Figure 5.26: Packet modification rate with (DR) = 0.5, and (IR) = 0.5
It can be observed from figures 5.23 to 5.25, that the packet modification detec-
tion accuracy was almost 100%. There were extreme cases where the intermediate
node did not get a chance to come in contact with the source node to check messages
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forwarded to it where all the packets were modified. This is why the packet detection
accuracy increased with time, because the probability of intermediate nodes to come
in contact with source nodes increased.
The packet modification rate decreased over time, as shown in figure 5.26. As
malicious nodes were caught in the network, they couldn’t perform modification
attacks, thus the decrease of modified packets as time progressed. As shown in the
graph, with increasing number of malicious nodes, malicious nodes tended to modify
more packets thus the increase in the packet modification rate.
The malicious node detection accuracy over time is shown in figures 5.27 to 5.29.
The accuracy for all the trust weights within the 3 hours of simulation time was
between 90% to 100%. Even with increasing the number of malicious nodes in the
network, the algorithm still maintained the detection accuracy. This high level of
accuracy came with almost a zero false positive rate as shown next in figures 5.30
to 5.32.
Figure 5.27: Malicious node detection accuracy, 1 hour of simulation time
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Figure 5.28: Malicious node detection accuracy, 2 hours of simulation time
Figure 5.29: Malicious node detection accuracy, 3 hours of simulation time
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Figure 5.30: Malicious node detection - false positive rate, 1 hour of simulation time
Figure 5.31: Malicious node detection - false positive rate, 2 hours of simulation time
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Figure 5.32: Malicious node detection - false positive rate, 3 hours of simulation time
5.5.3 The Developed Trust/Reputation Based Approach in Epi-
demic and PRoPHET Routing
In this section, the following settings were used to run the experiment:
• threshold value = 0.2
• Default starting network trust value = 0.4
• Set 4 from table 5.1
The malicious path detection accuracy, the false positive rate for malicious path
detection (which was null), packet modification detection accuracy, and false positive
rates for malicious node detection accuracy (which was null) gave very similar results
in both Epidemic and PRoPHET routing.
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Figure 5.33: Malicious node detection accuracy using Epidemic/PRoPHET routing, 1 hour
of simulation time
Figure 5.34: Malicious node detection accuracy using Epidemic/PRoPHET routing, 2 hours
of simulation time
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Figure 5.35: Malicious node detection accuracy using Epidemic/PRoPHET routing, 3 hours
of simulation time
The malicious node detection accuracy is shown in figures 5.33 to 5.35. With
1 hour of simulation time, PRoPHET routing achieved a higher accuracy than Epi-
demic routing. Both protocols showed similar accuracy with 2 hours of simulation
time, and with 3 hours of simulation time the accuracy was slightly higher using
Epidemic routing. The PRoPHET protocol was a smarter version of Epidemic rout-
ing where intermediate nodes were not chosen just upon an opportunistic contact,
but in addition to that, their chances of meeting with destination nodes and history
encounters made them eligible to be chosen for transmitting messages. This is why
with 1 hour of simulation time; the accuracy was higher. However, over time, the
proposed technique worked equally with both protocols. And the decision of mes-
sage forwarding was controlled by nodes themselves using the solid trust/reputation
system. Source nodes also got feedback from intermediate nodes and knew who to
trust next time.
The packet modification rate is shown in figures 5.36, and 5.26 (image above).
The rate was similar, but slightly decreased in PRoPHET routing towards the end of
simulation time.
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Figure 5.36: Packet modification rate with (DR) = 0.5, and (IR) = 0.5 in Epidemic routing
5.6 Impact of Mobility Speed and Storage on Mali-
cious Node Detection Accuracy
In this section, tests were conducted to learn how mobility speed and storage could
impact the malicious node detection accuracy. The same simulation settings in sec-
tion 5.5.1 were used but with nodes being as:
• Trams only.
• Cars only.
• Walkers only.
With a threshold value of 0.2, a default starting trust value of 0.4, and DR = 05
and IR = 0.5, results are shown in figures 5.37 to 5.39. The line showing All was the
accuracy from figures 5.27 to 5.29 with DR = 0.5 and IR = 0.5.
The false positive rate for these settings was zero, therefore, their graphs are not
presented.
153
Chapter 5 A Trust and Reputation Based Packet Integrity Defense Mechanism in
OppNets
Figure 5.37: Malicious node detection accuracy (impact of mobility speed and storage), 1
hour of simulation time
Figure 5.38: Malicious node detection accuracy (impact of mobility speed and storage), 2
hours of simulation time
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Figure 5.39: Malicious node detection accuracy (impact of mobility speed and storage), 3
hours of simulation time
With 1, 2, and 3 hours of simulation time, it had been observed from the re-
sults that trams achieved and maintained the highest detection accuracy, then cars,
then pedestrians. The detection accuracy was high for each type and with increasing
number of malicious nodes eventually all types gave similar results. This showed
that the algorithms were detecting nodes even in cases where they didn’t occur much
in paths. The solid trust/reputation based system was very effective that it was able
to give a high malicious node detection accuracy for cars and walkers.
5.7 Comparison Analysis
In this section, a comparison analysis is conducted to show how Epidemic [77] and
PRoPHET [78] routing perform in the ONE simulator using the same simulation set-
tings defined in section 5.5.1. This is followed by showing how both performed with
the proposed trust/reputation technique. The purpose of this comparison is to ob-
serve to what extent the proposed trust/reputation system could preserve the integrity
of packets in an OppNet, and to observe the importance level of a trust/reputation
system.
The results are shown in figure 5.40. This is the packet modification rate with
50% malicious nodes in the network. As can be noted from the graph, the packet
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modification rate in Epidemic and PRoPHET routing without the implementation of
the proposed trust/reputation system was not controlled, and the packet modifica-
tion rate increased with time. With the same protocols implementing the proposed
trust/reputation system, the packet modification rate decreased with time. This was
an assurance that the proposed trust/reputation system made a huge difference to the
network performance, and showed the importance of trust and reputation in preserv-
ing the integrity of packets in OppNets.
Figure 5.40: Epidemic and PRoPHET routing with and without implementing the developed
technique
5.8 Summary
In this chapter, selective modification attacks were addressed where some of the
packets may be modified by the malicious node. Further, complete modification at-
tacks where the malicious node modified all the packets were addressed. In addition
to that, the malicious node may had performed a malicious act at times, and at other
times chose not to perform a malicious act; this was called an ‘on/off’ attack which
had also been addressed. Using the Merkle hashing technique to authenticate the
packets, the encounter rate and direct trust, indirect trust, and meeting trust, a node’s
identity could be validated, and malicious nodes could be detected. Using Epidemic
and PRoPHET routing, the proposed system was validated and presented to show
how effectively the technique worked in detecting selective/complete/‘on/off’ packet
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modification attacks, malicious paths and nodes. As modified packets were detected
and their transmission was stopped, over time, the packet modification rate dropped,
thus improving the performance of the network. Results showed that the trust/rep-
utation system had successfully detected nodes with slow speed, or even nodes that
did not occur often in paths. Further results showed how the proposed trust/reputa-
tion based technique compared with non-trust/reputation based techniques in terms
of controlling the packet modification rate.
157
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, a conclusion is presented showing how the proposed methods achieved
the aim of this research thesis which is establishing trust relationships and secure
channels in opportunistic networks. This chapter starts off with a summary for each
chapter including its outcome. Followed by a discussion of how the proposed so-
lution evolved to deal with the proposed problems. Finally, the chapter ends with
possible intentions for future work.
6.1 Summary of Thesis
Opportunistic networks (OppNets) have evolved from delay tolerant networks (DTNs).
They have similar characteristics to DTNs where both networks don’t have a proper
network infrastructure. Apart from this, OppNets share similar features to DTNs
where there is no fixed path to destination nodes, nodes might not have constant
connectivity in the network as they transfer messages between each other, and the
source node does not know when the message will reach the destination node due to
delayed delivery. OppNets however, differ from DTNs in some aspects where nodes
always meet based on opportunistic contacts between each other, thus the name "Op-
portunistic" was assigned to this type of network.
Researchers became interested in OppNets and developed routing protocols that
are specifically made to deal with their features. Some of those protocols have been
implemented and used in projects such as Zebranets [3], in the military [4], in inter-
planetary networks [5], and for natural disasters recovery where opportunistic com-
munication between people becomes the only option.
However, researchers have come to realize that with such great uses of OppNets,
they are also open and prone to various security threats including packet dropping
and modification attacks. Security is the most important feature that must be imple-
mented in any protocol, and no matter what features the protocol provides, if it does
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not incorporate any security measures; the protocol will not be demanded. And so
research continues to find better ways to secure those open networks from different
types of attacks.
In this thesis, the available security methods that aimed in securing different types
of networks including OppNets to protect them from malicious acts, behaviours, and
attacks, were presented. Researchers have invested in developing security methods
that are based on the trust and reputation attributes that allows nodes decide how
much to trust each other based on their honesty in delivering authentic packets. In
addition, methods that are based on trust/reputation, and some of the methods that
aren’t trust/reputation based, were also presented.
Selective packet dropping and modification/integrity attacks were addressed. In
an OppNet, the malicious node may drop some packets to send an incomplete mes-
sage, or modify the packets to change the content of the message. In the case where
the packets are modified but arrive complete at the destination, their content is not in
their original form. Thus, the integrity of the packets is breached, that’s why it could
be referred to packet modification attacks as packet integrity attacks as well. Pro-
tecting the network from such attacks is very important because when data reaches
the destination incomplete or altered with, not only the data would be useless, the
network’s performance would be greatly affected.
Complete modification attacks where the malicious node modifies all of the pack-
ets, were also addressed. In addition to that, cases where the malicious node may per-
form a malicious act at times, and at other times chooses not to perform a malicious
act, were also presented, this is called an ‘on/off’ attack.
To establish trust relationships and secure channels in opportunistic networks, the
techniques used in this thesis can be summarized as:
• Merkle tree root and path trust: In chapter 3, a selective packet dropping attack
was detected by destination nodes. Where destination nodes calculate a new
Merkle tree from the packets they receive to compute the Merkle root. They
then compare it with the Merkle root they find in any of the packet’s header that
was embedded and sent by the source node in each packet. When the destina-
tion node finds that both roots are equal, then it can confirm that the message is
complete, thus it will increment the trust value of all the nodes that participated
in forwarding the message. On the other hand, however, when the destination
node finds that the 2 roots are not matching, it confirms that the message is
incomplete and that a selective packet dropping attack has occurred. Based on
that, it decreases the trust value for each node in the path that contributed in
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forwarding the message. And the advantage of using trust, is that the value of
a node’s trust has to fall below a required threshold before it can be detected as
malicious. Destination nodes do not accept future messages from nodes clas-
sified as malicious. If it happens to be that good nodes always exist in paths
with malicious nodes, they may get misclassified as malicious, but they still
have a chance to increase their trust values in other paths. Based on the results
of evaluating this technique, the malicious node detection accuracy increased
with time, with some false positive rates.
• Direct and indirect trust, and reputation: In chapter 4, a selective packet drop-
ping attack was detected by intermediate and destination nodes. In this tech-
nique, when the source node originates any message, it creates a hash tree from
its packets, and embeds in each packet’s header half of the Merkle tree hashes.
Any node that receives those packets can use the embedded hashes to know the
expected number of packets. The receiving node counts the number of the em-
bedded hashes, and compares the result with the number of packets it received.
If the result equals the received packets, it can confirm that the message is
complete, and thus it increases the direct trust value of the node it received the
packets from. If the result however is not equal to the received packets, then
it confirms that a selective packet dropping attack had occurred, and thus it
decreases the direct trust value of the node it received the packets from. Nodes
save the direct trust values in their local reputation tables, which also includes
stored values for indirect trust. Direct trust is summed with indirect trust (de-
pending on the weight assigned to each) to compute the reputation value for
each node. When nodes encounter each other, they exchange the computed
reputation values from their reputation tables and update their reputation val-
ues accordingly. The technique in this chapter allowed nodes to evaluate the
feedback they received from other nodes. The results of technique evaluation
varied depending on the weights assigned for direct and indirect trust, thresh-
old value, and the default starting network trust for nodes. The best setting
chosen for the weights showed a high malicious node detection accuracy with
no false positive rates, and a decrease in the packet dropping rate with time.
• The encounter rate, direct, indirect, and meeting trust, and reputation: In chap-
ter 5, a selective or complete packet modification/integrity attacks were de-
tected which were performed by malicious nodes that acted malicious at times,
and non-malicious at other times (‘on/off’ attacks). In this technique, when a
source node creates a message, it constructs a Merkle tree from the packets,
and embeds more than half of the tree hashes in the packets headers. When a
node receives the packets; it constructs a new Merkle tree from the received
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packets and compares the hashes with the embedded hashes. Using an ef-
ficient algorithm, the receiving node is able to authenticate each packet and
detect any modified packets. This works in the case where only some packets
are modified, but if all of the packets are modified, and the malicious node has
modified all the embedded hashes as well, then the receiving node won’t be
able to detect the modified packets. This is where trust and reputation plays
a very important role. Although, it is most likely that a malicious node that
modifies all the packets and the embedded hashes be detected in future paths;
an algorithm was designed to allow nodes to check the leaf hashes with source
nodes. The algorithm is efficient and conditional so only messages that need
to be checked are checked, the outcome is used to update the meeting trust.
The direct trust is derived from the selective modification attack detection re-
sults, if a selective modification attack is detected, the direct trust for the node
forwarding the packets drops below the threshold value and can no longer in-
crease. If no selective modification attack is detected, the direct trust for the
node forwarding the message is updated based on the encounter rate over a
time period. So the higher the encounter rate with a legitimate node, the higher
the update value for the direct trust. Indirect trust is updated when a node
receives feedback from a node about other nodes, the feedback is always eval-
uated before it is updated into the reputation table of the node receiving the
feedback. The reputation value is computed from direct, indirect, and meeting
trust. The reputation value automatically changes when any of the trust values
change. A node can check the reputation value in its reputation table of a tar-
get node before it decides to trust it. The evaluation results for the technique
showed a high malicious node detection accuracy with no false positive rates,
and a decrease in the packet modification rate over time.
Trust and reputation are found to be excellent attributes to secure OppNets be-
cause they allowed nodes make the correct routing decisions.
When evaluating each technique, extensive evaluations were conducted to find
the best weight (where applicable) for the direct, indirect, meeting trust, threshold,
default starting network trust, and the update trust value. Each point on all the pre-
sented graphs were an average of 30 simulation runs. The simulator used for all
techniques is the ONE simulator, and C++ was used as the programming language to
program all the techniques.
The proposed techniques were also tested using Epidemic and PRoPHET routing,
and found PRoPHET to give slightly better results because of the conditions it used
to make routing decisions.
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Further evaluations were conducted for the above techniques to show a study on
how mobility speed and storage could impact the malicious node detection accu-
racy. The results indicated that storage played a more important role than mobility
speed, because larger storage allowed nodes to carry more information, store more
messages, and accept new messages. It had been noted that storage was important
when dealing with packet dropping attacks. When working with packet modifica-
tion attacks however, storage and mobility gave the same results for the malicious
node detection accuracy. This was because the technique proposed in chapter 5 was
refined so that it was able to detect malicious nodes even if they didn’t occur many
times in paths due to their slow speed or small buffers.
For the techniques presented in this thesis, a demonstration of how Epidemic and
PRoPHET routing performed in the ONE simulator using the same simulation set-
tings defined in each chapter was shown. How both protocols performed with each
of the proposed techniques was shown. Results showed how the presented tech-
niques could protect the completeness and integrity of packets in an OppNet, and
have shown the importance level of a trust/reputation system in an OppNet.
6.2 Discussion
OppNets are prone to different attacks including packet dropping and modification
attacks, both attacks damage the message and breaches the completeness and in-
tegrity of the message. When an unauthenticated message reaches its destination,
the data its carrying is altered with, making the message useless to its destination.
Transferring altered messages across the network consumes a lot of the network’s
resources and degrades its performance. As data flows in the network, some packets
may be lost for malicious reasons, or non-malicious reasons like the expiry of the
packet’s life, or not enough storage on the node’s device. Using dynamic trust, this
issue has been addressed where nodes had chances to prove themselves legitimate in
alternative paths. Further, selective modification attacks were addressed where some
of the packets were modified by the malicious node. Complete modification attacks
were addressed where the malicious node modified all of the packets. In addition to
that, the case when the malicious node performed a malicious act at times, and at
other times, it didn’t (an ‘on/off’ attack) was also addressed. Not much research had
been invested in considering ‘on/off’ packet modification attacks for modifying the
whole message with all of the packets, and specifically in OppNets.
In this thesis, an aim to develop a secure OppNet model that protected the net-
work from packet dropping and modification/integrity attacks was developed. The
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model was designed to detect selective packet dropping attacks, selective or com-
plete ‘on/off’ packet modification attacks, malicious paths, and malicious nodes in a
network. To achieve this aim, the proposed model started with a simple solution then
developed it until the model was ready to meet the aim of this thesis.
Chapter 3 started with a model that allowed destination nodes to detect selective
packet dropping attacks using just the Merkle root, and based on the results, des-
tination nodes would build path trust for the nodes that participated in forwarding
the message in a given path. The results of malicious node detection gave good re-
sults, and the model was performing what it was designed to do. However, using this
technique, some nodes could be falsely identified as malicious if they always accom-
panied malicious nodes in malicious paths. This happened because only destination
nodes checked for selective packet dropping attacks, so when a destination node de-
tected the attack it didn’t know which node in the path had performed the attack, so it
built path trust based on the results. Also, in this technique, using the Merkle root by
itself did not give lots of information about the attack such as the number of dropped
packets, and whether the attack was a dropping or modification attack.
The model was enhanced in chapter 4 to allow each node in the network to be in
charge of detecting a selective packet dropping attack. This improved the network
performance since nodes stopped the transmission process for any messages detected
to be incomplete. Using the number of Merkle tree hashes to detect the number
of dropped packets had allowed the system to record the packet dropping rate over
time which was decreasing, this was a sign that the model was functioning as it
was supposed to be. Also, in this chapter, the model incorporated reputation, which
allowed nodes to propagate feedback about other nodes. This increased the malicious
node detection rate as presented in graphs.
The model was improved further in chapter 5 to deal with malicious nodes that
modify the packet rather than drop it. The model dealt with smarter malicious nodes
that may attempt to modify all of the packets and embed new hashes, making it
harder for intermediate nodes to detect this attack. Using the static feature for the
direct trust was useful in this chapter because with packet modification attacks the
malicious node had no intention but to be malicious, using static direct trust was
useful in dealing with ‘on/off’ attacks. Using the encounter rate to update the direct
trust gave a fair result, using trust created from meeting with source nodes had refined
the malicious node detection accuracy. Overall, the results from this chapter were
accurate.
A summary of features for chapters 3, 4, and 5 is shown in figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1: Establishing trust relationships and secure channels in OppNets
6.3 Future Work
After presenting the proposed research thesis, and although the proposed trust-reputation
based techniques presented in this thesis were designed to work with any trust man-
agement scheme that provides a trust or reputation values between 0.0 and 1.0, and
defines a threshold value that is used to determine good nodes from malicious ones,
maintains static or dynamic trust, and implements any protocol, the proposed tech-
niques can be improved, and for future work the following are considered:
• The proposed algorithms were tested in Epidemic and PRoPHET routing. It
would be interesting to run further tests and implement the algorithms with
other OppNet protocols to see how the results compare. In addition to Epi-
demic and PRoPHET routing, the ONE simulator also includes Direct Deliv-
ery, First Contact, MaxProp, Spray and Wait, and Bubble RAP.
• To combine all the presented techniques and make one complete model that
can detect both selective packet dropping and selective or complete ‘on/off’
modification attacks. Trust can be updated based on the detected attack. Dy-
namic direct trust could be assigned for detecting packet dropping attacks to
give nodes a chance to prove that they have not dropped the packets for mali-
cious purposes. Static direct trust could be assigned for detecting packet mod-
ification attacks, because the intention behind the attack is clearly malicious.
• Embedding the complete model into an OppNet routing protocol like PRoPHET
or one that shows the best results and best efficiency (from the first step) is an
excellent way to propose a secure OppNet trust/reputation based routing pro-
tocol with full embedded features designed to protect the network from packet
dropping and modification attacks.
• The proposed trust-reputation techniques can also be applied to newly emerg-
ing technologies such as pocket switched networks, vehicular ad-hoc networks
or intelligent transportation systems, and Internet of things.
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Appendix A
Complete Results for Chapter 4
For each variation, the results are presented in the order:
1. Malicious node detection accuracy
2. Malicious node detection false positive rate
3. Packet dropping rate
A.1 Variation 1: Varying the threshold Value
A.1.1 Threshold = 0.1, Default Starting Network Value = 0.5, Up-
date Trust Value by = 0.1
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A.2.1 Threshold = 0.2, Default Starting Network Value = 0.4, Up-
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A.3 Variation 3: Varying the Default Starting Net-
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A.4 Variation 4: Varying the Update Trust Value with
a Default Starting Network Value = 0.4
A.4.1 Threshold = 0.3, Default Starting Network Value = 0.4, Up-
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A.5 Variation 5: Varying the Update Trust Value with
a Default Starting Network Value = 0.5
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Complete Results for Chapter 5
For each variation, the results are presented in the order:
1. Malicious path detection accuracy
2. Malicious path detection false positive rate
3. Packet modification detection accuracy
4. Packet modification rate
5. Malicious node detection accuracy
6. Malicious node detection false positive rate
B.1 Variation 1: Varying the threshold Value with a
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B.1.1 Threshold = 0.2, Default Starting Network Value = 0.4
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